ILNews

SCOTUS to hear Indiana steelworkers’ case Monday

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

This question arising in an Indiana labor case will be before the Supreme Court of the United States on Monday: What does “changing clothes” mean?

That language in Section 203(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act has been interpreted differently in federal circuits around the nation. The case before the justices, Sandifer v. United States Steel Corp., 12-417, arrives with a 7th Circuit holding that the acts of changing clothes and walking to work stations are not compensable under Section 203(o).

Clifton Sandifer and other workers claimed that U.S. Steel was in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act by not compensating them for the time they spend changing into safety gear and walking to their work stations. The 7th Circuit rejected that argument, affirming the order of Judge Robert Miller of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.

Alison Fox, who practices primarily in labor law at Faegre Baker Daniels LLP in South Bend, is following the case but is not involved. She said that while the question is a narrow one, it could resolve different interpretations among circuits, some of which consider safety gear to be clothing, for instance, while others don’t.

Likewise, some circuits, including the 7th, hold that the statute addresses the question, while several other circuits have ruled the question is one that may be negotiated between employers and unions.

Fox said the varying circuit rulings have resulted in some companies that do business nationwide operating under different practices from region to region. The federal Department of Labor also has changed its interpretation over the years, she noted.

“The whole point of the provision we’re talking about is to create some certainty,” Fox said.

If the Supreme Court affirms the 7th Circuit, Fox said it could invalidate provisions of collective bargaining agreements that compensate workers for the time they spend changing or washing clothes. If the court reverses, a result could be that unionized workers can negotiate for pay during such times.

“A wide range of industries would be affected” by any ruling, she said. “Because it involves common types of safety gear in many industries, I think it will have a wide-ranging impact.”


 

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

ADVERTISEMENT