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Opinions May 9, 2012

May 9, 2012
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The following opinions were posted after IL deadline Tuesday:
7th Circuit Court of Appeals


Susan Schaefer-LaRose v. Eli Lilly & Co.; James Jirak, et al. v. Abbott Laboratories Inc.
Nos. 10-3855, 11-1980, 11-2131
U.S. District Court, Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, Judge Sarah Evans Barker.
Civil. In a decision that combined cases from District courts in Indiana and Illinois, the court concludes that under the regulations of the Department of Labor, the pharmaceutical sales representatives are classified properly within the administrative exemption to the overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Affirms judgment in favor of Eli Lilly on whether sales reps were entitled to overtime.  

Clifton Sandifer, et. al. v. United States Steel Corporation
10-1821, 10-1866
U.S. District Court, Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division, Judge Robert L. Miller, Jr.
Civil. Affirms interlocutory appeal from United States Steel Corporation, which claimed that “travel time” for employees to walk from the locker room to their work stations should not be a compensable act. A District court judge had certified that question for interlocutory appeal, but had ruled that the Fair Labor Standards Act does not allow for compensation of changing clothes. The plaintiffs appealed that ruling, and the 7th Circuit affirmed the District court.

Wednesday’s opinions
7th Circuit Court of Appeals posted no opinions by IL deadline.

Indiana Supreme Court and Indiana Tax Court posted no opinions by IL deadline.

Indiana Court of Appeals

Ashanti Clemons v. State of Indiana
49A02-1108-PC-737
Post conviction. Affirms denial of amended petition for post-conviction relief. Clemons was not denied effective assistance of his trial and appellate counsel.

Halston Thomas v. State of Indiana
49A02-1109-CR-830
Criminal. Affirms convictions of murder and Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license. The state established that Gordon was unavailable to testify at trial and that Thomas had an opportunity to cross-examine her at the deposition, which was testimonial in nature.

Douglas P. Wilson, Jr. v. State of Indiana
79A05-1107-CR-350
Criminal. Affirms convictions of and sentence for Class B felony dealing in a narcotic drug, Class D felony possession of a narcotic drug, Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, and Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while suspended. By abandoning his vehicle after being pulled over by police, Wilson relinquished any reasonable expectation of privacy in it. There is sufficient evidence to support his drug convictions and sentence.

In the Matter of Children Alleged to be Children in Need of Services, D.H. & G.H., and D.B.H. v. The Indiana Dept. of Child Services (NFP)
71A03-1109-JC-425
Juvenile. Affirms determination that children are in need of services.

In Re the Marriage of: Tanya A. (Bennett) Louderback v. Edward L. Bennett (NFP)
58A01-1109-DR-449
Domestic relation. Affirms order granting Bennett’s motion to modify custody, awarding primary custody to Bennett.

Clinton Davis v. State of Indiana (NFP)
48A05-1110-CR-547
Criminal. Affirms denial of fourth motion to correct erroneous sentence.

Henry L. Shell, Jr. v. State of Indiana (NFP)
52A04-1107-CR-370
Criminal. Affirms conviction of Class B felony dealing in methamphetamine.

Mark Bailey v. State of Indiana (NFP)
49A05-1110-CR-541
Criminal. Affirms conviction of Class D felony possession of cocaine.

Zachary Bowser v. State of Indiana (NFP)

49A02-1107-CR-638
Criminal. Affirms order denying motion to suppress evidence and remands for further proceedings.

Kathryn Gillespie v. Review Board of the Indiana Dept. of Workforce Development, et al. (NFP)
93A02-1106-EX-539
Agency appeal. Affirms decision that Gillespie is ineligible for unemployment benefits.

Juan Murillo Bravo v. Silvia Bravo and Rancho Bravo, Inc. (NFP)
54A01-1108-PL-354
Civil plenary. Affirms order awarding attorney fees to Rancho Bravo and Silvia Bravo.

C.K. v. Indiana Department of Child Services (NFP)
02A05-1110-JT-593
Juvenile. Affirms involuntary termination of parental rights.

Term. of the Parent-Child Rel. of A.B. and P.B.; E.B. (Mother) v. Indiana Dept. of Child Services (NFP)
35A04-1111-JT-629
Juvenile. Affirms involuntary termination of parental rights.

Robert Allen Barker v. State of Indiana (NFP)
36A01-1109-CR-405
Criminal. Affirms sentence for Class B felony possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon.

Paul T. Dhaenens v. State of Indiana (NFP)
30A01-1111-CR-567
Criminal. Affirms convictions of Class C felony criminal confinement and Class D felony domestic battery.


 

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  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

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