COA: No double jeopardy violations in fatal flight from police

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A South Bend motorist who fled police, ran a red light and hit another vehicle, killing the driver, was unable to convince the Indiana Court of Appeals that his convictions violate double jeopardy.

James Woodrow Morrison pled guilty to Level 3 felony resisting law enforcement while operating a vehicle in a manner that causes death; Level 4 felony operating a vehicle with a controlled substance in the blood causing death, a Level 4 felony; and three counts of Level 6 felony operating a vehicle with a controlled substance in the body causing serious bodily injury.

The St. Joseph Superior Court sentenced Morrison to a total of 23½ years.

Before the Court of Appeals, Morrison argued his convictions for the Level 3 and Level 4 felonies violated his right against double jeopardy. He pointed to Edmonds v. State, 100 N.E. 3d 258 (Ind. 2018) and asserted his convictions constituted a statutory double jeopardy violation.

The appellate panel disagreed in James Woodrow Morrison v. State of Indiana, 18A-CR-1073.

Writing for the court, Senior Judge Randall Shepard noted in Edmonds, the defendant’s convictions included one court of felony resisting law enforcement by fleeing in a vehicle causing death and two counts of felony resisting law enforcement by fleeing in a vehicle causing serious bodily injury.

By contrast, Morrison was convicted of only one offense under the resisting statute — resisting law enforcement while operating a vehicle in a manner that causes death. His convictions for causing seriously bodily injury while operating a vehicle arise from the operating while intoxicated statute.

“In Edmonds, the Supreme Court plainly stated that its decision was specific to and rested only on the statutory grounds of resisting statute,” Shepard wrote. “While a perpetrator who races away from police after a multiple victim collision commits only one ‘resisting,’ a perpetrator whose driving injures multiple victims commits multiple offenses under the operating statutes.”

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