7th Circuit denies convicted murderer habeas relief

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An Indiana man who was denied habeas relief, arguing his trial attorney was ineffective for not trying to suppress as evidence clothing he had given to police after his arrest, lost his appeal before the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Tuesday.

Tyrone L. Jones was convicted of murder and other charges related to the death of Sam Alexander in Indianapolis. Jones was allegedly the last person to see Alexander alive. A witness saw him with Alexander’s television, which Jones had pawned. He also attempted to pawn Alexander’s microwave.

Police found Alexander dead in his apartment with his hands bound. When Jones was brought to police headquarters for questioning by Detective Charles Benner, Jones signed a form that contained sections of advice of rights and waiver of rights. Jones agreed to give Benner his shoes and clothing. The shoe print of Jones’ shoe was the same as one that appeared on a pillowcase in the house.

Jones appealed his convictions, which were upheld, and then sought post-conviction relief in state court. He claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on his attorneys’ failure to object to the admission of the evidence related to the seizure of his shoes on the basis of Pirtle v. State, 323 N.E.2d. 634 (Ind. 1975).  The post-conviction court concluded that Jones had voluntarily surrendered the clothing. The Court of Appeals denied his claim, finding the mere admission of his shoes or clothing did not prejudice him.

“Here, Detective Benner’s request for Mr. Jones’s shoes fits comfortably within the category of searches to which Pirtle does not apply. It was limited in scope and was minimally intrusive – certainly less so than a blood sample or even a cheek swab. Mr. Jones has not come forward with any examples of Indiana cases that have required Pirtle warnings in circumstances similar to his, nor is there any indication that Indiana courts are inclined to extend the rule of Pirtle to apply in such circumstances,” Judge Kenneth Ripple wrote in Tyrone L. Jones v. Richard Brown, 12-3245.

“In the present case, had Mr. Jones’s counsel moved to suppress the shoes, or any evidence that resulted from the testing of the shoes, on the basis of Pirtle, we believe that the state court would have denied that motion. Consequently, trial counsel’s failure to press an unavailing argument based on Pirtle was not ‘outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance’ that Strickland allows, and trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective.”

“By determining that Mr. Jones had not established that the admission of inculpatory evidence was the result of any Pirtle error, the Court of Appeals of Indiana reasonably concluded that the second, so-called prejudice prong of Strickland had not been satisfied. Consequently, on habeas review, we cannot conclude that Mr. Jones was prejudiced by any failure of his trial counsel,” Ripple wrote.


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  1. If a class action suit or other manner of retribution is possible, count me in. I have email and voicemail from the man. He colluded with opposing counsel, I am certain. My case was damaged so severely it nearly lost me everything and I am still paying dearly.

  2. There's probably a lot of blame that can be cast around for Indiana Tech's abysmal bar passage rate this last February. The folks who decided that Indiana, a state with roughly 16,000 to 18,000 attorneys, needs a fifth law school need to question the motives that drove their support of this project. Others, who have been "strong supporters" of the law school, should likewise ask themselves why they believe this institution should be supported. Is it because it fills some real need in the state? Or is it, instead, nothing more than a resume builder for those who teach there part-time? And others who make excuses for the students' poor performance, especially those who offer nothing more than conspiracy theories to back up their claims--who are they helping? What evidence do they have to support their posturing? Ultimately, though, like most everything in life, whether one succeeds or fails is entirely within one's own hands. At least one student from Indiana Tech proved this when he/she took and passed the February bar. A second Indiana Tech student proved this when they took the bar in another state and passed. As for the remaining 9 who took the bar and didn't pass (apparently, one of the students successfully appealed his/her original score), it's now up to them (and nobody else) to ensure that they pass on their second attempt. These folks should feel no shame; many currently successful practicing attorneys failed the bar exam on their first try. These same attorneys picked themselves up, dusted themselves off, and got back to the rigorous study needed to ensure they would pass on their second go 'round. This is what the Indiana Tech students who didn't pass the first time need to do. Of course, none of this answers such questions as whether Indiana Tech should be accredited by the ABA, whether the school should keep its doors open, or, most importantly, whether it should have even opened its doors in the first place. Those who promoted the idea of a fifth law school in Indiana need to do a lot of soul-searching regarding their decisions. These same people should never be allowed, again, to have a say about the future of legal education in this state or anywhere else. Indiana already has four law schools. That's probably one more than it really needs. But it's more than enough.

  3. This man Steve Hubbard goes on any online post or forum he can find and tries to push his company. He said court reporters would be obsolete a few years ago, yet here we are. How does he have time to search out every single post about court reporters and even spy in private court reporting forums if his company is so successful???? Dude, get a life. And back to what this post was about, I agree that some national firms cause a huge problem.

  4. rensselaer imdiana is doing same thing to children from the judge to attorney and dfs staff they need to be investigated as well

  5. Sex offenders are victims twice, once when they are molested as kids, and again when they repeat the behavior, you never see money spent on helping them do you. That's why this circle continues