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Opinions Aug. 16, 2011

August 16, 2011
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The following opinion was posted after IL deadline Monday:

7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Blanca Gomez and Joan Wagner-Barnett v. St. Vincent Health Inc.
10-2379
U.S. District Court, Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, Judge Sarah Evans Barker.
Civil. Affirms District Court’s decision to not certify the class, not to award statutory penalties, and the amount of damages awarded to Barnett in the proposed class action seeking damages from and statutory penalties against St. Vincent for violating the notice provisions regarding extending health care coverage after ending employment. The District Court didn’t err in awarding Barnett $396 in damages pursuant to U.S.C. Section 1132(c)(1) or in finding the proposed counsel inadequate to represent the class.

Today’s opinions:
Indiana Supreme Court had posted no opinions at IL deadline.


7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Lady Di’s, Inc. v. Enhanced Services Billing, Inc., and ILD Telecomunications, doing business as ILD Teleservices, Inc.
10-3903
U.S. District Court, Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, Judge Sarah Evans Barker.
Civil. Affirms District Court’s denial of plaintiff’s request for class certification and grant of the defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the unjust enrichment and statutory deception claims, holding Indiana “anti-cramming” regulation does not apply to the defendants because they are not telephone companies and did not act in this case as billing agents for telephone companies.

Indiana Court of Appeals
Gordon B. Dempsey v. Dept. of Metropolitan Development
49A02-1102-MI-165
Miscellaneous. Reverses trial court’s dismissal of Dempsey’s appeal, holding that because he paid a fine under protest to avoid a tax sale, his appeal is not moot. Remands to the trial court with instructions that it determine whether a fine was warranted.

Murat Temple Association, Inc. v. Live Nation Worldwide, et al.
49A02-1008-PL-952
Civil plenary. Affirms trial court’s dismissal of Murat Temple Association’s claim for tortious interference with a contractual relationship.

Harrion Dixon v. State of Indiana (NFP)
49A02-1101-CR-35
Criminal. Affirms conviction of Class B misdemeanor public intoxication.

Jeffrey L. Turnmire v. State of Indiana (NFP)
03A01-1101-CR-41
Criminal. Affirms aggregate sentence of Class C felony operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated causing serious bodily injury and Class D felony operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator.

Steven Young v. State of Indiana (NFP)
49A02-1012-CR-1326
Criminal. Affirms convictions of Class D felony theft and Class D felony pointing a firearm.

Kurt St. Angelo v. State of Indiana (NFP)
51A01-1105-IF-189
Infraction. Affirms trial court’s judgment that St. Angelo committed a Class C infraction of speeding.

Michael S. Fahlbeck v. Bryan Bucklen, et al. (NFP)
20A03-1102-PL-54
Civil plenary. Affirms trial court’s award of attorney fees to Bucklen, et. al., holding that Fahlbeck waived his argument on appeal because it was not properly asserted at the trial court level.

Winfred Jefferson v. State of Indiana (NFP)
02A05-1103-CR-191
Criminal. Affirms sentence following guilty plea to Class D felony theft.

Jose Cruz v. State of Indiana (NFP)
49A02-1012-CR-1343
Criminal. Affirms conviction of Class C felony child molesting.

Johnny Joe Olinger v. State of Indiana (NFP)
83A01-1012-CR-668
Criminal. Affirms sentence for Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct.

Kenny Mong v. State of Indiana (NFP)
89A01-1012-CR-662
Criminal. Reverses sentence for two counts Class A felony dealing in cocaine, finding the sentence is inappropriate in light of the offense and character of the offender and that the trial court’s statements at sentencing conflicted with the sentence imposed.

Term. of Parent-Child Rel. of N.D.; H.D. and D.D. v. I.D.C.S. (NFP)
40A05-1101-JT-17
Juvenile termination of parental rights. Affirms termination of parental rights for mother and father.

Cartier D. Tasby v. State of Indiana (NFP)
27A05-1010-CR-710
Criminal. Affirms convictions of Class D felony residential entry, Class D felony theft, and Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.

Purl Robert Silk III v. State of Indiana (NFP)
20A04-1008-CR-584
Criminal. Affirms the trial court’s denial of Silk’s petition to file a belated notice of appeal, holding that Silk was not diligent in requesting permission to file a belated notice of appeal.

Indiana Tax Court had posted no opinions at IL deadline.
 

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  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

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