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Store owner’s ‘Spice law’ prosecution may proceed, COA rules

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The state may press criminal charges under the state’s synthetic drug law against a Hamilton County defendant who unsuccessfully argued to the Indiana Court of Appeals that the law was vague and represents an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the Board of Pharmacy.

In 2011, the Legislature outlawed possession of synthetic cannabinoids commonly known as Spice or K2, and in 2012 it expanded the list to include synthetic drugs including AM-2201. The statute is I.C. 35-31.5-2-321, and the law took effect March 15, 2012.

Between March 21 and 26, 2012, undercover detectives from the Hamilton/Boone County Drug Task force made multiple purchases of substances containing AM-2201 from Love Jeet Kaur and Kamal Jit Singh, the owners of a Valero gas station in Noblesville. In May 2011, Kaur was charged with Class D felony dealing in a synthetic cannabinoid, Class D felony possession of a synthetic cannabinoid, and Class D felony maintaining a common nuisance.

Kaur moved to dismiss the charges, which the trial court denied and Court of Appeals on Monday affirmed in Love Jeet Kaur v. State of Indiana, 29A05-1208-CR-424.
 
“Because we conclude that the charging information and probable cause affidavit were sufficient to place Kaur on notice, the Synthetic Drug Law is not vague as applied to Kaur, and the Synthetic Drug Law does not represent an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power as applied to Kaur, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Kaur’s motion to dismiss,” Judge Cale Bradford wrote for the panel.



 

 

 

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