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Sex Offender Registration Act not ex post facto as applied to Perry County man

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The Indiana Court of Appeals upheld the denial of a petition to remove a convicted child molester from the sex offender registry, finding the Sex Offender Registration Act is non-punitive as applied to him.

Daniel Hollen was convicted in Knox County in January 2000 of two counts of Class B felony child molesting for offenses that happened between July 4, 1994, and Sept. 30, 1995. In 2012, he filed pro se a “petition to remove registration act, sexual violent predator status and global positioning satellite” in Perry County, where he lived. He argued his classification as a SVP was contrary to the ex post facto clauses of the Indiana and U.S. constitutions and that he’s being retroactively punished by having to register as a SVP for the rest of his life. He believed the Act wasn’t in effect at the time he committed his offenses.

The case was transferred from Perry Circuit Court to Knox Circuit Court, but it was then sent back to Perry County because that is where Hollen resides. The Perry Circuit Court denied the motion.

The Court of Appeals pointed out that many of Hollen’s arguments are scattered and he failed to put forth a cogent argument on most points. The court addressed his argument that the requirement he registers as a SVP constitutes an ex post facto law because, he claims, the offenses were committed before the effective date of the Act.

Because he was found guilty of two counts that took place after July 1, 1994, the date the Act took effect, the judges didn’t find his argument persuasive that the offenses took place prior to the Act’s effective date. They also looked at the amendments enacted through the years to see if they are constitutional as applied to Hollen.

The COA used the “intent-effects” test to analyze whether the effects of applying the regulatory scheme are punitive as to Hollen by considering seven factors outlined in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S. Ct. 554, 567-68 (1963). Those include whether the behavior to which the sanction applies is already a crime and whether the sanction appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.

Under the circumstances of Hollen’s case, the court found in Daniel J. Hollen v. State of Indiana, 62A04-1211-MI-636, that the factors weigh in favor of treating the Act as non-punitive as applied to Hollen.

 

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  1. As one of the many consumers affected by this breach, I found my bank data had been lifted and used to buy over $200 of various merchandise in New York. I did a pretty good job of tracing the purchases to stores around a college campus just from the info on my bank statement. Hm. Mr. Hill, I would like my $200 back! It doesn't belong to the state, in my opinion. Give it back to the consumers affected. I had to freeze my credit and take out data protection, order a new debit card and wait until it arrived. I deserve something for my trouble!

  2. Don't we have bigger issues to concern ourselves with?

  3. Anyone who takes the time to study disciplinary and bar admission cases in Indiana ... much of which is, as a matter of course and by intent, off the record, would have a very difficult time drawing lines that did not take into account things which are not supposed to matter, such as affiliations, associations, associates and the like. Justice Hoosier style is a far departure than what issues in most other parts of North America. (More like Central America, in fact.) See, e.g., http://www.theindianalawyer.com/indiana-attorney-illegally-practicing-in-florida-suspended-for-18-months/PARAMS/article/42200 When while the Indiana court system end the cruel practice of killing prophets of due process and those advocating for blind justice?

  4. Wouldn't this call for an investigation of Government corruption? Chief Justice Loretta Rush, wrote that the case warranted the high court’s review because the method the Indiana Court of Appeals used to reach its decision was “a significant departure from the law.” Specifically, David wrote that the appellate panel ruled after reweighing of the evidence, which is NOT permissible at the appellate level. **But yet, they look the other way while an innocent child was taken by a loving mother who did nothing wrong"

  5. Different rules for different folks....

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