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Prosecutor can’t grant use immunity to parents of injured infant

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The Indiana Supreme Court held Wednesday that a prosecutor can’t petition a court to compel a party to testify under the grant of use immunity when the party is the primary target of the investigation and has invoked his constitutional right against self-incrimination if no charges have been filed or a grand jury proceeding hasn’t been initiated.

The issue arose in In Re: Prosecutor's Subpoena Regarding S.H. and S.C.; S.H. v. State of Indiana, 73S01-1209-CR-563, in which the Shelby County Prosecutor’s Office was investigating multiple puncture wounds on the back of S.H.’s and S.C.’s newborn. S.C. gave birth to the child alone in their apartment; when S.H. returned and took the mother and child to the hospital, the staff saw the wounds. This led to an investigation and removal of the baby from her parents’ care.

The county prosecutor petitioned for subpoenas to compel the parents to testify. The day before they were set to testify, their attorney moved to quash the subpoenas under their constitutional rights against self-incrimination. The prosecutor then petitioned for grant of use immunity, which the trial court granted. The court also denied the parents’ motion to correct error, holding the authority to compel testimony through use immunity was implicit in the office of the prosecutor itself.

The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed on other grounds, but the justices disagreed, reversing the trial court and sending the case back to Shelby Superior Court. Justice Mark Massa, writing for the court, held that the prosecutor had no statutory authority under I.C. 35-34-2 or 35-37-3 to request the grant of use immunity. These statutes allow a petition for grant of use immunity only when either a grand jury has been convened or the prosecutor has filed an indictment or information.

They also held that I.C. 33-39-1-4 doesn’t extend to a request for grant of use immunity. They rejected the state’s argument that In re Order for Indiana Bell Telephone to Disclose Records, 274 Ind. 131, 409 N.E.2d 1089 (1980), or any other precedent confers prosecutorial authority in the absence of express statutory language.

“We will not use Indiana Bell as a justification for a judicial expansion of that authority in contravention of the General Assembly’s express instructions. To do so would be an encroachment into the legislative purview incompatible with our constitutionally-mandated separation of powers,” he wrote.

“We also recognize that the General Assembly may have had good reason to restrict use immunity – a potent tool that permits courts to override an individual’s constitutional right against self-incrimination – to contexts in which there is substantial judicial oversight,” Massa continued. “Both grand jury proceedings and post-charge hearings and trials provide that oversight.”

 

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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