ILNews

Temporary and lessee worker same under act

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In what appears to be the first time the Indiana Court of Appeals has been presented with a joint employer argument in the context of Indiana Code Section 22-3-6-1(a), the Worker's Compensation Act, the appellate court determined that "temporary employee" and "leased employee" are not mutually exclusive terms and are interchangeable.

The main issue in Kenwal Steel Corp. v. John M. Seyring, No. 45A03-0806-CV-294, is whether Elwood Staffing, a staffing agency that places temporary employees, and Kenwal, where Seyring was placed, were joint employers for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act.

Seyring was injured in an accident while working at Kenwal, filed a worker's compensation claim against Elwood, and filed a complaint alleging Kenwal was negligent. Default judgment was entered against Kenwal; Kenwal's motion to set aside default judgment was granted, but the trial court denied its motion to dismiss.

Kenwal's argument is that because Seyring was a temporary employee, Elwood and Kenwal were joint employers pursuant to I.C. 22-3-6-1, and as his joint employer, the act provides the exclusive remedy for his injuries. The company also argued within the context of the act, temporary employees are equated to leased employees. Seyring argued that temporary employees and leased employees, the term used in the act, are not interchangeable.

The appellate court examined the statutory language of the Workers' Compensation Act and the "Guide to Indiana Worker's Compensation" handbook to rule that the act's reference to "lessor" and "lessee" isn't meant to exclude temporary employees. As such, Elwood was the lessor of Seyring, Kenwal was the lessee, and they were joint employers of him for purposes of the act, wrote Judge Michael Barnes. Seyring is therefore limited to the exclusive remedy provision of the act.

The appellate court also determined Kenwal didn't intentionally waive its right to enforce the exclusive remedy provision of the act in the terms of the company's contract with Elwood. Nothing in the contract could be construed to suggest the company intentionally relinquished its right to enforce that provision of the act, wrote the judge.

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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