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Opinions July 31, 2013

July 31, 2013
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The following 7th Circuit and Indiana Supreme Court opinions were released Tuesday after IL deadline:
7th Circuit Court of Appeals

United States of America v. Michael L. Brock
11-3473
Criminal. Vacates mandatory minimum 15-year sentence for violation of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), for conviction of possession of machineguns. Remands to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana for resentencing. The 7th Circuit held that a 7th Circuit decision earlier this year, United States v. Miller, concluded that possession of a sawed-off shotgun was not a violent felony under ACCA and applied the ruling to Brock’s case, holding that he did not qualify for an enhanced sentence the act imposes for violent felonies.  

Indiana Supreme Court
Ann L. Miller and Richard A. Miller v. Glenn L. Dobbs, D.O. and Partners in Health
15S05-1302-CT-91
Civil Tort. Reverses trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants’ and remand for further proceedings. Concludes even though the Millers’ attorney sent a check for filing and processing fees after he had filed the complaint, the document was still timely filed. Finds nothing in the Indiana Code that requires fees be submitted before the complaint is considered filed.

Today’s Opinions
7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Sikiru Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC
12-3820
Civil/Religious discrimination. Reverses summary judgment in favor of Heartland and remands to the District Court for proceedings, holding that a material issue of fact exists as to whether Sikiru Adeyeye’s rights under Title VII were violated when he was fired after taking time off work to attend his father’s burial rights in Nigeria.  

United States of America v. Terry L. Sabo
12-2700
Criminal. Affirms denial of motion to suppress evidence that resulted in his plea of guilty to charges of possession with the intent to distribute a controlled substance, possession of a firearm in the furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that Sabo’s action of stepping aside in his trailer after authorities asked if they could come inside implied consent for a search.


Bernard Hawkins v. United States of America
11-1245
Criminal. Denies petition for rehearing en banc of a petition for resentencing, holding in a 5-4 opinion that a recent 5-4 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Peugh v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2707 (2013), did not apply. Peugh held that the ex post facto clause prevents courts from sentencing a defendant based on guidelines promulgated after the commission of a crime if the newer guidelines would result in a sentencing range higher than those in place when a crime was committed. Dissenting judges held that Peugh applies to Hawkins’ case because his sentencing error was a miscarriage of justice that can be petitioned for relief in federal post-conviction proceedings.  


Indiana Court of Appeals
Michael E. Lyons, Ind; Denita L. Lyons, Ind.; Michael E. Lyons and Denita L. Lyons, as Co-personal Rep. of the Estate of Megan Renee Lyons, Deceased v. Richmond Community School Corp.Et Al.
89A04-1204-PL-159
Civil plenary. Clarifies and remands to the trial court for a jury determination on whether, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, Appellants/Plaintiffs Michael and Denita Lyons could have learned of the school corporation’s alleged ‘tortious acts’ prior to July 15, 2009, which was 180 days before the Lyonses filed notice of their claim regarding their daughter’s death.

Bruce Ryan v. State of Indiana

49A02-1211-CR-932
Criminal. Reverses Ryan’s two convictions for Class C felony sexual misconduct with a minor and remands for a new trial. Finds the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s statements during closing arguments deprived Ryan of a fair trial.  

Don H. Dumont, M.D., v Penny Davis and Nicole Anderson, as Co-Administratrixes of the Estate of Charmitta Jordan, Deceased
45A05-1207-CT-384
Civil tort. Reverses trial court’s order granting Davis and Anderson a new trial in the wrongful death action against Dumont. Finds that the dispute over the testimony given by two expert witnesses is not sufficient grounds to grant a new trial.  

Seth A. Miller v. State of Indiana

63A01-1210-CR-475
Criminal. Affirms in part and reverses in part the judgment of the trial court. Finds the evidence fails to establish the necessary element of an enterprise within the meaning of the statute. Overturns the conviction for corrupt business influence and vacates the sentence of eight years.   

In the Matter of the Involuntary Term. of the Parent-Child Rel. of M.N., Minor Child and his Father, M.D.N. v. Indiana Department of Chiild Services (NFP)
79A02-1301-JT-21
Juvenile. Affirms the juvenile court’s order terminating father’s parental rights to his son, M.N.  

Abdul G. Buridi v. RL BB Financial, LLC (NFP)

10A01-1212-MF-580
Mortgage foreclosure. Affirms denial of Buridi’s motion asking that the summary judgment be set aside because of newly discovered evidence.

Daniel R. Clemans v. State of Indiana (NFP)
29A02-1302-CR-289
Criminal. Affirms conviction of operating a motor vehicle while driving privileges are suspended due to being a habitual traffic violator, a Class D felony.

James W. Baker, Jr. v. State of Indiana (NFP)

03A01-1302-CR-49
Criminal. Affirms sentence for two courts of burglary as Class C felonies. Finds trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Baker to eight years on each of the two counts, all executed, to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively with Baker’s sentences in two other separate cases.

Joshua A. Yenna v. State of Indiana (NFP)
02A03-1211-CR-499
Criminal. Affirms conviction for Class D felony battery.

 In the Matter of the Paternity of C.B., A.B. v. R.B. (NFP)
54A01-1211-JP-495
Juvenile Paternity. Affirms in part and reverses in part the judgment of the trial court. Concludes the trial court’s decisions regarding the calculation of child support were well-supported by its findings and by the evidence. However, finds the trial court erred by granting R.B.’s request to change C.B.’s name because he did not include this request in his written petition to establish paternity.

The Indiana Supreme Court and Tax Court released no opinions prior to IL deadline.
 

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  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

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