Opinions July 31, 2012

July 31, 2012
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The following Indiana Supreme Court opinion was released Monday after IL deadline.
Dalmas Maurice Otieno Anyango and Jane Tinna Agola Otieno, as Natural Parents and Next of Kin of Isaiah Omondi Otieno, Deceased v. Rolls-Royce Corporation, Honeywell International Inc., et al.
Civil tort. Affirms trial court ruling dismissing the case based on forum non conveniens, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that another more convenient, adequate forum was available to plaintiffs in a wrongful death action.

Opinions July 31, 2012

7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Carol Aschermann v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, et al.
U.S. District Court, Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. Judge Larry J. McKinney.
Civil. Affirms the District Court judgment in favor of the insurers, in which an insurer stopped paying a worker’s disability benefits claim, holding that the decision was not arbitrary or capricious.

Indiana Supreme Court
Anthony H. Dye v. State of Indiana
Criminal. Reverses habitual-offender enhancement but summarily affirms the COA’s ruling that an executed term of 20 years is not inappropriate. Remanded to trial court with instructions to enter an order for an executed term of 20 years. Justice Massa dissents.

Shepherd Properties Co., d/b/a Shepco Commercial Finishes v. International Union of Painters and Allied Trades, District Council 91
Civil plenary. Affirms trial court ruling that private parties are liable for attorney fees of a substantially prevailing plaintiff under the Access to Public Records Act. Remands for determination of what additional attorney fees the union incurred under the APRA as a result of Shepherd Properties’ appeal. Chief Justice Dickson and Justice Massa dissent without opinion.

The Presbytery of Ohio Valley, Inc., d/b/a The Presbytery of Ohio Valley, d/b/a Ohio Valley Presbytery, et al. v. OPC, Inc., f/k/a Olivet Presbyterian Church, Inc., et al.
Mortgage foreclosure. Reverses and remands to the trial court for further proceedings in this property dispute, holding that neither party is fully entitled to either the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Olivet, nor the appeals court’s reversal and grant of summary judgment for the Presbytery. Justices Sullivan and Massa dissent.

Sean Thomas Ryan v. Dee Anna Ryan
Domestic relation. Affirms the trial court ruling that it had no authority to modify the property agreement between Sean and Dee Anna Ryan without Dee Anna’s consent. Finds the language of the parties’ agreement allows the court to conclude as a matter of contract law that Dee Anna is bound to agree to sales prices for the properties that would produce net proceeds less than those stated in the agreement.

James C. Purcell v. Old National Bank
Civil tort. Holds the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Trial Rule 50(A) in its determination that the evidence presented by Purcell was insufficient to merit presentation of evidence to the jury. When Stein’s interrogatory responses are viewed as a whole and in conjunction with his trial testimony, the import is that this evidence – standing alone – is insufficient to support Purcell’s intentional tort claims under the court’s qualitative analysis. Also agrees that Old National did not owe a duty of care to Purcell. Chief Justice Dickson and Justice Rucker dissent in part.

Indiana Court of Appeals
The Estate of K. David Short by Judith Y. Short, Personal Representative v. Brookville Crossing 4060 LLC d/b/a Baymont Inns & Suites and MPH Hotels, Inc. d/b/a Baymont Inns & Suites
Civil tort. Affirms trial court grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, holding that defendants did not have reason to know of the plaintiff’s peril.

James L. Hebner v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms in part and reverses part three convictions of resisting law enforcement, one as a Class D felony and two as Class A misdemeanors.

Samuel Davis, Jr. v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms conviction of Class B felony operating while intoxicated causing death.
Zachary Daye Riffle v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms conviction of Class C felony attempted burglary.

Tommy Joe Doublin v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms conviction of Class B felony burglary and adjudication as a habitual offender.
Joshua Wotowiec v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms conviction of Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license.

Joseph Peters v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms trial court’s denial of motion to dismiss child molesting charges.

Micole Draughon v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms in part, reverses in part sentence for Class C felony criminal recklessness, remanding to the trial court to conduct a hearing on indigency and how restitution is to be paid.

Kelly Allen v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms trial court revocation of probation.  

Michael Burnett v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms trial court convictions of Class B felony burglary, Class D felony theft and adjudication as a habitual offender.

In re the Guardianship of Thora Moulton: Alison E. Clapp (O'Callaghan) v. Donald J. Evans (NFP)
Guardianship. Reverses award of attorney fees and guardianship-related fees to Evans, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding fees filed too late.

David E. Arnold v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms revocation of probation.

David Smithers v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Post-conviction relief. Affirms denial of post-conviction relief.  

Melissa Bruce v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Affirms sentence for neglect of a dependent as a Class B felony.

Cynthia R. Atkinson v. Indiana Dept. of Administration (NFP)
Civil plenary. Affirms trial court denial of motion to correct error.

Indiana Tax Court posted no opinions at IL deadline.


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  1. Lori, you must really love wedding cake stories like this one ... happy enuf ending for you?

  2. This new language about a warning has not been discussed at previous meetings. It's not available online. Since it must be made public knowledge before the vote, does anyone know exactly what it says? Further, this proposal was held up for 5 weeks because members Carol and Lucy insisted that all terms used be defined. So now, definitions are unnecessary and have not been inserted? Beyond these requirements, what is the logic behind giving one free pass to discriminators? Is that how laws work - break it once and that's ok? Just don't do it again? Three members of Carmel's council have done just about everything they can think of to prohibit an anti-discrimination ordinance in Carmel, much to Brainard's consternation, I'm told. These three 'want to be so careful' that they have failed to do what at least 13 other communities, including Martinsville, have already done. It's not being careful. It's standing in the way of what 60% of Carmel residents want. It's hurting CArmel in thT businesses have refused to locate because the council has not gotten with the program. And now they want to give discriminatory one free shot to do so. Unacceptable. Once three members leave the council because they lost their races, the Carmel council will have unanimous approval of the ordinance as originally drafted, not with a one free shot to discriminate freebie. That happens in January 2016. Why give a freebie when all we have to do is wait 3 months and get an ordinance with teeth from Day 1? If nothing else, can you please get s copy from Carmel and post it so we can see what else has changed in the proposal?

  3. Here is an interesting 2012 law review article for any who wish to dive deeper into this subject matter: Excerpt: "Judicial interpretation of the ADA has extended public entity liability to licensing agencies in the licensure and certification of attorneys.49 State bar examiners have the authority to conduct fitness investigations for the purpose of determining whether an applicant is a direct threat to the public.50 A “direct threat” is defined as “a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices or procedures, or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services as provided by § 35.139.”51 However, bar examiners may not utilize generalizations or stereotypes about the applicant’s disability in concluding that an applicant is a direct threat.52"

  4. We have been on the waiting list since 2009, i was notified almost 4 months ago that we were going to start receiving payments and we still have received nothing. Every time I call I'm told I just have to wait it's in the lawyers hands. Is everyone else still waiting?

  5. I hope you dont mind but to answer my question. What amendment does this case pretain to?