Opinions July 3, 2013

July 3, 2013
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The following Indiana Supreme Court opinion was posted after IL deadline Tuesday:

Michael Chambers v. State of Indiana
Criminal. Reverses Court of Appeals ruling reducing an aggregate sentence for two convictions of Class B felony sexual misconduct with a minor and reinstates a trial court’s maximum consecutive sentence of 40 years in prison. Justices held the sentence imposed by the trial court was not inappropriate given the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant and did not warrant appellate revision.

Wednesday’s opinions
7th Circuit Court of Appeals
United States of America v. Ronald Ritz
U.S. District Court, Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, Judge William T. Lawrence.
Civil. Dismisses Ritz’s appeal of the grant of summary judgment in favor of the government that Ritz’s campground is subject to the Safe Drinking Water Act and its regulations. Ritz has waived all of the new arguments he now raises for the first time on appeal by failing to present them to the District Court.

Indiana Court of Appeals
Richard Hawkins v. State of Indiana
Criminal. Affirms sentence following guilty plea to Class A felonies dealing in cocaine and possession of cocaine. Hawkins waived the right to appeal the appropriateness of his sentence.

In Re the Marriage of: Harry L. Tillman v. R. Virginia Tillman
Domestic relation. Affirms dismissal of Harry Tillman’s petition, by guardian Deborah Wagner, for dissolution of marriage. The trial court acted within its discretion when it granted R. Virginia Tillman’s motion to dismiss as neither the current Indiana statutes governing dissolution of marriage nor governing the guardianship of incapacitated persons provide a means for the guardian of an incapacitated person to file a petition for dissolution of marriage on behalf of the incapacitated person.

Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., v. Acadia Merrillville Realty, L.P. and Boyd Construction Company, Inc.
Civil tort. Reverses summary judgment for Acadia and Boyd Construction on whether the companies breached their respective duties of care after a Pier 1 customer brought a negligence claim against the three companies following a slip-and-fall. Whether Acadia discharged its duty of care merely by contracting with Boyd is a question for the jury to decide, and, because there is evidence that additional salting was necessary after Boyd salted the sidewalk, a jury could reasonably infer that Boyd failed to exercise reasonable care in performing its snow and ice removal services. Judge Brown dissents.

Booker T. Prince, Jr. v. Marion County Auditor and Marion County Treasurer
Miscellaneous. Affirms denial of Prince’s motion for relief from judgment. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the application for judgment and order for sale of his property of the Marion County auditor and treasure substantially complied with statutory requirements. The court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the officials’ notices regarding the tax sale process met the requirements of due process.

Keion Gaddie v. State of Indiana
Criminal. Reverses conviction of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. Gaddie had no duty to stop when law enforcement ordered him to do so.

Anthony Edwards v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms sentence for convictions of Class B felony burglary, Class D felony theft, seven counts of Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass, and Class B misdemeanors public intoxication, voyeurism, and failure to stop after an accident causing damage to property other than another vehicle.

Carlos A. Smith v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms conviction of Class D felony possession of marijuana with a prior conviction of possession of marijuana.

Michael G. Chamlee v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms convictions of Class A felony dealing in methamphetamine, Class B felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and Class C felony possession of chemical reagents or precursors.

Jasen M. Snelling v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms aggregate 40-year sentence following guilty plea to five counts of Class C felony offering and selling a security that was not registered, federally covered or exempt from registration; five counts of Class C felony failing to register as a broker-dealer, and nine counts of Class C felony securities fraud.

Thomas R. Tokarski and Sandra W. Tokarski v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms trial court striking of the Tokarskis’ objections and issuance of an order of appropriation and appointment of appraisers after the state sought to condemn real property owned by the couple to build I-69.

Adam J. Smith v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms revocation of probation.

Wesley Cashdollar v. State of Indiana (NFP)

Criminal. Affirms revocation of probation.

In Re: the Marriage of: William Scott Wilson v. Andrea (Wilson) Gunning (NFP)
Domestic relation. Affirms order dissolving marriage and determination of issues including division of property, attorney fees, child support and custody.

In Re: The Paternity of S.J.E-C: Clarence Cones, III v. S.J.E-C, by next friend: Tabetha J. Emenaker, and Tabetha J. Emenaker (NFP)
Juvenile. Affirms order modifying custody of the minor child in favor of mother T.E.

Kevin Govan v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms denial of motion to correct erroneous sentence.

William Temple v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Miscellaneous. Reverses order dismissing petition for writ of state habeas corpus relief following revocation of Temple’s parole. Remands with instructions to transfer the cause to the court where he was convicted and sentenced.

State of Indiana v. Mark M. Hairston (NFP)
Post conviction. Grants rehearing and concludes that Hairston’s sentence runs afoul of the protection against double jeopardy enhancements and his appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue on direct appeal amounts to ineffective assistance. Remands with instructions to vacate his 10-year repeat sexual offender enhancement and adjust his sentence accordingly.

Justin Land v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms conviction of Class B felony causing death while operating a motor vehicle.

Armando B. Quintero v. Maria L. Quintero (NFP)
Domestic relation. Affirms order with respect to the award of one-half of the value of the home and attorney fees of $8,000 to Maria Quintero. Reverses division of the full value of Armando Quintero’s pension between the parties and remands with instructions.

Corrie Tomblin v. Michael A. Tomblin (NFP)

Domestic relation. Affirms order modifying custody in the decree dissolving the Tomblins’ marriage.

Greg Haney, as Trustee of the Revocable Trust Agreement of Jay Budman Farrar Executed October 5, 1999 v. Patricia J. Farrar, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Jay B. Farrar (NFP)
Estate, unsupervised. Affirms denial of Haney’s petition to require Patricia Farrar to pay certain estate expense out of the estate as opposed to funds within the trust over which Haney was the trustee.

Joseph E. Stambaugh v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms convictions of Class C felony operation a motor vehicle after lifetime suspension of driving privileges, Class D felonies resisting law enforcement and possession of cocaine, Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana and Class B misdemeanor false informing.

Arlisha Williams v. Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development, and UPS Ground Freights, Inc. (NFP)
Agency action. Affirms denial of unemployment benefits.

Alfred Vela v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms conviction of Class A felony voluntary manslaughter.

The Indiana Supreme Court and Tax Court posted no decisions by IL deadline.


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  1. Lori, you must really love wedding cake stories like this one ... happy enuf ending for you?

  2. This new language about a warning has not been discussed at previous meetings. It's not available online. Since it must be made public knowledge before the vote, does anyone know exactly what it says? Further, this proposal was held up for 5 weeks because members Carol and Lucy insisted that all terms used be defined. So now, definitions are unnecessary and have not been inserted? Beyond these requirements, what is the logic behind giving one free pass to discriminators? Is that how laws work - break it once and that's ok? Just don't do it again? Three members of Carmel's council have done just about everything they can think of to prohibit an anti-discrimination ordinance in Carmel, much to Brainard's consternation, I'm told. These three 'want to be so careful' that they have failed to do what at least 13 other communities, including Martinsville, have already done. It's not being careful. It's standing in the way of what 60% of Carmel residents want. It's hurting CArmel in thT businesses have refused to locate because the council has not gotten with the program. And now they want to give discriminatory one free shot to do so. Unacceptable. Once three members leave the council because they lost their races, the Carmel council will have unanimous approval of the ordinance as originally drafted, not with a one free shot to discriminate freebie. That happens in January 2016. Why give a freebie when all we have to do is wait 3 months and get an ordinance with teeth from Day 1? If nothing else, can you please get s copy from Carmel and post it so we can see what else has changed in the proposal?

  3. Here is an interesting 2012 law review article for any who wish to dive deeper into this subject matter: Excerpt: "Judicial interpretation of the ADA has extended public entity liability to licensing agencies in the licensure and certification of attorneys.49 State bar examiners have the authority to conduct fitness investigations for the purpose of determining whether an applicant is a direct threat to the public.50 A “direct threat” is defined as “a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices or procedures, or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services as provided by § 35.139.”51 However, bar examiners may not utilize generalizations or stereotypes about the applicant’s disability in concluding that an applicant is a direct threat.52"

  4. We have been on the waiting list since 2009, i was notified almost 4 months ago that we were going to start receiving payments and we still have received nothing. Every time I call I'm told I just have to wait it's in the lawyers hands. Is everyone else still waiting?

  5. I hope you dont mind but to answer my question. What amendment does this case pretain to?