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Religious defense doesn't discharge court's subject matter jurisdiction

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A court with authority to hear defamation and invasion of privacy claims is not ousted of subject matter jurisdiction just because a defendant pleads a religious defense, the Indiana Supreme Court ruled today.

In Rosalyn West v. Betty Wadlington, et al., No. 49S02-1009-CV-509, Rosalyn West filed a suit alleging defamation and invasion of privacy in Marion Superior Court against fellow church members Betty Wadlington and Jeanette Larkins. The City of Indianapolis as Larkins’ employer was also made a defendant after West learned a memo discussing West’s actions at the church was sent to Larkins at her Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department e-mail address. The memo was forwarded to 89 other people.

Larkins and the city filed a motion to dismiss under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing under the First and Fourteenth Amendments that any adjudication of the complaint would require entanglement of the church’s politics and doctrine. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice for all the defendants; the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed.

The justices also reversed the trial court, but not for constitutional reasons. Using Brazauskas v. Fort Wayne South Bend Diocese, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 286 (Ind. 2003), as a guide, they held just as with a claim concerning employment disputes, a court that has authority to hear claims of defamation and invasion of privacy isn’t ousted of subject matter jurisdiction merely because a defendant pleads a religious defense. As such, the trial court erred in dismissing West’s complaint on this ground.

But this case isn’t ripe for adjudication using a summary judgment standard of review, noted Justice Robert Rucker. When a T.R. 12(B)(6) motion is treated as a motion for summary judgment, the court must allow the parties a reasonable opportunity to present summary judgment materials, and there is nothing in the record to suggest the trial court afforded the parties an opportunity to present T.R. 56 materials in support of or against summary judgment.

“Instead, because the parties treated the Defendants’ motion as one to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court ruled accordingly. As noted above this was error. And on this ground we reverse the judgment of the trial court,” he wrote, remanding the issue for further proceedings.
 

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  1. Just an aside, but regardless of the outcome, I 'm proud of Judge William Hughes. He was the original magistrate on the Home place issue. He ruled for Home Place, and was primaried by Brainard for it. Their tool Poindexter failed to unseat Hughes, who won support for his honesty and courage throughout the county, and he was reelected Judge of Hamilton County's Superior Court. You can still stand for something and survive. Thanks, Judge Hughes!

  2. CCHP's real accomplishment is the 2015 law signed by Gov Pence that basically outlaws any annexation that is forced where a 65% majority of landowners in the affected area disagree. Regardless of whether HP wins or loses, the citizens of Indiana will not have another fiasco like this. The law Gov Pence signed is a direct result of this malgovernance.

  3. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  4. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  5. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

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