Feb. 13, 2026

U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit
Jennifer Shirk v. Trustees of Indiana University, et al.
No. 22-3212

Civil. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, Chief Judge James R. Sweeney II. Affirms the district court’s entry of summary judgment for Indiana University and related defendants on Shirk’s retaliation claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act. Holds that although the district court applied an incorrect “sole causation” standard to the Rehabilitation Act retaliation claim, the proper standard is but-for causation and, under de novo review, the summary-judgment record does not support a finding that Shirk’s protected activity caused her termination. Concludes the evidence showed she was fired for sending unprofessional and insubordinate emails to high-level university officials accusing her supervisors of mismanagement and bypassing unit leadership, and that isolated remarks about her medical leave or accommodation requests were insufficient to establish pretext. Rejects her comparator and pretext arguments and determines no reasonable jury could find that her termination was retaliatory. Appellant’s attorneys: Matthew R. Gutwein; Christopher S. Stake; Annavieve C. Conklin. Appellees’ attorney: Melissa A. Macchia.

The following opinion was issued on Feb. 12 after The Lawyer’s deadline. 

Indiana Supreme Court
Lamenski Ewing v. State of Indiana
No. 26S-CR-43

Criminal. Appeal from the Vanderburgh Circuit Court, Magistrate Celia Pauli. Reverses the revocation of Ewing’s probation after granting transfer and vacating the Court of Appeals’ opinion. Holds that a petition to revoke work release did not provide adequate notice that the State was also seeking to revoke Ewing’s probation, where the petition mentioned only revocation of his work-release placement and did not reference probation or the suspended portion of his sentence. Concludes that due process requires the State to notify a defendant of the specific sanctions it seeks in a revocation proceeding and that a prosecutor may not pursue sanctions beyond those identified in the revocation petition absent actual notice. Rejects the State’s argument that Ewing’s knowledge of statutory authority or plea agreement language was sufficient notice and determines that neither the petition nor subsequent hearings advised him that probation revocation was being sought. Accordingly, holds the trial court erred by revoking Ewing’s probation in addition to revoking his work release. Justice Slaughter, joined by Justice Massa, dissented, concluding Ewing received adequate notice that his probation could be revoked because both the governing statute and his plea agreement made clear that violating work release would result in execution of his suspended sentence. He argued due process does not require the State to specify every potential sanction within the revocation petition itself so long as the defendant had actual knowledge of the violation and its consequences. In his view, the majority improperly imposed a new requirement that notice of the requested sanction appear in the petition or at the initial hearing, despite precedent allowing notice from other sources. Appellant’s attorney: Matthew J. McGovern. Appellee: Office of the Indiana Attorney General.

This content was created with the assistance of artificial intelligence and has been reviewed by an editor for accuracy.