ILNews

Panel orders lower court to enforce protective order

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

Highlighting a bias in state statute relating to protective orders, the Indiana Court of Appeals has held that an accuser’s request for a civil contempt hearing against someone alleged to have violated a protective order can’t be tied to any other criminal or civil proceedings under way or available in the future.

The three-judge appellate decision came today in S.W. by P.W. v. B.K., No. 71A03-1012-PO-655, which comes from St. Joseph Superior Judge Roland Chamblee and Magistrate Brian Steinke.

This case involves a developmentally disabled adult named S.W. who shares an apartment with another developmentally disabled woman as part of a semi-independent living program. P.W., the woman’s sister, obtained a protective order following September 2010 incidents in which B.K. came to the apartment late at night and pounded on the door, trying to enter and yelling for S.W. to come to the door. The South Bend Police Department responded. The ex parte protective order prohibited B.K. from stalking, harassing, annoying, contacting, or visiting the residence. B.K. apparently disregarded the order and returned to the apartment at least twice in November and displayed similar behavior.

P.W. filed a petition for B.K. to appear for a hearing to show cause why he shouldn’t be held in contempt for violating the protective order, and with that petition P.W. filed affidavits supporting the request and also asked for attorney fees. The trial court denied her petition the same day without a hearing, stating that the protective order violations were criminal matters that should be handled by the prosecutor’s office. She filed a motion to correct error and the trial court denied that motion on the same grounds.

On appeal, the appellate panel addressed S.W.’s claim that her due-process rights were violated by the trial court’s refusal to hold a hearing on the alleged indirect civil contempt accusation. The panel explored Indiana Code 34-47-3-5 that lists an array of notice requirements for the accused and how that person must be served with the court order he or she is accused of violating and the specific facts outlined in the accusation.

“Interestingly, the indirect civil contempt statute addresses due process issues, but only in terms of preserving the due process rights of the person accused of contempt,” Judge Terry Crone wrote for the panel that included Judge Edward Najam and Chief Judge Margret Robb. “Absent from the statute is any express language indicating that the accuser is entitled to a hearing.”

The judges agreed with S.W’s citation of I.C. 34-47-5-6 that says in part, “an order for protection is in addition to, and not instead of, another available civil or criminal proceeding… A petitioner is not barred from seeking an order (of protection) because of another pending proceeding.”

“We do not find any parallel provision in the contempt statute, but find the statute instructive,” the court wrote in its footnote, expanding on what it wrote in the opinion itself. “The record does not indicate the specifics of any criminal proceedings against (B.K.) or whether they are still pending, and we do not believe that the decision to grant or deny a civil contempt petition should be based on such collateral matters. Instead, the petition should be valued independently, without reference to other proceedings that may or may not otherwise protect the person for whose safety the original protective order was issued.”

The judges also determined S.W. should be reimbursed her $250 appellate filing fee because this appeal is based on the trial court’s refusal to enforce the protective order against B.K. and that’s what is being reversed and remanded here.

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. Just an aside, but regardless of the outcome, I 'm proud of Judge William Hughes. He was the original magistrate on the Home place issue. He ruled for Home Place, and was primaried by Brainard for it. Their tool Poindexter failed to unseat Hughes, who won support for his honesty and courage throughout the county, and he was reelected Judge of Hamilton County's Superior Court. You can still stand for something and survive. Thanks, Judge Hughes!

  2. CCHP's real accomplishment is the 2015 law signed by Gov Pence that basically outlaws any annexation that is forced where a 65% majority of landowners in the affected area disagree. Regardless of whether HP wins or loses, the citizens of Indiana will not have another fiasco like this. The law Gov Pence signed is a direct result of this malgovernance.

  3. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  4. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  5. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

ADVERTISEMENT