Gender identity, sexual preference not established rights to privacy in criminal/child welfare cases, 7th Circuit affirms

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A district court ruled correctly in granting summary judgment to Starke County Sheriff’s Department and Indiana Department of Child Services’ officials and denying a transgender man and his significant other’s claims that they were arrested without probable cause and had their rights to privacy violated, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled Friday in affirming the lower court’s decision.

According to court records, John Doe, a transgender male who was born female, and A.B. were investigated and arrested for neglecting a dependent and failing to support a dependent child.

R.M., 17, met with Adam Gray, a detective with the Starke County Sheriff’s Department, and family case manager Katherine Purtee with the Indiana Department of Child Services and claimed Doe and A.B. abandoned him in February 2018.

R.M. had been living with his mother and stepfather since November 2017.

In January 2018, they discovered R.M. knew about his sister sneaking out of the house one evening.

As a result, Doe and A.B. told R.M. to leave the home and not return.

He had been staying with his friend, M.B., at Suzanne Brewer’s home before then and remained with them afterward.

During his meeting with Gray and Purtee, R.M. informed them of text messages between him and his mother in which she said he could return home, but he would be grounded.

R.M. told her that he didn’t want to be grounded and that he had told his school that he couldn’t return home to avoid being charged as a runaway.

After the meeting, R.M. was brought to the Starke County Sheriff’s Department for a recorded interview. There, he reiterated what he said in the meeting and that it wasn’t the first time he had been kicked out of the house.

His statements also raised concern that Doe was sexually assaulting R.M.’s sisters.

Brewer confirmed in a letter to Gray that R.M. had stayed in her home and that A.B. had not called her about R.M. or stopped by to check on him, nor had she provided money to support him.

Brewer took R.M. to his home to gather his belongings, and when they arrived, a bag of his clothes was on the porch.

Gray arrested A.B. and Doe for neglect of a dependent and nonsupport of a dependent child after contacting a prosecutor about possible charges and being advised that probable cause of a crime existed.

While interviewing A.B., Gray informed her about the allegations made against Doe.

Gray told A.B. that K.B.’s birth certificate had been falsified to name Doe as the father. He also told her that Doe was born female, used to be named Barbara B. and has female genitalia.

A.B. claimed she didn’t know Doe had female genitalia until Gray told her in the interview.

After the arrests, Purtee took the minor children into custody for placement in foster or kinship care.

While on the phone with A.B.’s sister, April Hopkins, Purtee disclosed that Doe was born female. Purtee also disclosed this while at the Brewers’ home to Brewer, M.B., J.M. and R.M.

Doe and A.B. sued Gray and Purtee in their individual capacities, the Starke County Sheriff’s Department and the Indiana Department of Child Services under 42 U.S.C. Section 1993.

In a 14th Amendment claim against Gray and Purtee, Doe alleged they violated his right to privacy by disclosing his “sexual preference.” The couple also claimed Gray lacked probable cause to arrest them under the Fourth Amendment, and brought a state-law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Gray and Purtee.

The defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims, and a month later the plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint.

They wanted to change their 14th Amendment claim to assert a right to privacy in “gender identity” rather than “sexual preference.”

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana denied the motion to amend and granted summary judgment to the defendants.

On appeal to the 7th Circuit, Doe and A.B. raised three issues, the first being whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on Doe’s 14th Amendment claim because they claimed there was a clearly established right to privacy in one’s sexual preference or gender identity at the time that information was disclosed.

Judge Michael Brennan wrote the opinion for the court.

Brennan wrote the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, as there is no clearly established right to privacy on one’s sexual preference or gender identity during a criminal or child welfare investigation.

“A general recognition of a privacy right in certain medical or sexual information is not enough to show a more specific privacy right in one’s sexual preference or gender identity during a criminal or child welfare investigation, especially one involving allegations of child sexual abuse,” Brennan wrote.

The second issue raised on appeal was whether the text messages between A.B. and R.M. established a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Gray had probable cause to arrest Doe and A.B., precluding summary judgment on their Fourth Amendment claim.

“The totality of the circumstances also supports probable cause for the arrests for nonsupport of a dependent child. Doe and A.B. failed to provide R.M. with food while he was out of their home, except on one occasion. Moreover, the evidence did not conclusively establish the affirmative defense that R.M. abandoned the home,” Brennan wrote.

Lastly, Doe and A.B. argued that Gray, in his official capacity, is not entitled to immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act because he was not adopting or enforcing state law in disclosing Doe’s sexual preference or gender identity.

The court found that Gray was entitled to immunity under the ITCA, as was the Starke County Sheriff’s Department.

“Gray told A.B. during the interview that the children’s placement needed to be reevaluated, which was why he needed to speak with A.B. For purposes of child placement, therefore, it was relevant to identify K.B.’s father. Gray thus provided information about Doe to A.B. while enforcing state law within the scope of the Starke County Sheriff’s Department’s operational power,” Brennan wrote.

Judges Joel Flaum and Ilana Rover concurred.

The case is John Doe and A.B. v. Adam Gray, et al., 22-1501.

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