Clearing up confusion among the courts as to whether a jury instruction regarding the definition of “intentionally” can include that the defendant intended to “cause the result” of his conduct, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed Pattern Jury Instruction 9.05 represents a correct statement of the law.
Wayne A. Campbell, convicted of two counts of attempted murder, Class B felony burglary resulting in bodily injury, Class B felony aggravated battery and Class C felony battery, appealed pro se the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The justices took his case to address his claim that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to object to a supplemental jury instruction on the definition of intentionally after deliberations had begun.
After the jury asked for the definition of intent, the trial judge read Pattern Jury Instruction 9.05, which in part says, “If a person is charged with intentionally causing a result by his conduct, it must have been his conscious objective not only to engage in the conduct, but also to cause the result.” The “also to cause the result” language is not included in the applicable statute detailing culpability.
Campbell argued that Corley v. State, 663 N.E.2d 175 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), supports his argument because that court in that case did not include the “also to cause the result” language. The COA later said in Corley’s case it found no authority to support Corley’s argument that the “cause as a result” language must be included in jury instruction.
But that disputed language was in the Pattern Jury Instructions at that time, Justice Robert Rucker pointed out in Wayne A. Campbell v. State of Indiana, 13S05-1410-PC-682. In addition, a different COA panel reached a different conclusion four years earlier in Johnson v. State, 605 N.E.2d 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
“Here, the second sentence of the contested instruction serves to emphasize the heavy burden placed on the State to prove that a defendant acted intentionally,” Rucker wrote, referring to Campbell’s case. “And this is so because not only must the State prove that an accused had the ‘conscious objective’ to engage in the prohibited conduct but also that he intended to ‘cause the result’ of his conduct. For clarity the sentence might be amended to read ‘If a person is charged with intentionally causing a result by his conduct, the State is required to prove it must have been his conscious objective not only to engage in the conduct but also cause the result.’
“Nonetheless even in its current form the instruction holds the State to this higher burden of proof even though the statute defining intentionally does not do so in express terms. The State does not contend this is an inappropriate burden and we conclude that Pattern Jury Instruction 9.05 represents a correct statement of the law. As such trial counsel in this case did not render ineffective assistance in failing to object to the instruction.”