ILNews

Sexual misconduct may not be abusive

Back to TopCommentsE-mailPrintBookmark and Share

The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals vacated today a man's sentence following a guilty plea on a child pornography charge because it was unsure whether his previous conviction in Indiana for sexual misconduct with a minor should be considered abusive and allow for his minimum sentence to be increased.

In United States of America v. Sean Osborne, No. 08-1176, Sean Osborne pleaded guilty to possessing and distributing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 2252(a). Under that section, a defendant with a previous conviction in any state relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual misconduct with a minor or ward would have an increased minimum sentence of 15 years. Osborne was convicted in 2002 of violating Indiana Code Section 35-42-4-9(b), which makes it a crime for someone 18 or older to fondle or touch someone age 14 or 15 with intent to arouse the sexual desires of the child or adult.

The question in this case is whether Osborne's sexual misconduct in the 2002 case was abusive. The District Court ruled every conviction under that state statute arises from abusive sexual conduct and sentenced him to the 15-year minimum.

The federal statute section doesn't define what is abusive nor has any appellate court addressed what makes sexual conduct involving a minor abusive. Interpreting that any offense out of sexual conduct with a minor is abusive would make the use of the word unnecessary in the statute, wrote Judge Frank Easterbrook.

Under I.C. Section 35-42-4-9(b), it's possible for an 18-year-old high school student to be convicted for sexual contact with his or her 15-year-old significant other that may be considered typical behavior for high school students in a relationship.

"Exploratory touching between students in high school is not a form of 'abusive' sexual contact, as that word is ordinarily understood," wrote the judge.

Because of the lack of a definition of abusive under federal Section 2252, the 7th Circuit ruled it's best to say as a matter of federal law that sexual behavior is abusive only if it is similar to one of the crimes denominated as a form of abuse elsewhere in Title 18.

Unless the charging papers can show Osborne has been convicted of violating the Indiana Code in a way that shows abusive sexual behavior, the District Court must treat his 2002 conviction as non-abusive because the elements of the statute permit a conviction for many kinds of conduct that federal law doesn't consider abusive, wrote Judge Easterbrook.

The federal appellate court remanded the case for further proceedings.

ADVERTISEMENT

Post a comment to this story

COMMENTS POLICY
We reserve the right to remove any post that we feel is obscene, profane, vulgar, racist, sexually explicit, abusive, or hateful.
 
You are legally responsible for what you post and your anonymity is not guaranteed.
 
Posts that insult, defame, threaten, harass or abuse other readers or people mentioned in Indiana Lawyer editorial content are also subject to removal. Please respect the privacy of individuals and refrain from posting personal information.
 
No solicitations, spamming or advertisements are allowed. Readers may post links to other informational websites that are relevant to the topic at hand, but please do not link to objectionable material.
 
We may remove messages that are unrelated to the topic, encourage illegal activity, use all capital letters or are unreadable.
 

Messages that are flagged by readers as objectionable will be reviewed and may or may not be removed. Please do not flag a post simply because you disagree with it.

Sponsored by
ADVERTISEMENT
Subscribe to Indiana Lawyer
  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

ADVERTISEMENT