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Opinions Oct. 8, 2010

October 8, 2010
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 Indiana Supreme Court had posted no opinions at IL deadline.

Indiana Court of Appeals
Richmond State Hospital, et al. v. Paula Brattain, et al.
49A02-0908-CV-718
Civil. Reverses finding that the merit employees, represented by Veregge and Strong, are entitled to 20 years of back pay and remands with instructions to recalculate the merit employees’ back pay based on the time period beginning 10 days before the July 29, 1993, complaint was filed and ending when the state abolished the split class system. Instructs the trial court to determine whether the state abolished the split class system on Sept. 12 or Sept. 19, 1993. Affirms in all other respects.

Earl Budd v. State of Indiana
31A01-0910-PC-504
Post conviction. Affirms denial of successive petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court didn’t err by finding Indiana Code Section 35-50-6-3.3(h)(2)(B) doesn’t constitute a bill of attainder, an ex post facto law or a denial of equal protection.

R.R. F. v. L.L.F.
69A01-1001-DR-77
Domestic relation. Affirms order father pay retroactive child support to a date preceding the filing date of mother’s petition to modify. The provision in the parties’ agreed entry whereby father ceased child support payments upon E.F.’s 18th birthday was contrary to law and void. The dissolution court should have credited father for certain payments against the court’s order that he pay $2,961.75 for the period May 11 to Aug. 22, 2009. Remands to the dissolution court and instructs to first consider the reduction in the parents’ obligation toward E.F.’s college expenses realized by mother’s tax credit and then apportion the parents’ obligations accordingly.

Victor J. Bandini v. Joann M. Bandini
49A04-1001-DR-26
Domestic relation. The trial court correctly interpreted the parties’ settlement agreement as contemplating an equal division of Victor’s gross retirement pay. The trial court erred in ordering him to pay his ex-wife an amount equal to half of his gross retirement pay prior to any deductions for his Veterans Administration disability benefits waiver and Survivor Benefit Plan costs. Indiana trial courts lack authority to enforce even an agreed-upon division of property insofar as it divides amounts of gross military retirement pay that were, previous to the decree, waived to receive disability benefits or elected to be deducted from gross pay as SBP costs to benefit the former spouse. Holds that a military spouse may not, by a post-decree waiver of retirement pay in favor of disability benefits or Combat-Related Special Compensation, unilaterally and voluntarily reduce the benefits awarded the former spouse in a dissolution decree. Remands for further proceedings.

Ronald J. McGary v. State of Indiana (NFP)
87A01-1003-CR-129
Criminal. Affirms sentence following guilty plea to operating a motor vehicle as a habitual traffic offender as a Class D felony.

Jason D. Miller v. State of Indiana (NFP)
08A02-1002-CR-129
Criminal. Reverses determination of Miller’s credit time classification and remands for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Affirms convictions of and sentences for Class A felony child molesting and Class C felony child molesting.

Steven A. Reynolds v. State of Indiana (NFP)
29A02-1003-CR-471
Criminal. Affirms sentences for two counts of Class A misdemeanor battery.

Fraternal Order of Police, Evansville Lodge No. 73 v. City of Evansville, IN. (NFP)
82A04-1002-PL-94
Civil plenary. Affirms conclusion the city didn’t breach the collective bargaining agreement by reducing the number of patrol sergeants allowed to work on holidays.

Jeremy M. Frantzreb v. State of Indiana (NFP)
24A05-1002-CR-109
Criminal. Reverses convictions of Class C felony forgery and Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana and remands for a new trial.

Indiana Parole Board v. Martin De La Torre (NFP)
72A01-1005-CR-254
Criminal. Reverses denial of the Indiana Parole Board’s motion to correct error.

S.T. v. State of Indiana (NFP)
49A02-1002-JV-301
Juvenile. Affirms adjudication for committing what would be Class C felony robbery if committed by an adult.

Indiana Tax Court had posted no opinions at IL deadline.
 

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  1. It's a big fat black mark against the US that they radicalized a lot of these Afghan jihadis in the 80s to fight the soviets and then when they predictably got around to biting the hand that fed them, the US had to invade their homelands, install a bunch of corrupt drug kingpins and kleptocrats, take these guys and torture the hell out of them. Why for example did the US have to sodomize them? Dubya said "they hate us for our freedoms!" Here, try some of that freedom whether you like it or not!!! Now they got even more reasons to hate us-- lets just keep bombing the crap out of their populations, installing more puppet regimes, arming one faction against another, etc etc etc.... the US is becoming a monster. No wonder they hate us. Here's my modest recommendation. How about we follow "Just War" theory in the future. St Augustine had it right. How about we treat these obvious prisoners of war according to the Geneva convention instead of torturing them in sadistic and perverted ways.

  2. As usual, John is "spot-on." The subtle but poignant points he makes are numerous and warrant reflection by mediators and users. Oh but were it so simple.

  3. ACLU. Way to step up against the police state. I see a lot of things from the ACLU I don't like but this one is a gold star in its column.... instead of fighting it the authorities should apologize and back off.

  4. Duncan, It's called the RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION and in the old days people believed it did apply to contracts and employment. Then along came title vii.....that aside, I believe that I am free to work or not work for whomever I like regardless: I don't need a law to tell me I'm free. The day I really am compelled to ignore all the facts of social reality in my associations and I blithely go along with it, I'll be a slave of the state. That day is not today......... in the meantime this proposed bill would probably be violative of 18 usc sec 1981 that prohibits discrimination in contracts... a law violated regularly because who could ever really expect to enforce it along the millions of contracts made in the marketplace daily? Some of these so-called civil rights laws are unenforceable and unjust Utopian Social Engineering. Forcing people to love each other will never work.

  5. I am the father of a sweet little one-year-old named girl, who happens to have Down Syndrome. To anyone who reads this who may be considering the decision to terminate, please know that your child will absolutely light up your life as my daughter has the lives of everyone around her. There is no part of me that condones abortion of a child on the basis that he/she has or might have Down Syndrome. From an intellectual standpoint, however, I question the enforceability of this potential law. As it stands now, the bill reads in relevant part as follows: "A person may not intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion . . . if the person knows that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely because the fetus has been diagnosed with Down syndrome or a potential diagnosis of Down syndrome." It includes similarly worded provisions abortion on "any other disability" or based on sex selection. It goes so far as to make the medical provider at least potentially liable for wrongful death. First, how does a medical provider "know" that "the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion SOLELY" because of anything? What if the woman says she just doesn't want the baby - not because of the diagnosis - she just doesn't want him/her? Further, how can the doctor be liable for wrongful death, when a Child Wrongful Death claim belongs to the parents? Is there any circumstance in which the mother's comparative fault will not exceed the doctor's alleged comparative fault, thereby barring the claim? If the State wants to discourage women from aborting their children because of a Down Syndrome diagnosis, I'm all for that. Purporting to ban it with an unenforceable law, however, is not the way to effectuate this policy.

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