The opening of an ajar car door by a police officer during a foot chase with a suspected robber didn't violate the man's
federal or state constitutional rights, the Indiana Court of Appeals concluded today.
In Joshua P. Lindsey v. State of Indiana, No. 29A02-0902-CR-196, the appellate court determined that the exigent
circumstance of officer safety justified Officer Charles Kruse's opening wider Joshua Lindsey's car door and visually
inspecting the interior to make sure no one else was in the car. Lindsey left the driver's side door slightly ajar.
Kruse saw Lindsey run into a CVS, brandish a weapon, and then quickly leave the store running in the direction of his car.
A thorough search of the car wasn't performed until a search warrant was obtained and Lindsey was in custody. He moved
to suppress the evidence found in the car, claiming Kruse's actions violated his constitutional rights. The trial court
denied his motion.
"Officer Kruse merely opened wider a door that was already ajar to look inside the car based on a reasonable belief
that an armed accomplice might be inside. Any expectation of privacy Lindsey had in his car was surely reduced when he parked
his car in a public lot with the door ajar and the key in the ignition," wrote Judge Nancy Vaidik.
The officer's actions were also reasonable under the Indiana Constitution, based on Litchfield v. State, 824
N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005). Kruse had a high degree of suspicion that Lindsey had just violated the law because he saw Lindsey
go into the CVS with a weapon. The degree of intrusion of his quick inspection of the car was minimal and he performed the
search based on law enforcement safety, wrote the judge.
Lindsey also challenged the removal of juror No. 37 for cause, and in denying his Baston challenge to the state's preemptory
strike of juror No. 10. The jurors in question and Lindsey are African-American.
The trial court didn't err in striking juror No. 37 because he answered it would be hard for him to be fair and impartial
to the state because of past experiences he had with police, the appellate court concluded. The trial court also didn't
err in denying Lindsey's Baston challenge because the state proved it removed juror No. 10 for race-neutral reasons. In
addition, juror No. 5, who is also African-American, was struck by Lindsey.
The Court of Appeals also affirmed Lindsey's aggregate 70-year sentence for robbery, criminal confinement, resisting
law enforcement, and adjudication as a habitual offender.














Never heard of remand to another state. How often does that happen?
I highly recommend Deanna and her team of professionals that serve the legal community. Great information and many thanks for sharing.
they are pushing these cases against lawyers too far. thought-crime.
vagueness cannot challenged, so let's write all laws vaguely and throw the constitution out the window.Even if the court is operating under a particular law, if they don't it they will change it to their liking. What a joke!!!
Two convictions becomes one conviction with exactly the same sentence, only it is not clear wheter or not that sentence will be 18 months, 120 months or 138 months. Actually if the guns were in a home, whether or not they were his, he is protected under the 2nd amendment. Jurors need to learn the law and the constitution before judging others. The cour5ts need to do this as well.