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SCOTUS defines money-laundering 'proceeds'

Michael W. Hoskins
January 1, 2008
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The Supreme Court of the United States has defined money laundering and tossed out the convictions of an East Chicago man in a split decision today.

The high court ruled on U.S. v. Efrain Santos, et al., No. 06-1005, which involved a money-laundering ring in East Chicago. This was one of two money-laundering cases decided by the court today; the other came in Cuellar v. U.S., No. 06-1456, which held that mere concealment of money during a transport is not enough to support a conviction for money laundering.

In Santos, a majority of justices held that "proceeds" according to the federal money-laundering statute applies only to transactions involving criminal profits, not the total amount of money.

Justices applied a narrow interpretation that authoring Justice Antonin Scalia said will not unduly burden the federal government and law enforcement agencies, who must show only that a single instance of unlawful activity was profitable.

The court applied the rule of lenity that favors defendants, not prosecutors, as it pondered the statute and reflected on the word "proceeds."

"Under either of the word's ordinary definitions, all provisions of the federal money-laundering statute are coherent; no provisions are redundant and the statute is not rendered utterly absurd," the opinion states. "From the face of the statute, there is no more reason to think that 'proceeds' means 'receipts' than there is to think that 'proceeds' means 'profits.' Under a long line of our decisions, the tie must go to the defendants. Because the 'profits' definition of 'proceeds' is always more defendant-friendly than the (other) definition, the rule of lenity dictates that it should be adopted."

But in a dissenting opinion - with which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Anthony Kennedy and Steven Breyer concurred - Justice Samuel Alito wrote, "Concluding that 'proceeds' means 'profits,' the plurality opinion's interpretation would frustrate Congress' intent and maim a statute that was enacted as an important defense against criminal enterprises."

Specifically, the Santos case involves the federal prosecution of a tavern lottery raid where Santos - known as "Puerto Rican Frankie" - was arrested for running the illegal operation throughout the region from the 1970s to 1994. He was sentenced to 17 years in prison in 1998, but was released after the 7th Circuit issued rulings that changed the interpretation of money laundering. Following those decisions, U.S. District Judge James Moody in Hammond ruled that Santos' actions were no longer considered money laundering because of an interpretation of "net proceeds" and "gross proceeds" in federal laws.

Indianapolis lawyer Todd Vare with Barnes & Thornburg argued before the high court Oct. 3, 2007, making Santos the oldest case on its docket this term. This was the Hoosier attorney's first appearance before the SCOTUS and now represents a victory in a case that he took pro bono.

"My client is very pleased that he's properly being kept a free men," said Vare, indicating he spoke with his client within minutes of hearing about the ruling this morning. "Legally, I'm very pleased because it reflects the arguments we made about this ambiguous statute and, what's most interesting, is the division of justices on either side shows how difficult it was interpreting this statute and applying interpretations to the facts here."
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  1. Just an aside, but regardless of the outcome, I 'm proud of Judge William Hughes. He was the original magistrate on the Home place issue. He ruled for Home Place, and was primaried by Brainard for it. Their tool Poindexter failed to unseat Hughes, who won support for his honesty and courage throughout the county, and he was reelected Judge of Hamilton County's Superior Court. You can still stand for something and survive. Thanks, Judge Hughes!

  2. CCHP's real accomplishment is the 2015 law signed by Gov Pence that basically outlaws any annexation that is forced where a 65% majority of landowners in the affected area disagree. Regardless of whether HP wins or loses, the citizens of Indiana will not have another fiasco like this. The law Gov Pence signed is a direct result of this malgovernance.

  3. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  4. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  5. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

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