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Statute doesn't authorize dismissal of charges

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Even if the Indiana Court of Appeals concluded the trial court violated statute by failing to set a juvenile delinquency hearing within the 60-day time limit, the appellate court doesn't believe the statute authorizes dismissal of the charges as the defendant argues.

In J.D. v. State of Indiana, No. 49A05-0901-JV-40, J.D. argued under Indiana Code Section 31-37-11-2(b), his charges for committing what would have been Class D felony theft and Class B misdemeanor criminal mischief if committed by an adult should have been dismissed because his hearing wasn't set until after a 60-day timeframe within the statute.

Section 2(b) says if a child is not in detention and a petition has been filed, a hearing must be commenced not later than 60 days, excluding weekends and legal holidays, after the petition is filed.

After the state filed the petition Aug. 11, 2008, that J.D. was a delinquent child, he was released to his parents on supervised home release. He was later placed with the Indiana Department of Correction in another cause. At a Sept. 8 conference, a denial hearing was scheduled for Dec. 2; J.D. didn't object to the date, which was more than 60 days after the petition was filed.

The Court of Appeals compared Section 2(b) to the speedy-trial provisions of Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C), using caselaw on the rule to help interpret the subsection. Because J.D. didn't object to the hearing set outside a 60-day time limit, he waived his rights under Indiana Code Section 31-37-11-2(b), the appellate court determined.

Even if he didn't waive his rights, it isn't clear under the statute that a dismissal would be warranted. The only section of Indiana Code Chapter 31-37-11 that calls for discharge is Section 9, which isn't applicable in the instant case. Section 7 says if the court fails to meet the applicable time limits, a child in detention will be released to a parent or guardian.

But when a child isn't in detention, Section 7 is silent. However, that doesn't mean a violation of 2(b) requires outright dismissal.

"To the contrary, we fail to see why dismissal would be inappropriate for a child who is in detention, but somehow appropriate for a child who is not," wrote Judge Paul Mathias. "Without clear statutory authorization, we cannot say that a violation of the sixty-day limit of Section 2(b) required the trial court to dismiss the allegations that J.D. was a delinquent child."

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  1. Just an aside, but regardless of the outcome, I 'm proud of Judge William Hughes. He was the original magistrate on the Home place issue. He ruled for Home Place, and was primaried by Brainard for it. Their tool Poindexter failed to unseat Hughes, who won support for his honesty and courage throughout the county, and he was reelected Judge of Hamilton County's Superior Court. You can still stand for something and survive. Thanks, Judge Hughes!

  2. CCHP's real accomplishment is the 2015 law signed by Gov Pence that basically outlaws any annexation that is forced where a 65% majority of landowners in the affected area disagree. Regardless of whether HP wins or loses, the citizens of Indiana will not have another fiasco like this. The law Gov Pence signed is a direct result of this malgovernance.

  3. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  4. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  5. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

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