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Vintage Corvette belongs to the last buyer

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Although a 1965 Chevrolet Corvette was the subject of litigation over ownership when it was purchased by a third party on eBay, the Indiana Court of Appeals has found the hotrod belongs to the eBay bidder.

The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment granted to Donald Gindelberger in James N. Brinkely and Stephanie L. Brinkley v. Michael Haluska, P.E., d/b/a Retro Tech, et al, 32A01-1204-MI-181. It found Gindelberger to be a good faith purchaser for value.

The Brinkleys bought the Corvette in 2005 and, in 2006, contracted with Michael Haluska to restore the car for $12,500 plus parts and additional expenses. However, the parties eventually had disagreement about Haluska’s work and the amount of money the Brinkleys still owed.

Mechanic’s Lien Plus, hired by Haluska, filed a lien on the vehicle and sent a certified notice to James Brinkley at his father’s residence which was the address listed on the title. The notice stated the vehicle would be sold at public auction in August 2009 if the charges of $7,400 were not paid.

Brinkley did not receive the notice of the sale.

At the August auction, Haluska purchased the vehicle for $100.

Then Mechanic’s Lien sent a second certified notice to Brinkley at his own address, informing him the car would be sold at public auction in November 2009 if he did not pay the charges.

On Nov. 20, 2009, the Brinkleys filed a complaint for injunctive relief against Haluska to bar the sale of the vehicle and to regain possession. That same day, Haluska filed an application for certificate of title with the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles and on Nov. 23, 2009, he was issued the certificate of title.

Haluska was served with the Brinkleys' complaint on Dec. 3, 2009, but he subsequently listed the car for sale on eBay. Gindelberger purchased the vehicle for $25,100 and received the certificate of title showing Haluska as the owner. Gindelberger did not examine the county court records prior to purchasing the vehicle.

After the trial court granted an injunction, ordering Haluska not to transfer title or deliver the signed title to the vehicle to any third party, the Brinkleys filed an amended complaint. They alleged Gindelberger was “not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice” because he had constructive notice of their lawsuit against Haluska.

The COA rejected that argument. It found there is no lis pendens notice for automobiles and there is no authority requiring Gindelberger to search pending litigation records prior to purchasing a vehicle.

 

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  1. Indiana's seatbelt law is not punishable as a crime. It is an infraction. Apparently some of our Circuit judges have deemed settled law inapplicable if it fails to fit their litmus test of political correctness. Extrapolating to redefine terms of behavior in a violation of immigration law to the entire body of criminal law leaves a smorgasbord of opportunity for judicial mischief.

  2. I wonder if $10 diversions for failure to wear seat belts are considered moral turpitude in federal immigration law like they are under Indiana law? Anyone know?

  3. What a fine article, thank you! I can testify firsthand and by detailed legal reports (at end of this note) as to the dire consequences of rejecting this truth from the fine article above: "The inclusion and expansion of this right [to jury] in Indiana’s Constitution is a clear reflection of our state’s intention to emphasize the importance of every Hoosier’s right to make their case in front of a jury of their peers." Over $20? Every Hoosier? Well then how about when your very vocation is on the line? How about instead of a jury of peers, one faces a bevy of political appointees, mini-czars, who care less about due process of the law than the real czars did? Instead of trial by jury, trial by ideological ordeal run by Orwellian agents? Well that is built into more than a few administrative law committees of the Ind S.Ct., and it is now being weaponized, as is revealed in articles posted at this ezine, to root out post moderns heresies like refusal to stand and pledge allegiance to all things politically correct. My career was burned at the stake for not so saluting, but I think I was just one of the early logs. Due, at least in part, to the removal of the jury from bar admission and bar discipline cases, many more fires will soon be lit. Perhaps one awaits you, dear heretic? Oh, at that Ind. article 12 plank about a remedy at law for every damage done ... ah, well, the founders evidently meant only for those damages done not by the government itself, rabid statists that they were. (Yes, that was sarcasm.) My written reports available here: Denied petition for cert (this time around): http://tinyurl.com/zdmawmw Denied petition for cert (from the 2009 denial and five year banishment): http://tinyurl.com/zcypybh Related, not written by me: Amicus brief: http://tinyurl.com/hvh7qgp

  4. Justice has finally been served. So glad that Dr. Ley can finally sleep peacefully at night knowing the truth has finally come to the surface.

  5. While this right is guaranteed by our Constitution, it has in recent years been hampered by insurance companies, i.e.; the practice of the plaintiff's own insurance company intervening in an action and filing a lien against any proceeds paid to their insured. In essence, causing an additional financial hurdle for a plaintiff to overcome at trial in terms of overall award. In a very real sense an injured party in exercise of their right to trial by jury may be the only party in a cause that would end up with zero compensation.

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