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Oral findings allowed in attorney fee case

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A Marion Superior Court didn't err when it failed to issue written findings and conclusions pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52 in a dispute over attorney fees, the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled. The appellate court also affirmed the trial court's award of fees based on quantum meruit rather than a contingency fee agreement with the client.
 
The Nunn Law Office had originally represented Joseph Carpenter in a personal injury action and had an agreement that Nunn would represent him for any of his claims arising out of the motorcycle accident for "40 percent of all amounts recovered or offered." An insurance company attempted to settle, but Carpenter rejected it. Nunn initiated a lawsuit on Carpenter's behalf, but two months later, Carpenter discharged the law firm and hired Peter H. Rosenthal to represent him. Carpenter settled his case for $42,500.

After learning of the settlement, Nunn moved to determine the proper division of attorney fees. The trial court orally calculated a judgment in favor of Nunn for $1,462.88 based upon quantum meruit for Nunn's work on the case.

Ruling on a motion for special findings of fact and conclusions of law filed by Nunn, the trial court entered a judgment for the same amount in favor of Nunn without entering written findings and conclusions.

The issues in Nunn Law Office v. Peter H. Rosenthal, No. 49A05-0809-CV-523, were whether the trial court erred as a matter of law by not issuing written findings and conclusions, and whether quantum meruit or the contingency agreement in Carpenter's contract with Nunn should determine the amount of attorney fees owed to Nunn.

An Indiana Supreme Court ruling suggested that the preferred format for findings and conclusions is in the written form, but the trial court's failure to issue written findings and conclusions doesn't constitute reversible error, wrote Judge Cale Bradford. The plain language of T.R. 52(A) doesn't require the findings and conclusions to be in writing and the purpose of the rule is to provide parties and reviewing courts with the theory upon which the trial judge decided the case.

The Court of Appeals concluded oral findings and conclusions can achieve this purpose as long as they are thoroughly detailed in the record. It also ruled the basis for the $1,462.88 judgment was apparent from the trial court's oral explanation in the record. In addition, any error in the trial court's failure to justify its use of quantum meruit as the proper measure for calculating the attorney fees was a harmless one given the appellate court's conclusion it was the only proper measure for fee determination in the instant case.

Carpenter's fee agreement with Nunn expressly provided for compensation upon discharge, but was silent regarding Nunn's compensation upon pre-contingency discharge. While the 40 percent provision arguably permits payment of fees based upon settlements offered, recovered or not, a latter "no recovery, no fee" provision expressly states to the contrary that fees are not payable unless a recovery is obtained, wrote Judge Bradford.

In the absence of an applicable contractual provision, an attorney employed under a contingent fee contract and discharged before the occurrence of the contingency is limited to quantum meruit recovery for the reasonable value of services rendered, wrote the judge.

Finally, the appellate court affirmed the amount of attorney fees to Nunn based on Nunn's relatively minimal investment of time in Carpenter's case and Rosenthal's success in getting a larger settlement.

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  1. Falk said “At this point, at this minute, we’ll savor this particular victory.” “It certainly is a historic week on this front,” Cockrum said. “What a delight ... “Happy Independence Day to the women of the state of Indiana,” WOW. So we broke with England for the right to "off" our preborn progeny at will, and allow the processing plant doing the dirty deeds (dirt cheap) to profit on the marketing of those "products of conception." I was completely maleducated on our nation's founding, it would seem. (But I know the ACLU is hard at work to remedy that, too.)

  2. congratulations on such balanced journalism; I also love how fetus disposal affects women's health protection, as covered by Roe...

  3. It truly sickens me every time a case is compared to mine. The Indiana Supreme Court upheld my convictions based on a finding of “hidden threats.” The term “hidden threat” never appeared until the opinion in Brewington so I had no way of knowing I was on trial for making hidden threats because Dearborn County Prosecutor F Aaron Negangard argued the First Amendment didn't protect lies. Negangard convened a grand jury to investigate me for making “over the top” and “unsubstantiated” statements about court officials, not hidden threats of violence. My indictments and convictions were so vague, the Indiana Court of Appeals made no mention of hidden threats when they upheld my convictions. Despite my public defender’s closing arguments stating he was unsure of exactly what conduct the prosecution deemed to be unlawful, Rush found that my lawyer’s trial strategy waived my right to the fundamental error of being tried for criminal defamation because my lawyer employed a strategy that attempted to take advantage of Negangard's unconstitutional criminal defamation prosecution against me. Rush’s opinion stated the prosecution argued two grounds for conviction one constitutional and one not, however the constitutional true threat “argument” consistently of only a blanket reading of subsection 1 of the intimidation statute during closing arguments, making it impossible to build any kind of defense. Of course intent was impossible for my attorney to argue because my attorney, Rush County Chief Public Defender Bryan Barrett refused to meet with me prior to trial. The record is littered with examples of where I made my concerns known to the trial judge that I didn’t know the charges against me, I did not have access to evidence, all while my public defender refused to meet with me. Special Judge Brian Hill, from Rush Superior Court, refused to address the issue with my public defender and marched me to trial without access to evidence or an understanding of the indictments against me. Just recently the Indiana Public Access Counselor found that four over four years Judge Hill has erroneously denied access to the grand jury audio from my case, the most likely reason being the transcription of the grand jury proceedings omitted portions of the official audio record. The bottom line is any intimidation case involves an action or statement that is debatably a threat of physical violence. There were no such statements in my case. The Indiana Supreme Court took partial statements I made over a period of 41 months and literally connected them with dots… to give the appearance that the statements were made within the same timeframe and then claimed a person similarly situated would find the statements intimidating while intentionally leaving out surrounding contextual factors. Even holding the similarly situated test was to be used in my case, the prosecution argued that the only intent of my public writings was to subject the “victims” to ridicule and hatred so a similarly situated jury instruction wouldn't even have applied in my case. Chief Justice Rush wrote the opinion while Rush continued to sit on a committee with one of the alleged victims in my trial and one of the judges in my divorce, just as she'd done for the previous 7+ years. All of this information, including the recent PAC opinion against the Dearborn Superior Court II can be found on my blog www.danbrewington.blogspot.com.

  4. On a related note, I offered the ICLU my cases against the BLE repeatedly, and sought their amici aid repeatedly as well. Crickets. Usually not even a response. I am guessing they do not do allegations of anti-Christian bias? No matter how glaring? I have posted on other links the amicus brief that did get filed (search this ezine, e.g., Kansas attorney), read the Thomas More Society brief to note what the ACLU ran from like vampires from garlic. An Examiner pledged to advance diversity and inclusion came right out on the record and demanded that I choose Man's law or God's law. I wonder, had I been asked to swear off Allah ... what result then, ICLU? Had I been found of bad character and fitness for advocating sexual deviance, what result then ICLU? Had I been lifetime banned for posting left of center statements denigrating the US Constitution, what result ICLU? Hey, we all know don't we? Rather Biased.

  5. It was mentioned in the article that there have been numerous CLE events to train attorneys on e-filing. I would like someone to provide a list of those events, because I have not seen any such events in east central Indiana, and since Hamilton County is one of the counties where e-filing is mandatory, one would expect some instruction in this area. Come on, people, give some instruction, not just applause!

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