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No abuse by trial court in modifying maintenance payment terms

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The Indiana Court of Appeals held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a man’s petition to revoke spousal maintenance.

Michael Palmby agreed in May 2008 to pay his wife, Karen Palmby, $1,500 a month for two years as part of their divorce agreement. They had been married nearly 27 years and Karen Palmby mainly stayed home with their three children during the course of their marriage. The spousal maintenance was to help Karen Palmby obtain any training to reenter the workforce.

But Michael Palmby ended up paying about $12,000 because he lost significant income due to the housing downturn in 2008 and 2009. He was a Realtor making $120,000 when they divorced; he quit real estate and started working at a call center in 2013 making $50,000. Instead of using the money for work training, Karen Palmby used it to pay medical bills after she broke her arm. She obtained employment at a department store during the pendency of the divorce and has since received a promotion.

In 2013, she sought to recover the remaining money owed; Michael Palmby sought to end the maintenance because of a substantial and continuing change in his circumstances. The trial court decided that Michael Palmby should have $200 per paycheck garnished to pay for the spousal maintenance.

The Court of Appeals found that because the settlement agreement rested on a ground on which the trial court could have ordered the maintenance in the absence of an agreement, the trial court had the authority to modify the instant agreement with respect to rehabilitative maintenance.

The judges noted that Michael Palmby didn’t request a modification based on a substantial and continuing change in circumstances in December 2009 when he entered into an agreement acknowledging he was in contempt for failure to make the payments and had 10 percent of his paycheck garnished until the amount was paid in full.

“Mindful of the ‘great restraint’ which we should exercise in reviewing settlement agreements, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Michael’s request to revoke the spousal maintenance and instead modified the payment terms of the accumulated rehabilitative maintenance,” Judge Patricia Riley wrote in Michael W. Palmby v. Karen M Palmby, 32A04-1310-DR-506.

 

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  1. First comment on this thread is a fitting final comment on this thread, as that the MCBA never answered Duncan's fine question, and now even Eric Holder agrees that the MCBA was in material error as to the facts: "I don't get it" from Duncan December 1, 2014 5:10 PM "The Grand Jury met for 25 days and heard 70 hours of testimony according to this article and they made a decision that no crime occurred. On what basis does the MCBA conclude that their decision was "unjust"? What special knowledge or evidence does the MCBA have that the Grand Jury hearing this matter was unaware of? The system that we as lawyers are sworn to uphold made a decision that there was insufficient proof that officer committed a crime. How can any of us say we know better what was right than the jury that actually heard all of the the evidence in this case."

  2. wow is this a bunch of bs! i know the facts!

  3. MCBA .... time for a new release about your entire membership (or is it just the alter ego) being "saddened and disappointed" in the failure to lynch a police officer protecting himself in the line of duty. But this time against Eric Holder and the Federal Bureau of Investigation: "WASHINGTON — Justice Department lawyers will recommend that no civil rights charges be brought against the police officer who fatally shot an unarmed teenager in Ferguson, Mo., after an F.B.I. investigation found no evidence to support charges, law enforcement officials said Wednesday." http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/22/us/justice-department-ferguson-civil-rights-darren-wilson.html?ref=us&_r=0

  4. Dr wail asfour lives 3 hours from the hospital,where if he gets an emergency at least he needs three hours,while even if he is on call he should be in a location where it gives him max 10 minutes to be beside the patient,they get paid double on their on call days ,where look how they handle it,so if the death of the patient occurs on weekend and these doctors still repeat same pattern such issue should be raised,they should be closer to the patient.on other hand if all the death occured on the absence of the Dr and the nurses handle it,the nurses should get trained how to function appearntly they not that good,if the Dr lives 3 hours far from the hospital on his call days he should sleep in the hospital

  5. It's a capital offense...one for you Latin scholars..

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