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SCOTUS rules on Wal-Mart class-certification case

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With a ruling from the nation’s highest court, an Indianapolis federal judge and the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals learned they were correct in how they decided a sex-bias suit involving Rolls Royce.

The Supreme Court of the United States handed down its decision Monday in Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, et al., No. 10-277, reversing a decision by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals that allowed as many as 1.6 million female employees to join together in what would be the nation’s largest class-action lawsuit. Plaintiffs alleged Wal-Mart's habit of giving managers discretion to make pay and promotion decisions was a discriminatory policy that resulted in men earning more money than their female counterparts and holding a disproportionate number of leadership positions.

Specifically at issue in the nationwide class-action suit was whether claims of monetary relief can be certified under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(b)(2), which is designed for cases primarily seeking injunctive or declaratory relief and offers slightly more relaxed requirements in proving class status than what’s required in monetary relief requests.

Justice Antonin Scalia wrote for the majority that the class was not properly certified under Rule 23(b)(2), and that the plaintiffs should have used Rule 23(b)(3) for its requests for monetary relief. The court held that claims for monetary relief can’t be certified under Rule 23(b)(2), at least where the money requested is not incidental to the requested injunctive or declaratory relief, but justices stopped short of creating any blanket answer about whether that could ever happen.

“Respondents nonetheless argue that their back pay claims were appropriately certified under Rule 23(b)(2) because those claims do not ‘predominate’ over their injunctive and declaratory relief requests,” the syllabus states. “That interpretation has no basis in the Rule’s text and does obvious violence to the Rule’s structural features.”

If the court had agreed with the female employees’ arguments, it wrote that District courts would have to continuously re-evaluate class membership rosters to excise those who leave their employment and become ineligible for relief from the class-action suit.

That issue ties in with a case from Indianapolis that Judge Sarah Evans Barker had decided, Sally A. Randall, et al. v. Rolls-Royce Corp., No. 10-3446, and the 7th Circuit affirmed earlier this year. Both courts addressed a similar issue raised in Wal-Mart, and this national ruling upholds what the outcome was in Rolls-Royce and sets the stage for future class-action lawsuits involving both monetary and injunctive relief.

“Respondents wish to sue for millions of employment decisions at once,” Justice Scalia wrote. “Without some glue holding together the alleged reasons for those decisions, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class members’ claims will produce a common answer to the crucial discrimination question.”

But the four more liberal members of the court wrote they’d give more weight to the plaintiffs' evidence of widespread discrimination, which included a statistical analysis of Wal-Mart's employee ranks as well as the experiences of female workers who testified to a culture of discrimination.

In a partial dissent, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the plaintiffs had met their burden of alleging a question common to the proposed class, namely whether Wal-Mart’s discretionary pay and promotion policies are discriminatory.

“Managers, like all humankind, may be prey to biases of which they are unaware,” Justice Ginsburg wrote. “The risk of discrimination is heightened when those managers are predominantly of one sex, and are steeped in a corporate culture that perpetuates gender stereotypes.”
 

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  1. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  2. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  3. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

  4. Why in the world would someone need a person to correct a transcript when a realtime court reporter could provide them with a transcript (rough draft) immediately?

  5. This article proved very enlightening. Right ahead of sitting the LSAT for the first time, I felt a sense of relief that a score of 141 was admitted to an Indiana Law School and did well under unique circumstances. While my GPA is currently 3.91 I fear standardized testing and hope that I too will get a good enough grade for acceptance here at home. Thanks so much for this informative post.

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