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Officer safety justified opening ajar car door

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The opening of an ajar car door by a police officer during a foot chase with a suspected robber didn't violate the man's federal or state constitutional rights, the Indiana Court of Appeals concluded today.

In Joshua P. Lindsey v. State of Indiana, No. 29A02-0902-CR-196, the appellate court determined that the exigent circumstance of officer safety justified Officer Charles Kruse's opening wider Joshua Lindsey's car door and visually inspecting the interior to make sure no one else was in the car. Lindsey left the driver's side door slightly ajar.

Kruse saw Lindsey run into a CVS, brandish a weapon, and then quickly leave the store running in the direction of his car. A thorough search of the car wasn't performed until a search warrant was obtained and Lindsey was in custody. He moved to suppress the evidence found in the car, claiming Kruse's actions violated his constitutional rights. The trial court denied his motion.

"Officer Kruse merely opened wider a door that was already ajar to look inside the car based on a reasonable belief that an armed accomplice might be inside. Any expectation of privacy Lindsey had in his car was surely reduced when he parked his car in a public lot with the door ajar and the key in the ignition," wrote Judge Nancy Vaidik.

The officer's actions were also reasonable under the Indiana Constitution, based on Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005). Kruse had a high degree of suspicion that Lindsey had just violated the law because he saw Lindsey go into the CVS with a weapon. The degree of intrusion of his quick inspection of the car was minimal and he performed the search based on law enforcement safety, wrote the judge.

Lindsey also challenged the removal of juror No. 37 for cause, and in denying his Baston challenge to the state's preemptory strike of juror No. 10. The jurors in question and Lindsey are African-American.

The trial court didn't err in striking juror No. 37 because he answered it would be hard for him to be fair and impartial to the state because of past experiences he had with police, the appellate court concluded. The trial court also didn't err in denying Lindsey's Baston challenge because the state proved it removed juror No. 10 for race-neutral reasons. In addition, juror No. 5, who is also African-American, was struck by Lindsey.

The Court of Appeals also affirmed Lindsey's aggregate 70-year sentence for robbery, criminal confinement, resisting law enforcement, and adjudication as a habitual offender.

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  1. Indianapolis employers harassment among minorities AFRICAN Americans needs to be discussed the metro Indianapolis area is horrible when it comes to harassing African American employees especially in the local healthcare facilities. Racially profiling in the workplace is an major issue. Please make it better because I'm many civil rights leaders would come here and justify that Indiana is a state the WORKS only applies to Caucasian Americans especially in Hamilton county. Indiana targets African Americans in the workplace so when governor pence is trying to convince people to vote for him this would be awesome publicity for the Presidency Elections.

  2. Wishing Mary Willis only God's best, and superhuman strength, as she attempts to right a ship that too often strays far off course. May she never suffer this personal affect, as some do who attempt to change a broken system: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QojajMsd2nE

  3. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  4. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  5. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

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