ILNews

Summary judgments on federal preemption are reversible error

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The Indiana Court of Appeals has found an exterminator and the insecticide maker should not have been granted summary judgments on the issue of federal preemption.

In John Gresser and Janice Gresser, et al. v. The Dow Chemical Company, Inc; Dowelanco n/k/a Dow Agrosciences LLC; and Reliable Exterminators, Inc., 79A02-1111-CT-1014, the appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings.

Among its findings, the COA ruled that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Dow Chemical Company and Reliable Exterminators on the issue of federal preemption.

The Gresser family filed product liability claims against Dow and negligence claims against Reliable after they began experiencing an array of health problems. They contend the pesticide made by Dow and used by Reliable to kill termites caused a host of physical and cognitive aliments which forced them to eventually move out of their home.

The lower court determined that the Gressers’ product liability and negligence claims were preempted pursuant to PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131, S.Ct. 2567 (2011).

The Gressers appealed.

In regards to the federal preemption, the COA ruled that because the Gressers did not establish their product liability claims against Dow under Indiana Product Liability Act, the chemical company is not required to defend against these claims. Consequently there is no viable conflict preemption issue under PLIVA.  

In addition, the Gressers’ claim that Reliable failed to warn does not render compliance with both state and federal law impossible, the COA held. Pointing to Dow Chemical Co. v. Ebling, 753 N.E.2d 633, 640 (Ind. 2001), the court noted the use of state tort law to further disseminate label information facilitates rather than frustrates the objective of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and does not burden an applicator’s compliance with FIFRA.


The COA affirmed summary judgment to Dow on Gressers’ failure to warn claims under IPLA. The court also correctly denied Reliable’s summary judgment motions pertaining to the Gressers’ negligence claims and the possibility of a punitive damage award, the judges ruled.

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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