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Officer safety justified opening ajar car door

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The opening of an ajar car door by a police officer during a foot chase with a suspected robber didn't violate the man's federal or state constitutional rights, the Indiana Court of Appeals concluded today.

In Joshua P. Lindsey v. State of Indiana, No. 29A02-0902-CR-196, the appellate court determined that the exigent circumstance of officer safety justified Officer Charles Kruse's opening wider Joshua Lindsey's car door and visually inspecting the interior to make sure no one else was in the car. Lindsey left the driver's side door slightly ajar.

Kruse saw Lindsey run into a CVS, brandish a weapon, and then quickly leave the store running in the direction of his car. A thorough search of the car wasn't performed until a search warrant was obtained and Lindsey was in custody. He moved to suppress the evidence found in the car, claiming Kruse's actions violated his constitutional rights. The trial court denied his motion.

"Officer Kruse merely opened wider a door that was already ajar to look inside the car based on a reasonable belief that an armed accomplice might be inside. Any expectation of privacy Lindsey had in his car was surely reduced when he parked his car in a public lot with the door ajar and the key in the ignition," wrote Judge Nancy Vaidik.

The officer's actions were also reasonable under the Indiana Constitution, based on Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005). Kruse had a high degree of suspicion that Lindsey had just violated the law because he saw Lindsey go into the CVS with a weapon. The degree of intrusion of his quick inspection of the car was minimal and he performed the search based on law enforcement safety, wrote the judge.

Lindsey also challenged the removal of juror No. 37 for cause, and in denying his Baston challenge to the state's preemptory strike of juror No. 10. The jurors in question and Lindsey are African-American.

The trial court didn't err in striking juror No. 37 because he answered it would be hard for him to be fair and impartial to the state because of past experiences he had with police, the appellate court concluded. The trial court also didn't err in denying Lindsey's Baston challenge because the state proved it removed juror No. 10 for race-neutral reasons. In addition, juror No. 5, who is also African-American, was struck by Lindsey.

The Court of Appeals also affirmed Lindsey's aggregate 70-year sentence for robbery, criminal confinement, resisting law enforcement, and adjudication as a habitual offender.

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  1. Just an aside, but regardless of the outcome, I 'm proud of Judge William Hughes. He was the original magistrate on the Home place issue. He ruled for Home Place, and was primaried by Brainard for it. Their tool Poindexter failed to unseat Hughes, who won support for his honesty and courage throughout the county, and he was reelected Judge of Hamilton County's Superior Court. You can still stand for something and survive. Thanks, Judge Hughes!

  2. CCHP's real accomplishment is the 2015 law signed by Gov Pence that basically outlaws any annexation that is forced where a 65% majority of landowners in the affected area disagree. Regardless of whether HP wins or loses, the citizens of Indiana will not have another fiasco like this. The law Gov Pence signed is a direct result of this malgovernance.

  3. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  4. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  5. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

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