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Opinions Nov. 7, 2013

November 7, 2013
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Indiana Court of Appeals
Debra Minott, Faith Laird, Patti Bailey v. Lee Alan Bryant Health Care Facilities, Inc.; Parkview Residential Care Center, L.L.C.; Parke County Residential Care Center, L.L.C., et al.
49A05-1305-PL-213
Civil plenary. Reverses denial of state’s request for restitution for damages paid. The Nov. 8 order was not a final judgment because it did not address the issue of restitution. Holds the law firms and creditor banks in this case are judgment creditors. Remands for further proceedings.

Michael P. Stafford v. State of Indiana (NFP)
17A04-1304-CR-178
Criminal. Affirms convictions and 120-year sentence for Class A felony criminal deviate conduct, Class A felony kidnapping, Class B felony burglary, Class B felony criminal confinement, and Class B felony robbery while armed with a deadly weapon.

Michael Schepers v. State of Indiana (NFP)
19A01-1303-CR-100
Criminal. Affirms denial of Schepers’ motion to suppress and remands for retrial.

Michael Kelley v. State of Indana (NFP)
45A04-1303-PC-161
Post conviction. Affirms denial of petition for post-conviction relief.

David Fields v. State of Indiana (NFP)
15A01-1301-PC-3
Post conviction. Affirms denial of petition for post-conviction relief.

Anthony Tsikouris, Diann Tsikouris, and the 601 Building, Inc., v. LaPorte Savings Bank (NFP)
46A05-1212-MF-659
Mortgage foreclosure. Affirms summary judgment in favor of bank on its foreclosure action. However, the amount of the damages was erroneous, and the trial court therefore abused its discretion when it denied the motion to correct error. Additionally, the motion to correct error should have been granted as to the award of attorney fees. Remands with instructions to conduct a hearing on damages and attorney fees.

State of Indiana v. Jerramy Bushong (NFP)
67A04-1304-CR-196
Criminal. Affirms denial of the state’s motion to correct error, which challenged the grant of a motion to suppress evidence.

Jeffrey V. McCloud v. State of Indiana (NFP)
49A02-1304-CR-322
Criminal. Double jeopardy principles embodied in the continuing crime doctrine bar entry of two judgments of conviction against McCloud for resisting law enforcement. The trial court erred when it imposed a sentence in excess of statutory authority against McCloud for possession of paraphernalia, as a Class A misdemeanor. McCloud’s 47-year sentence was not inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B). Remands with instructions to vacate his conviction for resisting law enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor and to enter a sentence within the authorized statutory range on McCloud’s conviction for possession of paraphernalia as a Class A misdemeanor.

The Indiana Supreme Court and Tax Court posted no decisions by IL deadline. The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals posted no Indiana opinions by IL deadline.
 

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  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

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