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Given that the U.S. Supreme Court typically accepts only 60 to 80 certiorari petitions out of 8,000-plus requests, it is not surprising that it is rare for the court to accept a case dealing with interpretation of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. But we have an opinion on just such an issue issued just days ago.
Specifically, in Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc., v. Burton, 607 U.S. ___ 2026 WL 135998 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026), the court addressed whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1)’s requirement that parties make Rule 60(b) motions within a “reasonable time” applies to a motion seeking relief from an allegedly void judgment under Rule 60(b)(4). The court unanimously answered “yes.”
The case arose as a bankruptcy debtor’s adversarial proceeding against Coney Island Auto Parts to collect $50,000 in unpaid invoices. The debtor attempted to serve process on Coney Island by mail but purportedly failed to comply with bankruptcy rules for mail service. Coney Island did not answer, and the bankruptcy court entered a default judgment against it in 2015.
Over the following six years the trustee tried to enforce the judgment against Coney Island, including setting a demand letter to the company’s CEO in 2016. Lower courts held that this was sufficient notice of the judgment. In 2021, a marshal seized funds from Coney Island’s bank account in satisfaction of the judgment. Coney Island moved to vacate the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, asserting that the original failure to make proper service rendered the judgment void.
The Bankruptcy Court denied relief, holding that Coney Island had failed to abide by Rule 60’s requirement that such motions for relief be made within a “reasonable time.” The District Court and Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split of authority on Rule 60’s reasonable-time limit applies to motions seeking relief from allegedly void judgments. One of the contrary decisions was Rodd v. Region Constr. Co., 783 F.2d 89, 91 (7th Cir. 1986). In Rodd, the Seventh Circuit explained, “We held in Alskar v. Honeywell, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 419 (1982), ‘that the reasonable time criterion of Rule 60(b) as it relates to void judgments, means no time limit, because a void judgment is no judgment at all.’ We also held that ‘the court that entered a void judgment may vacate it at any time.’” The Rodd panel (which included Judge Grant from the Northern District of Indiana by designation), affirmed the district court’s relief from the judgment.
The court’s reasoning
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision that the “reasonable time” requirement applies and that relief was not sought within a reasonable time. The court explained: “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 permits a court to ‘relieve a party … from a final judgment, order, or proceeding,’ and subdivision (b)(4) specifically authorizes a court to grant relief from a ‘void’ judgment. Parties may seek relief under Rule 60 by filing a motion with the court.” Coney Island, *3.
The court continued: “Rule 60 also imposes a time limit for such motions. Rule 60(c)(1) provides that a ‘motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time.’ Because a motion for relief from an allegedly void judgment is a ‘motion under Rule 60(b),’ the reasonable-time limit applies. Accord, Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 533, (2022) (‘All [Rule 60(b) motions] must be filed ‘within a reasonable time’).”
The Court further explained, “The structure of Rule 60 confirms what the plain text of subdivision (c)(1) provides. When Rule 60 modifies the default reasonable-time limit, it does so expressly. For example, Rule 60(c)(1) imposes a 1-year limit on Rule 60(b) motions alleging mistakes, new evidence, or fraud. Thus, one would expect Rule 60 to include an analogous provision if a special, unlimited-time principle applied to motions alleging voidness. Cf. Kemp, 596 U.S., at 534–535. But the Rule does not.”
Regarding the position that a reasonable-time limit does not apply to motions alleging voidness, the Court reasoned: “Even if the passage of time cannot cure voidness, the same principle holds true for most legal errors. Nevertheless, statutes and rules routinely limit the time during which a party can seek relief from a judgment infected by error. Therefore, a party in Coney Island’s position would need to show that some principle of law, such as the Due Process Clause, gives a party the right to allege voidness at any time.” But, as the Court noted, Coney Island disclaimed any such Due Process argument.
In concurrence, Justice Sotomayor agreed that the reasonable time language of rule 60(c)(1) applies but concurred because the majority unnecessarily opines on the potential validity of a constitutional challenge to the reasonable time limit under the Due Process Clause that was not asserted. She concluded, “This Court does ‘not generally entertain arguments that were not raised below and are not advanced in this Court by any party.’ Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 721, (2014). There is no reason to depart from that practice absent unusual circumstances, which certainly are not present here.”
So, reasonable time applies, but perhaps a future case could still advance and be heard on the Due Process Clause front.•
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Maley is a partner with Barnes & Thornburg LLP. You can contact him at [email protected].
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