ILNews

Opinions March 21, 2013

March 21, 2013
Keywords
Back to TopE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

Indiana Supreme Court
Anthony D. Dye v. State of Indiana
20S04-1201-CR-5
Criminal. On rehearing, reaffirms that a person convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon may not have his or her sentence enhanced under the general habitual offender statute by proof of the same felony used to establish that the person was a “serious violent felon.” The state is not permitted to support Dye’s habitual offender finding with a conviction that arose out of the same res gestae that was the source of the conviction used to prove Dye was a serious violent felon. Affirms original opinion in all other respects. Justice Massa concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.

Todd J. Crider v. State of Indiana
91S05-1206-CR-306
Criminal. Reverses in part the sentencing order that Crider’s habitual offender enhancement in a White County case be served consecutively to the habitual offender enhancement in a case from Tippecanoe County. Concludes that the waiver of the right to appeal contained in the plea agreement is unenforceable where the sentence imposed is contrary to law and the defendant did not bargain for the sentence.

Indiana Court of Appeals
Clark County Board of Aviation Commissioners v. Dennis Dreyer and Margo Dreyer as Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of Margaret A. Dreyer
10A01-1206-PL-288
Civil plenary. Affirms denial of the Board of Aviation Commissioners’ Trial Rule 60(B) motion for partial relief from an $865,000 judgment in favor of Margaret Dreyer after the board instituted eminent domain proceedings. Because legal error may not be collaterally attacked, and the commissioners did not object to Dreyer’s July 2009 objections and did not raise the issue in the first appeal, the trial court did not err by denying their Trial Rule 60(B) motion.

Town of Cedar Lake v. Gina Alessia, Candi Reiling, Andrew Balkema, Individually and as Members of the Town of Cedar Lake Park Board
45A03-1207-PL-316
Civil plenary. Reverses summary judgment for the park board members on their claims of illegal termination, declaratory judgment on the validity of the ordinance and injunctive relief. Also reverses the reinstatement order regarding the park board members. The trial court erred when it used Dillon’s Rule to determine the scope of the town’s legal authority to dissolve the park board and Parks Department. The proper legal inquiry is based on Indiana’s Home Rule Act. Affirms the order that the law firm Austgen Kuiper & Associates P.C. may not continue to represent the park board and its members in any matters based on a current conflict of interest.

C.B. v. B.W.
49A02-1206-JP-539
Juvenile. Affirms order granting the father’s request to change the surname of C.D.B. in initial paternity proceedings over the mother’s objections. The trial court’s decision is not clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court or contrary to law. The mother has not shown reversible error.

Marquis Shipp v. State of Indiana (NFP)
49A02-1204-PC-322
Post conviction. Affirms denial of petition for post-conviction relief.

Arturo Fuentes v. State of Indiana (NFP)
79A02-1208-CR-698
Criminal. Affirms sentence for Class A felony dealing in cocaine and Class C felony possession of cocaine.

Christina J. Epps v. State of Indiana (NFP)
05A02-1207-CR-673
Criminal. Affirms convictions and sentence for two counts of Class A misdemeanor battery and one count of Class B misdemeanor battery.

The Indiana Tax Court posted no decisions by IL deadline. The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals posted no Indiana decisions by IL deadline.

 

ADVERTISEMENT

Sponsored by

facebook - twitter on Facebook & Twitter

Indiana State Bar Association

Indianapolis Bar Association

Evansville Bar Association

Allen County Bar Association

Indiana Lawyer on Facebook

facebook
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

ADVERTISEMENT