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Trial court erred in finding provision was liquidated damages clause

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A forfeiture provision in a purchase agreement between the Dean V. Kruse Foundation and Jerry Gates, the buyer of West Baden property, did not constitute a liquidated damages clause as the trial court ruled, the Indiana Court of Appeals held Tuesday. The judges ruled that the Kruse parties are entitled to more damages as a result of Gates’ breach of contract.

The Kruse Foundation was given a large parcel of property and 300,000 square foot manufacturing facility in West Baden. The foundation is the charitable organization that operates a World War II museum and automobile museum in Auburn. The foundation found that the costs were too much to maintain the property and it continually lost money, so the foundation sought to sell the property. Those attempts were unsuccessful, so Dean Kruse, an auctioneer and licensed real estate broker, auctioned the property. The auction was final and required earnest money. Gates bought the property with a $4 million bid and 5 percent buyer’s premium. He gave $100,000 to Kruse as earnest money. A few weeks later, Gates informed Kruse he was terminating the purchase agreement.

The property was eventually sold for $2.35 million. Gates then sued Kruse and the foundation for breach of contract, fraud and conversion, seeking the earnest money back. The Kruse parties counterclaimed for breach of contract and slander of title. After a ruling for Gates and an appeal that reversed, the trial court entered summary judgment for the Kruse parties and found the $100,000 was the appropriate amount of damages. The trial court believed the purchase agreement contained a liquidated damages provision and the Kruse parties were only entitled to the earnest money. The Kruse parties appealed.

Using caselaw, the Court of Appeals found that the provision at issue in the purchase agreement indicates intent to penalize the purchaser for a breach rather than intent to compensate the seller in the event of a breach. Although there is no mention of forfeiture as a penalty, the provision is also not labeled as liquidated damages, Judge Patricia Riley wrote.

“Further, the Purchase Agreement provides that the remedy of specific performance may be available to the seller in the event of default, suggesting that there is no ability for the purchaser to simply ‘walk away’ in the event of his breach. These features arguably favor interpretation of the provision as a penalty rather than as one providing for liquidated damages,” she wrote.

The appellate judges also disagreed with the trial court that the evidence of the property’s value was uncertain as there was sufficient evidence to determine the fair market value of the property at the time of the breach. They also disagreed that the Kruse parties are precluded from asserting legal damages for Gates’ breach. The judges remanded with instructions for the trial court to calculate the measure of damages as a result of the breach of contract.

 

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  1. I gave tempparry guardship to a friend of my granddaughter in 2012. I went to prison. I had custody. My daughter went to prison to. We are out. My daughter gave me custody but can get her back. She was not order to give me custody . but now we want granddaughter back from friend. She's 14 now. What rights do we have

  2. This sure is not what most who value good governance consider the Rule of Law to entail: "In a letter dated March 2, which Brizzi forwarded to IBJ, the commission dismissed the grievance “on grounds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that you are guilty of misconduct.”" Yet two month later reasonable cause does exist? (Or is the commission forging ahead, the need for reasonable belief be damned? -- A seeming violation of the Rules of Profession Ethics on the part of the commission) Could the rule of law theory cause one to believe that an explanation is in order? Could it be that Hoosier attorneys live under Imperial Law (which is also a t-word that rhymes with infamy) in which the Platonic guardians can do no wrong and never owe the plebeian class any explanation for their powerful actions. (Might makes it right?) Could this be a case of politics directing the commission, as celebrated IU Mauer Professor (the late) Patrick Baude warned was happening 20 years ago in his controversial (whisteblowing) ethics lecture on a quite similar topic: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1498&context=ilj

  3. I have a case presently pending cert review before the SCOTUS that reveals just how Indiana regulates the bar. I have been denied licensure for life for holding the wrong views and questioning the grand inquisitors as to their duties as to state and federal constitutional due process. True story: https://www.scribd.com/doc/299040839/2016Petitionforcert-to-SCOTUS Shorter, Amici brief serving to frame issue as misuse of govt licensure: https://www.scribd.com/doc/312841269/Thomas-More-Society-Amicus-Brown-v-Ind-Bd-of-Law-Examiners

  4. Here's an idea...how about we MORE heavily regulate the law schools to reduce the surplus of graduates, driving starting salaries up for those new grads, so that we can all pay our insane amount of student loans off in a reasonable amount of time and then be able to afford to do pro bono & low-fee work? I've got friends in other industries, radiology for example, and their schools accept a very limited number of students so there will never be a glut of new grads and everyone's pay stays high. For example, my radiologist friend's school accepted just six new students per year.

  5. I totally agree with John Smith.

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