ILNews

Opinions June 27, 2011

June 27, 2011
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Indiana Supreme Court had posted no opinions at IL deadline.

Indiana Court of Appeals
Vincent M. Butler, Jr. v. State of Indiana
84A01-1008-CR-414
Criminal. Affirms revocation of Butler’s probation. The record shows that the trial court adequately advised Butler of his right to counsel and that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived that right. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the balance of his four-year previously suspended sentence. Judge Kirsch dissents.

In the Matter of the Trust of Harrison Eiteljorg
49A02-1005-TR-485
Trust. Affirms probate court finding that the trustees failed to distribute a portion of the trust corpus in a timely manner. There was sufficient evidence to sustain the finding on liability as the trustees knew there was property available in the trust for distribution yet declined to timely distribute it to the beneficiaries. Reverses assessment of damages and attorney fees and remands for a re-evaluation of the compensatory damages and a reduction in attorney fees. Judge Baker dissents.

Gary Ludban, et al. v. Ronald Burtch, et al.
44A05-1007-PL-437
Civil plenary. Affirms trial court ruling regarding the survey of land. The survey the Burtches had conducted was not erroneous as a matter of law, the trial court did not err in determining that the fence between the Ludban and Burtch properties establishes the property line, and the trial court did not err in denying the Ludbans’ adverse possession claim to a strip of land used for access to the lake. The trial court did not err in discrediting the survey the Ludbans had done or in implying that Gary Ludban disturbed the original monumentation between lots 29 and 30. The determination of the property line between the Reeds and the Ludbans based on the line of occupation is supported by the evidence.

Kimberly L. Benedict v. State of Indiana (NFP)
49A02-1012-CR-1359
Criminal. Affirms conviction of Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.

Paternity of K.B.; J.B. v. J.D. (NFP)
02A04-1008-JP-533
Juvenile. Affirms trial court grant of permission to allow mother to relocate to Tennessee with daughter.

Jerry L. Coleman v. Marla J. Coleman (NFP)
38A05-1008-DR-490
Domestic relation. Affirms denial of Jerry Coleman’s motion to correct error after the court awarded custody of his son to ex-wife, Marla Coleman, and twice found Jerry in contempt of court.

Indiana Tax Court had posted no opinions at IL deadline.

The Indiana Supreme Court granted seven transfers and denied 34 for the week ending June 24, 2011.

 

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  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

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