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Opinions Aug. 16, 2011

August 16, 2011
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The following opinion was posted after IL deadline Monday:

7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Blanca Gomez and Joan Wagner-Barnett v. St. Vincent Health Inc.
10-2379
U.S. District Court, Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, Judge Sarah Evans Barker.
Civil. Affirms District Court’s decision to not certify the class, not to award statutory penalties, and the amount of damages awarded to Barnett in the proposed class action seeking damages from and statutory penalties against St. Vincent for violating the notice provisions regarding extending health care coverage after ending employment. The District Court didn’t err in awarding Barnett $396 in damages pursuant to U.S.C. Section 1132(c)(1) or in finding the proposed counsel inadequate to represent the class.

Today’s opinions:
Indiana Supreme Court had posted no opinions at IL deadline.


7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Lady Di’s, Inc. v. Enhanced Services Billing, Inc., and ILD Telecomunications, doing business as ILD Teleservices, Inc.
10-3903
U.S. District Court, Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, Judge Sarah Evans Barker.
Civil. Affirms District Court’s denial of plaintiff’s request for class certification and grant of the defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the unjust enrichment and statutory deception claims, holding Indiana “anti-cramming” regulation does not apply to the defendants because they are not telephone companies and did not act in this case as billing agents for telephone companies.

Indiana Court of Appeals
Gordon B. Dempsey v. Dept. of Metropolitan Development
49A02-1102-MI-165
Miscellaneous. Reverses trial court’s dismissal of Dempsey’s appeal, holding that because he paid a fine under protest to avoid a tax sale, his appeal is not moot. Remands to the trial court with instructions that it determine whether a fine was warranted.

Murat Temple Association, Inc. v. Live Nation Worldwide, et al.
49A02-1008-PL-952
Civil plenary. Affirms trial court’s dismissal of Murat Temple Association’s claim for tortious interference with a contractual relationship.

Harrion Dixon v. State of Indiana (NFP)
49A02-1101-CR-35
Criminal. Affirms conviction of Class B misdemeanor public intoxication.

Jeffrey L. Turnmire v. State of Indiana (NFP)
03A01-1101-CR-41
Criminal. Affirms aggregate sentence of Class C felony operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated causing serious bodily injury and Class D felony operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator.

Steven Young v. State of Indiana (NFP)
49A02-1012-CR-1326
Criminal. Affirms convictions of Class D felony theft and Class D felony pointing a firearm.

Kurt St. Angelo v. State of Indiana (NFP)
51A01-1105-IF-189
Infraction. Affirms trial court’s judgment that St. Angelo committed a Class C infraction of speeding.

Michael S. Fahlbeck v. Bryan Bucklen, et al. (NFP)
20A03-1102-PL-54
Civil plenary. Affirms trial court’s award of attorney fees to Bucklen, et. al., holding that Fahlbeck waived his argument on appeal because it was not properly asserted at the trial court level.

Winfred Jefferson v. State of Indiana (NFP)
02A05-1103-CR-191
Criminal. Affirms sentence following guilty plea to Class D felony theft.

Jose Cruz v. State of Indiana (NFP)
49A02-1012-CR-1343
Criminal. Affirms conviction of Class C felony child molesting.

Johnny Joe Olinger v. State of Indiana (NFP)
83A01-1012-CR-668
Criminal. Affirms sentence for Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct.

Kenny Mong v. State of Indiana (NFP)
89A01-1012-CR-662
Criminal. Reverses sentence for two counts Class A felony dealing in cocaine, finding the sentence is inappropriate in light of the offense and character of the offender and that the trial court’s statements at sentencing conflicted with the sentence imposed.

Term. of Parent-Child Rel. of N.D.; H.D. and D.D. v. I.D.C.S. (NFP)
40A05-1101-JT-17
Juvenile termination of parental rights. Affirms termination of parental rights for mother and father.

Cartier D. Tasby v. State of Indiana (NFP)
27A05-1010-CR-710
Criminal. Affirms convictions of Class D felony residential entry, Class D felony theft, and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.

Purl Robert Silk III v. State of Indiana (NFP)
20A04-1008-CR-584
Criminal. Affirms the trial court’s denial of Silk’s petition to file a belated notice of appeal, holding that Silk was not diligent in requesting permission to file a belated notice of appeal.

Indiana Tax Court had posted no opinions at IL deadline.
 

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  1. I need an experienced attorney to handle a breach of contract matter. Kindly respond for more details. Graham Young

  2. I thought the slurs were the least grave aspects of her misconduct, since they had nothing to do with her being on the bench. Why then do I suspect they were the focus? I find this a troubling trend. At least she was allowed to keep her law license.

  3. Section 6 of Article I of the Indiana Constitution is pretty clear and unequivocal: "Section 6. No money shall be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any religious or theological institution."

  4. Video pen? Nice work, "JW"! Let this be a lesson and a caution to all disgruntled ex-spouses (or soon-to-be ex-spouses) . . . you may think that altercation is going to get you some satisfaction . . . it will not.

  5. First comment on this thread is a fitting final comment on this thread, as that the MCBA never answered Duncan's fine question, and now even Eric Holder agrees that the MCBA was in material error as to the facts: "I don't get it" from Duncan December 1, 2014 5:10 PM "The Grand Jury met for 25 days and heard 70 hours of testimony according to this article and they made a decision that no crime occurred. On what basis does the MCBA conclude that their decision was "unjust"? What special knowledge or evidence does the MCBA have that the Grand Jury hearing this matter was unaware of? The system that we as lawyers are sworn to uphold made a decision that there was insufficient proof that officer committed a crime. How can any of us say we know better what was right than the jury that actually heard all of the the evidence in this case."

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