ILNews

Mom may be liable for daughter's accident

Back to TopE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

The Indiana Court of Appeals judges agreed that a mother may possibly be liable for her daughter’s accident in which she struck a pedestrian with her car after drinking and talking on her cell phone at the time of the accident. The judges didn’t completely agree as to why the mother may be liable.

In Jerry Coleman Buchanan, by his father and guardian, Odell Buchanan v. Candice L. Vowell, Shannon Vowell, et al., No. 49A02-0909-CV-873, Jerry Buchanan sued Shannon Vowell for damages after her daughter, Candice, hit him while driving under the influence and while talking on her cell phone to her mother. Candice and Shannon left work at Brad’s Gold Club, where Candice drank the alcohol. Shannon followed Candice home in her own car and called Candice on the phone before the accident.

Buchanan suffered permanent brain damage and fractures from the accident. He alleged that Shannon knew Candice was intoxicated and should have known talking to her on the cell phone would further impair or distract Candice. He claimed she was liable under Restatement (Second) of Torts Sections 324A and 319. The trial court granted Shannon’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted.

On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal, but disagreed as to which Restatement (Second) of Torts applied. Senior Judge Betty Barteau and Judge Patricia Riley found Restatement (Second) of Torts Sections 324A, 315, and 876 to be relevant. The Court of Appeals has held as a general rule that under the gratuitous undertaking concept defined in Section 324A, someone other than a driver isn’t liable for damages caused by the negligent acts of the driver unless that person has a special relationship that gives him the right to control the vehicle. In this case, Shannon didn’t try to stop her daughter from driving but assisted her by letting her drive and then trying to give her directions over the phone, noted Senior Judge Barteau. In addition, other jurisdictions have held that gratuitous undertakings concerning drivers may result in liability to someone other than the person who injured the party.

The majority also cited Illinois cases that addressed this issue under Section 876, which provides a person is liable for tortious conduct if he or she does a tortious act in concert with the other person. The judges ruled that Shannon agreed to enter into a concerted activity whereby she would follow her drunken daughter and distract or direct her by talking to her on the phone.

“Furthermore, we note that Shannon owed a duty of reasonable care to those that shared the road with her, both motorists and pedestrians,” wrote Senior Judge Barteau. “Shannon, as an individual, may have breached this duty by calling and distracting a person she knew was operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.”

Judge Nancy Vaidik, in a separate concurring-in-result opinion, believed that only Section 876 applied.

“Given our duty to review a ruling on a motion to dismiss by looking at the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-movant with every reasonable inference construed in the non-movant’s favor, I believe that under these allegations, Shannon could conceivably be liable for aiding or encouraging Candice’s driving while intoxicated and leaving the scene of an accident,” she wrote.

Judge Vaidik also disagreed with the majority’s comments about the cell phone conversation. She didn’t believe merely calling someone on the phone knowing the person is driving and intoxicated constitutes a tortious act on its own.
 

ADVERTISEMENT

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

ADVERTISEMENT