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The IBA's Criminal Justice and Appellate Sections File Amicus Brief on Sentencing Issue

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By James Bell and Casey Kannenberg, Bingham McHale
 

Bell James Bell

Sentencing hearings occur in the vast majority of Indiana’s criminal cases. For years, the tools trial judges have used to determine a reasonable sentence have included testimony, character letters, the defendant’s background and Indiana’s sentencing statutes. Recently, Indiana’s trial courts have begun utilizing “scoring models” to help determine a reasonable sentence. The practice of using such “scoring models” was recently challenged by a criminal defendant and his case reached the Supreme Court of Indiana.
 

Kannenberg Casey Kannenberg

Specifically, in Malenchik v. State of Indiana, No. 79S02-0908-CR-364 (Ind. 2010), the trial court, at sentencing, considered the results of a Level of Service Inventory-Revised (“LSI-R”) Report and the results of the defendant’s Substance Abuse Subtle Screening Inventory (“SASSI”). The defendant’s score on the LSI-R placed him in the “High Risk/Needs” category and the SASSI indicated that the defendant has a “high probability” of having a substance dependency. During the sentencing hearing, the judge referenced both the LSI-R and SASSI results, noting that “[Y]our LSIR score is high. Your SASSI score is high with a high probability of substance dependence disorder.” Id. at 3. After considering the Reports and other factors, the trial court ultimately sentenced the defendant to six years imprisonment, with two years suspended. Malenchik, No. 79S02-0908-CR-364, at 3, 4.

On appeal, the defendant challenged the trial court’s use of these scoring models. The State, on the other hand, argued that the Reports may be used in criminal sentencing “if employed consistently with [their] proper purposes and limitations.” Id. Eventually, these arguments reached the Supreme Court of Indiana.

However, prior to ruling on the issue, Chief Justice Shepard requested amicus briefs to aid the Court in reaching a conclusion. With the approval of the IBA Board of Directors, the IBA’s Criminal Justice and Appellate Sections drafted and filed an amicus curiae brief. Prior to the filing of the brief, members of these sections polled judges and criminal practitioners to determine the IBA’s position. Regardless of the position taken by the IBA, the views of all members were contained in the amicus brief and presented to the Court.

The Supreme Court of Indiana eventually arrived at a balanced result that upheld the use of “scoring models,” but limited their use. Specifically, the Court held that “legitimate offender assessment instruments do not replace but may inform a trial court’s sentencing determinations.” Malenchik, No. 79S02-0908-CR-364, at 2. The Court also concluded that “[t]hese evaluations and their scores are not intended to serve as aggravating or mitigating circumstances nor to determine the gross length of sentence, but a trial court may employ such results in formulating the manner in which a sentence is to be served.” Id. at 14.

The Criminal Justice and Appellate Sections would like to thank the judges and lawyers who shared their views and aided in the drafting of this amicus brief. In addition, both sections would like to give a special thanks to Professor Joel Schumm of the Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis for taking his personal time to draft the amicus brief and for allowing the voices of the IBA’s members to be heard.

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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