7th Circuit Court of Appeals
Thomas H. Hurlow v. United States of America
Criminal. Reverses the district court’s denial of Hurlow’s 2255 petition and remands for further proceedings. Rules Hurlow’s allegation - he would not have entered into the plea agreement had his counsel informed him of his potentially meritorious Fourth Amendment claim - was sufficient to overcome the wavier in his plea agreement not to contest his conviction or sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255.
Indiana Tax Court
Miller Pipeline Corporation v. Indiana Dept. of State Revenue
Tax Court. Denies Miller Pipeline’s petition for partial summary judgment on its appeal of a Department of Revenue final determination denying its claim for a refund of gross retail sales and use tax paid between 2005-2007. The court held that evidence submitted in support of the motion was not properly designated and is inadmissible. The court will by separate order schedule a case management conference with parties to discuss pre-trial matters and scheduling.
Indiana Court of Appeals
Billy Savoy v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Reverses and remands to the trial court with instructions to vacate Savoy’s conviction for theft, a Class D felony, leaving as is his conviction and sentence for criminal mischief, a Class D felony. Rules Savoy has shown that there is a reasonable possibility that the trial court used the same evidentiary facts to establish the essential elements of theft and criminal mischief thus violating Indiana’s Double Jeopardy Clause.
Martin Mendoza v. State of Indiana (NFP)
Criminal. Reverses and remands the denial of Mendoza’s motion for return of his $658 taken at the time of his arrest. Rules there is no finding based on admissible evidence that Mendoza could not lawfully posses the property under the State forfeiture statutes or that Mendoza failed to file his motion properly. Consequently, the trial court was without authority to deny his motion for return of property.
Tammy Coleman v. Darryl Davis (NFP)
Order of Protection. Affirms trial court’s decision to enter a protective order against Coleman and in favor of Davis. Concludes the evidence was sufficient to permit the trial court, acting as the trier of fact, to reasonably conclude that Coleman was a “family or household member” who threatened physical harm to Davis or placed Davis in fear of physical harm, thereby committing “domestic or family violence” under the Civil Protection Order Act. In his dissent, John Baker argued the evidence presented in court failed to establish a sufficient threat under the CPOA.
The Indiana Supreme Court issued no opinions before IL deadline.