ILNews

Temporary and lessee worker same under act

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In what appears to be the first time the Indiana Court of Appeals has been presented with a joint employer argument in the context of Indiana Code Section 22-3-6-1(a), the Worker's Compensation Act, the appellate court determined that "temporary employee" and "leased employee" are not mutually exclusive terms and are interchangeable.

The main issue in Kenwal Steel Corp. v. John M. Seyring, No. 45A03-0806-CV-294, is whether Elwood Staffing, a staffing agency that places temporary employees, and Kenwal, where Seyring was placed, were joint employers for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act.

Seyring was injured in an accident while working at Kenwal, filed a worker's compensation claim against Elwood, and filed a complaint alleging Kenwal was negligent. Default judgment was entered against Kenwal; Kenwal's motion to set aside default judgment was granted, but the trial court denied its motion to dismiss.

Kenwal's argument is that because Seyring was a temporary employee, Elwood and Kenwal were joint employers pursuant to I.C. 22-3-6-1, and as his joint employer, the act provides the exclusive remedy for his injuries. The company also argued within the context of the act, temporary employees are equated to leased employees. Seyring argued that temporary employees and leased employees, the term used in the act, are not interchangeable.

The appellate court examined the statutory language of the Workers' Compensation Act and the "Guide to Indiana Worker's Compensation" handbook to rule that the act's reference to "lessor" and "lessee" isn't meant to exclude temporary employees. As such, Elwood was the lessor of Seyring, Kenwal was the lessee, and they were joint employers of him for purposes of the act, wrote Judge Michael Barnes. Seyring is therefore limited to the exclusive remedy provision of the act.

The appellate court also determined Kenwal didn't intentionally waive its right to enforce the exclusive remedy provision of the act in the terms of the company's contract with Elwood. Nothing in the contract could be construed to suggest the company intentionally relinquished its right to enforce that provision of the act, wrote the judge.

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  1. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  2. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  3. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

  4. Here's an idea...how about we MORE heavily regulate the law schools to reduce the surplus of graduates, driving starting salaries up for those new grads, so that we can all pay our insane amount of student loans off in a reasonable amount of time and then be able to afford to do pro bono & low-fee work? I've got friends in other industries, radiology for example, and their schools accept a very limited number of students so there will never be a glut of new grads and everyone's pay stays high. For example, my radiologist friend's school accepted just six new students per year.

  5. I totally agree with John Smith.

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