Post-judgment petitions for attorney fees permissible, COA rules

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Even after a trial court has entered a judgment and the case is settled, the Indiana Court of Appeals has ruled parties can still make a new filing for attorney fees.

In Boyer Construction Group Corp. v. Walker Construction Co., Inc. and Muller Realty, LLC, 45A03-1502-PL-66, the Court of Appeals dealt with dueling motions for attorney fees filed after the trial court issued its order. The appellate panel held both parties could petition after judgment but it found only one party was able to collect.
  
The dispute arose between the contractor Boyer and the subcontractor Walker over failure to pay for concrete work done at the Merrillville construction site of a new car dealership. Lake Superior Court found for Walker. It entered a judgment against Boyer for $1,680 plus pre-judgment interest and against Muller for $78,839.99 which included $41,854.15 in attorney fees.

Boyer then filed a motion against Walker. The contractor asserted it was the substantially prevailing party and therefore entitled to recover attorney fees. Boyer requested an award of $62,984.40 in attorney fees and expenses.

Walker responded by claiming it was the substantially prevailing party. It also requested an additional $20,400.28 in attorney fees and expenses to cover the cost involved in defending against Boyer’s “frivolous, certainly meritless” claim for fees.

The trial court ordered Boyer to remit $837.08 to Walker for attorney fees but denied Walker’s request for fees related to post-judgment work.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals gave Boyer a partial victory. The panel ruled Boyer was permitted to file a petition for attorney fees after the trial court entered the judgment.

However, the Court of Appeals upheld the denial of Boyer’s petition for those fees. Boyer tried to argue it was the substantially prevailing party but the Court of Appeals disagreed, finding the judgment was entirely in Walker’s favor. Therefore, Walker is the substantially prevailing party and is entitled to attorney fees.

Also, the Court of Appeals reversed the denial of Walker’s petition for supplemental attorney fees and expenses. Boyer contended Walker was not entitled to additional fees, in part, because the subcontractor already received every penny of fees it had requested at trial from Muller.  

Again, the Court of Appeals allowed the post-judgment petition for attorney fees. It found that neither the subcontract agreements nor existing caselaw limited Walker’s recovery of attorney fees to only those incurred prior to the trial court’s judgment.   

 

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