Feb. 6, 2026

Indiana Court of Appeals
In re Commitment of P.P. v. Community Fairbanks Behavioral Health
No. 25A-MH-1592

Mental Health. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, Magistrate Sarah Glasser. Reverses and remands. Reverses the trial court’s order of involuntary regular commitment and remands for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion. Holds that P.P.’s due process rights were violated when Community Fairbanks Behavioral Health petitioned for a temporary commitment but, during the commitment hearing, pivoted to request and obtained a regular commitment without prior notice. Concludes that the mid-hearing shift deprived P.P. of adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, including the potential for an indefinite loss of liberty, as required by Indiana Code § 12-26-2-2 and the Due Process Clause. Further holds the trial court lacked statutory authority to order a regular commitment because the Hospital neither filed a petition meeting the requirements for a regular commitment under Indiana Code § 12-26-7-3 nor proceeded through the statutory mechanism for transitioning from a temporary to a regular commitment under Indiana Code § 12-26-6-11 and § 12-26-7-4. Although P.P. did not challenge the findings that she was mentally ill, gravely disabled, and dangerous, the regular commitment order is void due to the procedural defects. Appellant’s attorneys: Joel M. Schumm; Brian Leon. Appellee’s attorneys: Jenny R. Buchheit; Abby V. DeMare; Rani B. Amani.

Indiana Court of Appeals
Reginald D. Akins, Jr. v. State of Indiana
No. 24A-CR-2140

Criminal. Appeal from the Delaware Circuit Court, Judge Judi L. Calhoun. Affirms Akins’s convictions for Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 3 felony dealing in cocaine, Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended, Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia and the habitual-offender adjudication. Holds that a warrantless search of Akins’s vehicle was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment and reasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, despite Indiana’s legalization of hemp, because a trained narcotics-detection dog’s general alert — when considered with surrounding circumstances including Akins’s outstanding warrants, suspended license, prior narcotics involvement, and presence at a known drug house — supported probable cause and a meaningful degree of suspicion. Further holds that although the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by calling one of its own deputy prosecutors to testify during the habitual-offender phase, the misconduct did not rise to the level of fundamental error because the State presented sufficient independent documentary evidence to establish Akins’s identity and prior felony convictions, and the misconduct did not have an undeniable and substantial effect on the jury’s verdict. Appellant’s attorney: Lisa Johnson. Appellee’s attorneys: Office of the Indiana Attorney General.

Indiana Court of Appeals
In re Te.W. (Minor Child), Child in Need of Services; C.K. (Mother) v. Indiana Department of Child Services
No. 25A-JC-2257

Juvenile. Appeal from the Hendricks Superior Court, Judge Travis Bauman-Crane. Dismisses the appeal as moot. Holds the CHINS court had concurrent jurisdiction under Indiana Code § 31-30-1-13(b) to issue a temporary custody order while a paternity action was pending. Further holds Mother’s challenge to the CHINS court’s order awarding joint physical custody is moot because, after the CHINS case was closed, the paternity court assumed primary jurisdiction, held an evidentiary hearing, and entered a temporary order adopting the CHINS court’s custody arrangement. Concludes that because the paternity court’s order now governs custody and Mother does not challenge that order, the Court of Appeals can grant no effective relief. Appellant’s attorney: Audrey Kathleen Lunsford. Appellee’s attorneys: No appellee’s brief filed.

Indiana Court of Appeals
Scotty Lee Van Hawk v. State of Indiana
No. 24A-CR-3161

Criminal. Appeal from the Kosciusko Circuit Court, Judge Michael W. Reed. Affirms Van Hawk’s convictions for three counts of Level 5 felony stalking and the trial court’s rulings. Holds the trial court did not violate Van Hawk’s speedy trial rights under Indiana Criminal Rule 4 or the United States and Indiana Constitutions. Concludes Van Hawk was not entitled to discharge under Criminal Rule 4(B) because he was on home detention rather than in jail and because he acquiesced in delays through counsel. Further holds he was not entitled to discharge under Criminal Rule 4(C) because the delays were largely attributable to his own actions, including continuances, conflicts with counsel, motions, and other procedural conduct. Applies the Barker v. Wingo factors and determines that although the delay was presumptively prejudicial in length, the reasons for delay and lack of prejudice weighed against Van Hawk. Rejects Van Hawk’s claim that the trial court erred by denying severance of the three stalking charges, concluding the offenses were connected by a pattern of conduct and motive rather than merely similar in character and that he failed to show prejudice. Also finds the issue waived because he did not renew his severance motion at trial. Holds the trial court provided reasonable accommodations for Van Hawk’s hearing impairment, including amplification devices and real-time captioning, and did not violate due process or the ADA. Concludes Van Hawk failed to cooperate in arranging alternative transcription services and that any imperfections in the accommodations did not impair his ability to participate in trial. Affirms the trial court’s determination that Van Hawk knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel after extensive advisements and colloquy. Further holds he had no right to standby counsel and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint one. Rejects Van Hawk’s claim that he received inadequate notice of the rescheduled trial date, emphasizing that he received notice by email and service, did not object, and chose to proceed to trial rather than request a continuance. Rejects claims that the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination, testimony, and closing argument, concluding he waived several issues and that the court acted within its authority to control proceedings and prevent harassment or waste of time. Appellant’s attorneys: Donald R. Shuler. Appellee’s attorneys: Office of the Indiana Attorney General.

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