ILNews

Opinions Feb. 13, 2014

February 13, 2014
Keywords
Back to TopE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

Indiana Supreme Court
Brian Yost v. Wabash College, Phi Kappa Psi Fraternity- Indiana Gamma Chapter at Wabash College, Phi Kappa Psi Fraternity, Inc., and Nathan Cravens
54S01-1303-CT-161
Civil tort. Reverses grant of summary judgment for the campus fraternity but affirms summary judgment for the college and national fraternity organization in the personal injury action brought by a fraternity pledge seeking damages for injuries sustained in an incident at the Phi Kappa Psi fraternity house. Holds that the designated evidence shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that Wabash College and the national fraternity, Phi Kappa Psi Fraternity, Inc., are each entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, but that as to the local fraternity, Phi Kappa Psi Fraternity – Indiana Gamma Chapter at Wabash College, there remain genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment. Justice Rucker concurs in part and dissents in part. Remands for further proceedings.

Indiana Court of Appeals
State of Indiana, acting on behalf of the Indiana Family & Social Services Administration v. International Business Machines Corporation
49A02-1211-PL-875
Civil plenary. Reverses finding that there was no material breach by IBM, but affirms award of $40 million in assignment fees and $9,510,795 in equipment fees to IBM. Affirms the trial court’s denial of deferred fees to IBM, reverses the trial court’s award of $2,570,621 in early termination close out payments and $10,632,333 in prejudgment interest to IBM, and remands the case to the trial court to determine the amount of fees IBM is entitled to for Change Orders 119 and 133. Remands the case to the trial court to determine the state’s damages for IBM’s material breach of the contract and to offset any damages awarded to IBM. Judge Friedlander concurs in part and dissents in part.

Wendy Thompson v. State of Indiana
61A01-1305-CR-207
Criminal. Affirms convictions and seven-year consecutive sentence for four counts of Class D felony operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration of at least 0.08 causing serious bodily injury. This Class D felony is a “crime of violence” within the meaning of I.C. 35-5-1-2(a), so her sentence does not exceed the maximum allowable under the consecutive-sentencing statute. Finds her sentence appropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and her character.

Rodregus Morgan v. State of Indiana
49A02-1304-CR-386
Criminal. Reverses conviction of Class B misdemeanor public intoxication. Holds the challenged portion of Indiana’s public intoxication statute is unconstitutionally vague as it neither requires that a defendant specifically intended to annoy another, nor does it employ an objective standard to assess whether a defendant’s conduct would be annoying to a reasonable person. Affirms conviction of Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct.

Larry Edward Flick v. Jewell Reuter
47A01-1303-PL-135
Civil plenary. Reverses summary judgment for Reuter on claims of adverse possession, prescriptive easement and trespass. Reuter is unable to prove she paid taxes on the land since 1988. Affirms awarding her nearly $30,000 in damages caused by Flick in his attempts to evict her from the land he purchased in a foreclosure sale.

Detrick L. Brown v. State of Indiana (NFP)
02A05-1309-CR-455
Criminal. Affirms conviction of Class C felony carrying a handgun without a license.

Duane Fry v. State of Indiana (NFP)
49A02-1306-CR-544
Criminal. Affirms convictions of Class B felony burglary and Class A misdemeanor criminal mischief.

Elgin Lamont Hoyle v. State of Indiana (NFP)
45A04-1307-CR-363
Criminal. Affirms sentence following guilty plea to Class B felony dealing in a narcotic drug.

Andrew T. Stout v. State of Indiana (NFP)
62A01-1305-CR-222
Criminal. Affirms denial of motion to withdraw guilty pleas for Class B felony burglary and Class D felony theft.

Wabash County Hospital Foundation, Inc. d/b/a Wabash County Hospital and Carole Riley v. Hai Lee (NFP)
85A04-1306-CT-291
Civil tort. Affirms denial of appellants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Charles Poling v. Property Owners Insurance Company (NFP)
27A02-1307-PL-585
Civil plenary. Affirms denial of Poling’s request to amend his complaint for a second time and dismissal of the Poling’s lawsuit.

The Indiana Tax Court posted no opinions by IL deadline. The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals posted no Indiana decisions by IL deadline.

 

ADVERTISEMENT

Sponsored by

facebook - twitter on Facebook & Twitter

Indiana State Bar Association

Indianapolis Bar Association

Evansville Bar Association

Allen County Bar Association

Indiana Lawyer on Facebook

facebook
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

ADVERTISEMENT