Trenton Morton: Scrutinizing Indiana’s rules for cultured meat labeling

Cultured meat: Godsend or scourge? If you ask Indiana General Assembly members, they’ll fume that they “don’t want a product imitating our safe food supply that the farmers at [sic] work so hard to produce.” Last year, to that end, Indiana passed a law that (1) banned the sale and production of cultured meat until July 1, 2027; and (2) requires, after the ban expires, that cultured meat packaging have the exact phrase, “THIS IS AN IMITATION MEAT PRODUCT.”

The labeling requirement deserves more discussion. Federal courts have chipped away at similar plant-based food-labeling restrictions in Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri and Oklahoma. Now, add Texas. In late January, in Turtle Island Foods Inc. v. Shuford (— F.Supp.3d —, No. 23-1032, W.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2026), the Western District of Texas used the Supreme Court’s Central Hudson test (from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission) to invalidate, on First Amendment grounds, a Texas law that required plant-based food labels to use words formatted to specific sizes and placed in specific contexts on the label.

I want to use snippets of this case to play out a scenario with Indiana’s labeling law. Of course, this isn’t the guaranteed approach a court will eventually choose. I think that enough pieces, however, could prove insightful. This is just one possible path.

• Indiana will face the high-burden Central Hudson test.

One of two tests could apply to Indiana’s law: the Zauderer test or the Central Hudson test. Indiana will likely try to hide behind Zauderer, by which a law will be upheld if it compels disclosure of “purely factual and uncontroversial information.” Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). This is an easier standard than Central Hudson.

The subject of cultured meat labeling, however, seems anything but uncontroversial. For example, 1,179 comments at the USDA highlight the controversy about the subject. And a word like “IMITATION” is value-laden, rather than factual. Indeed, with this seeming inapplicability of Zauderer, courts often shift to Central Hudson. See Nat’l Ass’n of Wheat Growers v. Bonta, 85 F.4th 1263, 1275 (9th Cir. 2023) (“The Supreme Court recognizes two levels of scrutiny governing compelled commercial speech.”).

So, with this shift, we examine Shuford, which applied the three-factor Central Hudson test to Texas’ law because the plaintiffs’ labeling was neither “misleading nor related to unlawful activity.” See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). Using “veggie chicken” as one example, Shuford joined the long list of “courts [that] have held that labels which include conventional animal food terms alongside terms that convey the plant-based nature of the product are not misleading.” (Slip op. 13).

Apply this formula to cultured meat. Packaging could combine (like cultured meat company, UPSIDE Foods has done at its website) a technical descriptor like “cultivated” with an animal food like “chicken.” Consistent and clear descriptors resemble the plant-based ones in Shuford and preceding cases. Cultured meat companies can carve out a strong First Amendment position by routinizing consistent descriptor use.

• Customers aren’t as easily confused as Indiana might hope.

Indiana would need to show a problem exists — that customers can’t distinguish between cultured meat and traditional meat labeling. In applying Central Hudson factor 1, Shuford chided Texas’ inability to produce “evidence that customers do not understand” plant-based food labeling. I envision a significant burden for Indiana.

First, look at the cultured meat industry. It can tailor the descriptiveness of its labeling strategy, as discussed in the previous section.

The Shuford court also observed, however, how customer confusion seems less likely when products have been known for decades, like the plant-based products the brand Tofurky sells. This might make the novelty of cultured meat seem different. But novelty doesn’t equate to confusion. A literate public needs only to grasp the difference among food products that are so labeled. The cultured meat industry can also educate the public to this end with its labeling and other outreach.

Second, although we’re stuck speculating, think about what Indiana would need to show. In a strange way, the state has the perverse incentive to show how confusable its citizens are. And gathering reliable, empirical evidence comes with technical and cost challenges. Here, Texas failed, offering zero examples of customers being confused about plant-based products. As cultured meat commercially proliferates, if Texas is any guide, Indiana will struggle likewise.

• Indiana’s labeling law is confusing and redundant.

For Central Hudson factor 2, the Shuford framework asks how Indiana could show that its law “mitigate[s]” customers’ confusion. (Slip Op. 15). Funny enough, the word “IMITATION” might cause unintended and separate confusion between cultured meat and plant-based meat. Wired and Reuters, for example, have used the word “imitation” to describe plant-based products. A vague, pejorative word like “IMITATION” is unhelpful to customers, especially when descriptive factual descriptors like “cell-based” or “cultured” exist.

For Central Hudson factor 3, the Shuford court asked whether Texas was “out of available options” and had tailored its law to target the “desired objective.” (Slip Op. 16). But Indiana, like Texas, has “the option of enforcing existing law.” 21 U.S. Code § 343 and IN Code § 16-42-1-16, among other statutes and regulations, punish food misbranding. In short, other laws already achieve the “desired objective.”

• Indiana’s labeling law has nothing to do with protecting customers.

Could Indiana satisfy all three Central Hudson factors? Shuford suggests, subtly, that the court understood what the Texas labeling law represented: protectionism disguised as consumer protection. Indiana’s law is no different. Indiana’s law doesn’t prevent customer confusion because it wasn’t intended to prevent customer confusion. Careful application of the Central Hudson factors should confirm that.•

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Morton is assistant general counsel for Los Angeles-based Mercy For Animals.