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Supreme Court splits on Barrett Law sewer payment case

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A divided Indiana Supreme Court has ruled that the City of Indianapolis didn’t violate the constitution by refusing to grant some homeowners’ refund requests for sewer project assessments they’d paid in full when other homeowners who’d made partial installment payments had the remaining balance of assessments owed discharged.

The 3-2 ruling came today in the case of City of Indianapolis, et al. v. Christine Armour, et al., No. 49A02-0901-CV-84, in which 45 homeowners in an Indianapolis subdivision sued the city for not receiving refunds of sewer assessments they’d paid. The assessments were part of a sanitary sewer project funded under the Barrett Law, Indiana Code Chapter 36-9-39, and the homeowners were able to either pay the full amount or make partial payments each month. But when the city switched to funding these projects under the Septic Tank Elimination Program, those who’d been paying monthly installments were no longer responsible for anything that had been unpaid. Homeowners who’d paid the nearly $10,000 assessments in one lump sum prior to Nov. 1, 2005, were denied any refund on any portion, equivalent to what the other neighbors had discharged by the city.

Those homeowners sued for refunds, declaratory relief, or a writ of mandamus, alleging the city's decision to not refund the money violated the Equal Protection Clause. The trial court agreed and entered judgment against Indianapolis for $380,914. The Indiana Court of Appeals in 2009 affirmed that judgment and found the city didn’t have a rational basis for granting relief to those who’d been paying gradually but not for those who had paid in full up front. The only way to resolve the constitutional Equal Protection Clause violation, according to the intermediate appellate court, was to issue refunds to the plaintiffs.

But the state Supreme Court disagreed, with a three-justice majority reversing the trial court decision and finding no constitutional violation had occurred. Justice Frank Sullivan wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Randall T. Shepard and Justice Steven David, while Justices Robert Rucker and Brent Dickson dissented.

“We hold that Resolution 101 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it rationally related to legitimate government interests,” Justice Sullivan wrote.

The majority found that the city’s rationale was that low- and middle-class families were more likely to have been paying gradually and those who paid in full up front were likely higher income, meaning it was reasonable that it would coincide with the government’s interest in moving away from the Barrett Law system because of the financial burdens it created. But overall, the majority cited a U.S. Supreme Court case from 1981 in determining that it doesn’t matter under the rational basis review what the actual facts might show about that financial hardship if the issue might be debatable before the governmental decision-maker. That is why the Court of Appeals erred in requiring actual proof of the financial hardship statuses of those who had their assessments discharged, the majority wrote.

The majority justices also pointed out that the decision to not refund money to those who’d paid in full was another legitimate government interest – preservation of limited resources in not emptying its coffers.

“It is true that those whose assessments were discharged also received a sewer and did so at a lower price,” Justice Sullivan wrote. “But the Equal Protection Clause does not require substantive equality among taxpayers if there is a rational basis for differing treatment, and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding otherwise.”

But Justices Rucker and Dickson disagreed, finding the city’s “rational basis” wasn’t sufficient and was used as more a blanket reason without any practical justification of it actually doing what it claimed to do.

“However, merely declaring that Barrett Law funding ‘imposed financial hardships on middle- and low-income property owners who were often most in need of sanitary sewers due to failing septic systems,’ does nothing to explain why the City treated differently residents who elected to pay their assessments in a lump sum versus those who elected to pay in installments,” Justice Rucker wrote. “Here, there is no indication that the Board even believed the classification would further its stated objective. In my view, the disconnect demonstrates that the classification fails to have ‘a fair and substantial relation’ to the statutory objective.”

The U.S. Supreme Court hasn't specifically addressed whether a municipality contravenes the Equal Protection Clause when it forgives an outstanding assessment owed by some property owners while, at the same time, it refuses to refund an equivalent amount to similarly situated property owners who have already paid the same assessment in full.
 

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  1. Falk said “At this point, at this minute, we’ll savor this particular victory.” “It certainly is a historic week on this front,” Cockrum said. “What a delight ... “Happy Independence Day to the women of the state of Indiana,” WOW. So we broke with England for the right to "off" our preborn progeny at will, and allow the processing plant doing the dirty deeds (dirt cheap) to profit on the marketing of those "products of conception." I was completely maleducated on our nation's founding, it would seem. (But I know the ACLU is hard at work to remedy that, too.)

  2. congratulations on such balanced journalism; I also love how fetus disposal affects women's health protection, as covered by Roe...

  3. It truly sickens me every time a case is compared to mine. The Indiana Supreme Court upheld my convictions based on a finding of “hidden threats.” The term “hidden threat” never appeared until the opinion in Brewington so I had no way of knowing I was on trial for making hidden threats because Dearborn County Prosecutor F Aaron Negangard argued the First Amendment didn't protect lies. Negangard convened a grand jury to investigate me for making “over the top” and “unsubstantiated” statements about court officials, not hidden threats of violence. My indictments and convictions were so vague, the Indiana Court of Appeals made no mention of hidden threats when they upheld my convictions. Despite my public defender’s closing arguments stating he was unsure of exactly what conduct the prosecution deemed to be unlawful, Rush found that my lawyer’s trial strategy waived my right to the fundamental error of being tried for criminal defamation because my lawyer employed a strategy that attempted to take advantage of Negangard's unconstitutional criminal defamation prosecution against me. Rush’s opinion stated the prosecution argued two grounds for conviction one constitutional and one not, however the constitutional true threat “argument” consistently of only a blanket reading of subsection 1 of the intimidation statute during closing arguments, making it impossible to build any kind of defense. Of course intent was impossible for my attorney to argue because my attorney, Rush County Chief Public Defender Bryan Barrett refused to meet with me prior to trial. The record is littered with examples of where I made my concerns known to the trial judge that I didn’t know the charges against me, I did not have access to evidence, all while my public defender refused to meet with me. Special Judge Brian Hill, from Rush Superior Court, refused to address the issue with my public defender and marched me to trial without access to evidence or an understanding of the indictments against me. Just recently the Indiana Public Access Counselor found that four over four years Judge Hill has erroneously denied access to the grand jury audio from my case, the most likely reason being the transcription of the grand jury proceedings omitted portions of the official audio record. The bottom line is any intimidation case involves an action or statement that is debatably a threat of physical violence. There were no such statements in my case. The Indiana Supreme Court took partial statements I made over a period of 41 months and literally connected them with dots… to give the appearance that the statements were made within the same timeframe and then claimed a person similarly situated would find the statements intimidating while intentionally leaving out surrounding contextual factors. Even holding the similarly situated test was to be used in my case, the prosecution argued that the only intent of my public writings was to subject the “victims” to ridicule and hatred so a similarly situated jury instruction wouldn't even have applied in my case. Chief Justice Rush wrote the opinion while Rush continued to sit on a committee with one of the alleged victims in my trial and one of the judges in my divorce, just as she'd done for the previous 7+ years. All of this information, including the recent PAC opinion against the Dearborn Superior Court II can be found on my blog www.danbrewington.blogspot.com.

  4. On a related note, I offered the ICLU my cases against the BLE repeatedly, and sought their amici aid repeatedly as well. Crickets. Usually not even a response. I am guessing they do not do allegations of anti-Christian bias? No matter how glaring? I have posted on other links the amicus brief that did get filed (search this ezine, e.g., Kansas attorney), read the Thomas More Society brief to note what the ACLU ran from like vampires from garlic. An Examiner pledged to advance diversity and inclusion came right out on the record and demanded that I choose Man's law or God's law. I wonder, had I been asked to swear off Allah ... what result then, ICLU? Had I been found of bad character and fitness for advocating sexual deviance, what result then ICLU? Had I been lifetime banned for posting left of center statements denigrating the US Constitution, what result ICLU? Hey, we all know don't we? Rather Biased.

  5. It was mentioned in the article that there have been numerous CLE events to train attorneys on e-filing. I would like someone to provide a list of those events, because I have not seen any such events in east central Indiana, and since Hamilton County is one of the counties where e-filing is mandatory, one would expect some instruction in this area. Come on, people, give some instruction, not just applause!

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