ILNews

Purse search violated Indiana Constitution

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

A majority of Indiana Court of Appeals judges reversed a woman's conviction of possession of cocaine because the concern for the safety of police officers doesn't justify the warrantless search of every purse that is stretched in such a way it appears it could be holding a gun.

In Tamica Webster v. State, No. 71A03-0902-CR-78, the judges reviewed Tamica Webster's case for violations of the Indiana Constitution and Judges Michael Barnes and Melissa May determined based on Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ind. 2005), the cocaine found in her purse shouldn't have been admitted into evidence.

Webster's boyfriend was driving her car when they were pulled over. The police officer allowed Webster to get out of the car near the gas station where she worked. She stood across a busy, four-lane street nearly 75 feet away watching the officer conduct the stop.

The officer asked her to return to the car after learning the vehicle registration may be in Webster's purse. She came back carrying her large, flexible cloth purse in both hands; the officer thought her purse was stretched in such a manner that it could have a gun in it.

After telling her repeatedly not to put her hands in her purse, Webster clutched it and turned away from the officer. He handcuffed her and searched the purse, where he found cocaine.

The degree of concern that Webster had violated the law was low, wrote Judge Barnes. The police officer asked Webster to come back to the traffic stop because he thought she had the vehicle registration, not because of suspicious criminal activity. Also, purses can contain many things that can make them stretched out and his concern she had a gun was based on mere speculation.

The degree of intrusion was high because she complied with the officer's request to return to the traffic stop, which imposed on her liberty. When he took her to the ground, handcuffed her, and searched her purse without a warrant, that was a severe intrusion on her ordinary activity, the judge continued.

"As for the extent of law enforcement need, we fully recognize and agree with the need of law enforcement officers to protect themselves from armed suspects," he wrote. "However, we cannot conclude that the concern for officer safety justifies the warrantless search of every purse that is stretched in a manner that suggests it could conceivably contain a gun."

The majority also ruled that the attenuation doctrine doesn't apply in this case. Even if Webster's clutching her purse and turning her body amounted to the crime of resisting law enforcement, her actions weren't so sufficiently attenuated to dissipate any taint of the unconstitutional search.

Chief Judge John Baker dissented, believing the officer's concern that Webster was carrying a gun wasn't based on mere speculation. When considering all the circumstances in this case - she wouldn't let go of her purse, she pulled away, and the purse's bulge - the officer's level of suspicion could have increased. The officer had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, he wrote, and although the officer wasn't certain Webster had a gun, he didn't need to be certain. Other than searching her purse, he had no other way of knowing whether there was a gun in it, wrote the chief judge.

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

ADVERTISEMENT