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Supreme Court upholds unemployment insurance decision

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The Indiana Supreme Court has upheld an Indiana Department of Workforce Development decision denying a woman her claim for unemployment insurance benefits after she was terminated for being unable to perform the required skills of her job.

In Diane Recker v. Review Board of the Indiana Dept. of Workforce Development, and FedEx Trade Networks, No. 93S02-1105-EX-285, the court considered a case involving Diane Recker who worked for FedEx Trade Networks and was required to pass all necessary training in order to take the position. She was repeatedly unable to complete a portion of the training program’s driving test requiring her to back up on a serpentine course and into a parking space. She had to fly to Oklahoma for that test, and on the flight there her ears became “clogged” in a way she believed impacted her ability to successfully complete the test. After she failed to pass the test, FedEx gave Recker the option to resign immediately or take a 30-day unpaid leave of absence. She resigned immediately and sought unemployment insurance benefits but was denied because she voluntarily left her job and did so without good cause. On appeal, an administrative law judge determined that she did not leave voluntarily but wasn’t entitled to benefits because she breached a duty owed to her employer and that justified her termination.

The unanimous court upheld the board’s decision that she was reasonably discharged because of the breach of duty. Using its rationale from Giovanoni v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dept of Workforce Dev., 927 N.E.2d 906, 908-12 (Ind. 2010), the court determined she had “some control” in performing the driving test, and the board didn’t find her clogged-ear defense was significant enough. This wasn’t a demonstrable impediment, and it was reasonable for the board to find that Recker was discharged for just cause and ineligible for benefits, the court ruled.

A footnote in the opinion delves into another topic that has been an issue before the state’s appellate courts – confidential names of parties being used in case names. The court of appeals has disagreed on that issue, and in a lengthy footnote Justice Brent Dickson wrote that information is to be excluded from public access only when requested by a party or person affected by the release of information. That didn’t happen here, so Recker’s name can be used in the appellate court documents.

 

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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