Court opinions

Indiana Court of Appeals
Reid J. Cowan v. State of Indiana
No. 25A-CR-1744

Criminal. Interlocutory appeal from the Grant Superior Court, Judge Nathan D. Meeks. Affirms the denial of Cowan’s motion challenging venue on a Level 4 felony child solicitation charge. Holds that Grant County is a proper venue under Indiana Code section 35-32-2-1(d) because Cowan’s alleged travel to Grant County to meet a person he believed to be a child constituted an act committed in furtherance of the charged offense. Rejects Cowan’s argument that the offense was complete at the time of the online communications and that travel was merely a sentencing enhancement, distinguishing prior case law decided before the legislature amended the statute to make travel an element of Level 4 felony child solicitation. Concludes that because travel is an element of the charged Level 4 offense, venue in Grant County is proper. Appellant’s attorneys: Michael C. Cunningham; Kelly N. Pyle. Appellee’s attorney: Office of the Indiana Attorney General.

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Indiana Court of Appeals
James Irwin Richter v. Neha Bhatnagar Richter
No. 25A-DC-1593

Civil. Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court, Special Judge Stephenie K. Gookins. Affirms the trial court’s order awarding Mother sole legal custody of the parties’ child, modifying Father’s child support obligation and authorizing the issuance of a passport for the child. Holds the trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying legal custody from joint to sole where the record showed ongoing conflict, unilateral decision-making by Father and an inability to effectively co-parent, constituting a substantial and continuing change in circumstances rendering joint legal custody no longer in the child’s best interests. Further holds the trial court did not err in calculating Father’s weekly gross income for child support purposes based on his tax returns reflecting total annual income. Concludes the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that the child obtain a passport in light of his advancement to high school and opportunities for international immersion trips, finding a substantial change in circumstances and implementing safeguards through the parenting coordinator to address Father’s concerns. Appellant’s attorneys: Bryan L. Ciyou; Anne M. Lowe. Appellee’s attorney: Dyllan M. Kemp.

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Indiana Court of Appeals
In the Matter of: A.B. and B.B. (Minor Children), E.B. (Mother) v. Indiana Department of Child Services
No. 25A-JC-1315

Civil. Appeal from the Brown Circuit Court, Judge Mary Wertz. Affirms the adjudication of A.B. and B.B. as children in need of services. Holds that even if the trial court erred in denying Mother’s emergency motion to continue the fact-finding hearing based on one of her attorneys’ hospitalizations, Mother failed to establish prejudice warranting reversal, particularly where she was represented by two attorneys and did not show how the denial affected her ability to secure expert testimony or prepare her defense. Further holds the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the results of Stepfather’s unstipulated polygraph examination, reiterating that polygraph evidence is generally inadmissible absent a valid stipulation and rejecting Mother’s argument for a civil-case exception. Concludes that Mother did not demonstrate reversible error in either the denial of the continuance or the exclusion of the polygraph evidence. Appellant’s attorneys: Bryan L. Ciyou; Anne M. Lowe. Appellee’s attorney: Office of the Indiana Attorney General.

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Indiana Court of Appeals
Eric D. Wilson v. State of Indiana
No. 25A-CR-1542
Criminal. Appeal from the Morgan Superior Court, Judge Brian H. Williams. Reverses Wilson’s conviction of Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Holds that Deputy Caleb Merriman lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the investigatory traffic stop where Wilson was observed making “jerky” and fidgeting body movements but committed no traffic violations and exhibited no erratic or unusual driving behavior. Concludes that, under the totality of the circumstances, the deputy’s observations amounted to a hunch rather than specific, articulable facts of criminal activity and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. Further holds the stop was unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution after balancing the Litchfield factors, noting the moderate intrusion of field sobriety tests, transport to a hospital and a blood draw, and the absence of law enforcement need supported by traffic violations or abnormal driving. Determines the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence obtained as a result of the stop. Attorney for appellant: Glen E. Koch II. Attorney for the appellee: Office of the Indiana Attorney General.

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U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit
Jennifer Shirk v. Trustees of Indiana University, et al.
No. 22-3212

Civil. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, Chief Judge James R. Sweeney II. Affirms the district court’s entry of summary judgment for Indiana University and related defendants on Shirk’s retaliation claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act. Holds that although the district court applied an incorrect “sole causation” standard to the Rehabilitation Act retaliation claim, the proper standard is but-for causation and, under de novo review, the summary-judgment record does not support a finding that Shirk’s protected activity caused her termination. Concludes the evidence showed she was fired for sending unprofessional and insubordinate emails to high-level university officials accusing her supervisors of mismanagement and bypassing unit leadership, and that isolated remarks about her medical leave or accommodation requests were insufficient to establish pretext. Rejects her comparator and pretext arguments and determines no reasonable jury could find that her termination was retaliatory. Appellant’s attorneys: Matthew R. Gutwein; Christopher S. Stake; Annavieve C. Conklin. Appellees’ attorney: Melissa A. Macchia.

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Indiana Court of Appeals
Joseph S. Rechlicz, et al. v. Price Point Builders, LLC
No. 25A-PL-1071

Interlocutory appeal from the Lake Superior Court, Judge John M. Sedia. Affirms the trial court’s order compelling arbitration of the Rechliczes’ claims against Price Point Builders arising from alleged construction defects in their home. Holds the limited warranty agreement between the parties contains a mandatory arbitration provision requiring that breach-of-warranty claims “shall be resolved by arbitration,” and that the homeowners’ claims fall within that agreement rather than the construction agreement’s optional arbitration clause. Further holds Price Point did not waive its right to compel arbitration by participating in litigation for 14 months before filing its motion, where the case had made little substantive progress – in part due to a clerical error with the court’s electronic filing system – no dispositive rulings on the merits had occurred, and Indiana law does not require a showing of prejudice to establish waiver. Concludes the trial court properly denied the motion to correct error and stayed proceedings pending arbitration. Appellants’ attorneys: Megan L. Craig; John R. Craig. Appellee’s attorneys: Nathan D. Vis; Edward R. Ricci Jr.

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Indiana Court of Appeals
John Sayre and Sam the Concrete Man v. Lee Trost
No. 25A-PL-1007

Civil. Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court, Judge Darren J. Murphy. Affirms the trial court’s judgment in favor of Lee Trost following a bench trial on claims arising from the installation of a concrete patio. Holds the evidence supports the trial court’s findings that the contractors breached the parties’ agreement and performed deficient and negligent work, including pouring mismatched concrete, incorrectly re-pouring sections, failing to complete the project within the contemplated timeframe, and leaving multiple defects and hazards unresolved nearly two years after the contract was executed. Further holds the trial court did not err in awarding $19,961 in damages, including return of the $7,425 deposit, $200 for drain and fence repairs, $836 for patio removal and $11,500 for replacement, where the court found the patio must be torn out and replaced, the existing work devalued the property, and the damages were within the scope of the evidence and necessary to compensate Trost for the loss of the benefit of the bargain. Judge Felix dissented, concluding the trial court erred by entering judgment on Trost’s negligence claim because the contractors’ duty arose solely from the contract and there was no invasion of interests beyond a breach of contractual obligations. He also concluded the trial court improperly awarded the full replacement cost of the patio, reasoning that while Trost was entitled to recover his deposit, repair costs and removal expenses, paying for an entirely new patio placed him in a better position than he would have occupied absent the breach. He would affirm the breach-of-contract finding, reverse the negligence judgment, and remand for a redetermination of damages, including any consequential damages proven with reasonable certainty. Appellant’s attorney: Jeffrey K. Eicher. Appellee’s attorney: Julie A. Camden. This content was created with the assistance of artificial intelligence and has been reviewed by an editor for accuracy.

Indiana Court of Appeals
Denitra Jones v. Full Spectrum Property Management
No. 25A-EV-532

Civil. Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court, Magistrate Kevin M. Eads. Reverses the trial court’s order granting possession of rental property to Full Spectrum Property Management and awarding damages, attorney fees, and costs, and remands with instructions to reinstate Jones’ counterclaim. Holds the landlord failed to carry its burden of proof on its breach-of-contract and possession claims and that the trial court improperly shifted the burden to Jones by relying on her equivocal testimony rather than requiring the landlord to present evidence of lease terms, arrearage calculations, and statutory notice of termination. Further holds the conduct of the possession hearing denied Jones due process of law where the proceeding began under the assumption the landlord was entitled to possession, Jones was not afforded a meaningful opportunity to present defenses — including habitability and notice arguments — and no landlord representative testified. Concludes the trial court erred by prospectively declaring Jones’ personal property abandoned and disposable before she vacated the premises. Further concludes the trial court mishandled Jones’ counterclaim by questioning its validity, failing to follow small claims procedures regarding service, and effectively dismissing it without a meaningful hearing. Appellant’s attorneys: Megan Stuart; Jennifer W. Terry; Renee Skeete. Appellee: No appellee’s brief filed.

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Indiana Court of Appeals
Ilene Breuning and Christine Morgan, as Co-Trustees of the Willi Breuning and Ilene Breuning Living Trust Agreement v. Tim W. Breuning
No. 25A-TR-1491

Civil. Interlocutory appeal from the Allen Superior Court, Judge Jennifer L. DeGroote. Reverses the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of trust beneficiary Tim W. Breuning and remands with instructions to enter summary judgment for co-trustees Ilene Breuning and Christine Morgan. Holds that Section 1.2 of the unambiguous trust agreement preserved the tenancy-by-the-entireties character of real property transferred into the trust and retained for the surviving settlor all rights, privileges and obligations as if the property were held free of the trust until the deaths of both settlors. Concludes that, upon Willi Breuning’s death, title to the property vested in Ilene Breuning by operation of law through survivorship, and that this specific provision controls over the general distribution provision in Section 5.1 governing the remaining trust estate. Determines the trial court erred by treating the property as part of the residuary trust estate subject to equal distribution. Appellants’ attorneys: Stephen J. Harants. Appellee’s attorney: Kent C. Litchin.

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Indiana Court of Appeals
In re Commitment of P.P. v. Community Fairbanks Behavioral Health
No. 25A-MH-1592

Mental Health. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, Magistrate Sarah Glasser. Reverses and remands. Reverses the trial court’s order of involuntary regular commitment and remands for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion. Holds that P.P.’s due process rights were violated when Community Fairbanks Behavioral Health petitioned for a temporary commitment but, during the commitment hearing, pivoted to request and obtained a regular commitment without prior notice. Concludes that the mid-hearing shift deprived P.P. of adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, including the potential for an indefinite loss of liberty, as required by Indiana Code § 12-26-2-2 and the Due Process Clause. Further holds the trial court lacked statutory authority to order a regular commitment because the Hospital neither filed a petition meeting the requirements for a regular commitment under Indiana Code § 12-26-7-3 nor proceeded through the statutory mechanism for transitioning from a temporary to a regular commitment under Indiana Code § 12-26-6-11 and § 12-26-7-4. Although P.P. did not challenge the findings that she was mentally ill, gravely disabled, and dangerous, the regular commitment order is void due to the procedural defects. Appellant’s attorneys: Joel M. Schumm; Brian Leon. Appellee’s attorneys: Jenny R. Buchheit; Abby V. DeMare; Rani B. Amani. This content was created with the assistance of artificial intelligence and has been reviewed by an editor for accuracy.

Indiana Supreme Court
Anthony Wayne Carter v. State of Indiana
No. 25S-LW-50

Criminal. Appeal from the Bartholomew Superior Court, Judge James D. Worton. Affirms Carter’s murder conviction and sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Holds the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to give a proposed lesser-included jury instruction on reckless homicide because there was no serious evidentiary dispute regarding Carter’s intent; Carter conceded he intentionally hastened the victim’s death by asphyxiation, which was an actual and proximate cause of death even if the gunshot wound was potentially fatal. Further holds sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding of the statutory torture aggravator under Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(11), based on evidence that Carter intentionally prolonged and amplified the victim’s suffering through shooting, strangulation, and methodical suffocation with a plastic bag and duct tape. Concludes the jury reasonably found the aggravators outweighed any mitigating circumstances and properly recommended life without parole. Appellant’s attorney: R. Patrick Magrath. Appellee’s attorneys: Office of the Indiana Attorney General. This content was created with the assistance of artificial intelligence and has been reviewed by an editor for accuracy.

Indiana Court of Appeals
In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of A.D. v. Community Fairbanks Behavioral Health
No. 25A-MH-3292
Mental Health. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, Judge David Certo. Affirms the trial court’s order temporarily committing A.D. to Community Fairbanks Behavioral Health for up to 90 days. Holds that clear and convincing evidence supported the finding that A.D. suffers from a mental illness — schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type — under Indiana Code § 12-7-2-130. Concludes the psychiatrist’s testimony, based on repeated evaluations, observed symptoms, and A.D.’s treatment history, was sufficient even though the physician could not specify the exact onset date of the disorder or personally observe symptoms for six months. Rejects A.D.’s argument that the diagnosis was too equivocal to support commitment. Notes that A.D. did not challenge the trial court’s finding that she was gravely disabled. Affirms that the evidence showed impaired judgment, inability to function independently, lack of a viable housing or employment plan, medication noncompliance, and behavior demonstrating an inability to regulate emotions. Appellant’s attorneys: Marion County Public Defender Agency (Talisha Griffin) and Joel M. Schumm. Appellee’s attorneys: Ice Miller LLP.

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Indiana Court of Appeals
Mark Landon Taylor v. State of Indiana
No. 25A-CR-2155

Criminal. Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court, Judge William J. Hughes. Affirms Taylor’s convictions and sentence for Class A misdemeanor domestic battery and Class A misdemeanor theft. Holds the trial court did not violate Taylor’s Sixth Amendment rights because the sentence imposed for domestic battery did not exceed the statutory maximum authorized by Indiana Code §§ 35-50-3-1 and 35-50-3-2, and thus Blakely does not apply. Further holds the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Taylor’s substance use was a contributing factor to the offense and sentencing him under Indiana Code § 35-50-3-1(c). Also holds the trial court did not err by imposing probationary terms without a substantiating report because Taylor received 365 days of probation on each misdemeanor conviction, and no single probationary term exceeded 12 months, making the statutory report requirement inapplicable. Rejects Taylor’s argument that the aggregate probationary period required a report and notes Taylor did not preserve a challenge to the consecutive nature of his sentences. Accordingly, affirms the judgment and sentence. Appellant’s attorney: Michael D. Frischkorn. Appellee’s attorneys: Office of the Indiana Attorney General.

Indiana Court of Appeals
In the Matter of the Estate of Beverly K. Webster, Deceased; Christopher D. Webster v. Fred William Webster, Christina Kay Webster, and Katie Doades, individually and as Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of Beverly K. Webster
24A-ES-2788

Civil. Appeal from the Daviess Circuit Court, Judge Gregory A. Smith. Affirms the trial court’s orders enforcing a mediated settlement agreement resolving a will contest and estate disputes and awarding attorney fees. Holds the settlement agreement governing distribution of estate assets was ambiguous as to the scope of “all real estate” and, after considering extrinsic evidence including the decedent’s will and related agreements, the trial court did not err in interpreting the agreement to apply to 32.035 acres rather than all estate real estate. Further holds the agreement did not invalidate the decedent’s will or its specific devises, and the probate court’s approval of the compromise did not adjudicate the merits or set aside the will. Concludes Christopher Webster breached multiple provisions of the settlement agreement by failing to make required payments, dismiss the will contest, and comply with payment obligations, while Fred William Webster complied. Affirms the award of attorney fees to Fred William Webster as caused by Christopher Webster’s breach and affirms closure of the estate. Appellant’s attorneys: Adam R. Doerr and Kevin D. Koons, Kroger, Gardis & Regas, LLP; Lucas John Rowe, The Rowe Law Firm. Appellee’s attorneys: Kathryn E. DeWeese and Ryan M. Heeb, Bunger & Robertson.

Indiana Court of Appeals
Michael L. Williams v. State of Indiana
25A-CR-687

Criminal. Appeal from the Boone Circuit Court, Judge Lori N. Schein. Affirms the trial court’s denial of Michael Williams’s request for credit time for the period he was on pretrial GPS monitoring. Holds that pretrial GPS monitoring, which the trial court expressly stated was not home detention, does not constitute “imprisonment” or “confinement” under Indiana Code 35-50-6 as in effect at the time of the offenses. Concludes Williams retained substantial freedom of movement, was not subject to direct supervision comparable to confinement, and experienced restrictions typical of pretrial release rather than custodial restraint. Further holds that because Williams was not confined, he was entitled to neither accrued time nor good time credit for the GPS-monitoring period. Accordingly, affirms the trial court’s calculation of credit time and the aggregate eleven-year executed sentence. Appellant’s attorney: Allan W. Reid, Foley Panszi Law, LLC. Appellee’s attorneys: Office of the Indiana Attorney General (Theodore E. Rokita; J.T. Whitehead, Deputy Attorney General).