Indiana Court Decisions: Feb. 2-6, 2026

Indiana Tax Court

Feb. 3

David A. Gertz and Nichelle L. Gertz v. Porter County Assessor

No. 24T-TA-00013

Tax. Appeal from the Indiana Board of Tax Review. Final Decision on Rehearing by Judge Justin L. McAdam. Grants the petition for rehearing for the limited purpose of modifying the Dec. 22, 2025, opinion to clarify the differentiation among the various Form 11 Notice documents filed by Gertz with the Indiana Board of Tax Review. Issues a new opinion consistent with that modification. Otherwise upholds the original decision and affirms the Board’s final determination reverting the property’s assessed value to the prior year’s assessment. Enters judgment in favor of the Porter County assessor and against the petitioners, with each party to bear its own costs. Petitioners: David A. Gertz (pro se) and Nichelle L. Gertz. Respondent’s attorneys: Mark E. GiaQuinta and Nicholas M. Brady.

Indiana Supreme Court

Feb. 4

Anthony Wayne Carter v. State of Indiana

No. 25S-LW-50

Criminal. Appeal from the Bartholomew Superior Court, Judge James D. Worton. Affirms Carter’s murder conviction and sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Holds the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to give a proposed lesser-included jury instruction on reckless homicide because there was no serious evidentiary dispute regarding Carter’s intent; Carter conceded he intentionally hastened the victim’s death by asphyxiation, which was an actual and proximate cause of death even if the gunshot wound was potentially fatal. Further holds sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding of the statutory torture aggravator under Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(11), based on evidence that Carter intentionally prolonged and amplified the victim’s suffering through shooting, strangulation, and methodical suffocation with a plastic bag and duct tape. Concludes the jury reasonably found the aggravators outweighed any mitigating circumstances and properly recommended life without parole. Appellant’s attorney: R. Patrick Magrath. Appellee’s attorneys: Office of the Indiana Attorney General.

Indiana Court of Appeals

Feb. 2

Mark Landon Taylor v. State of Indiana

No. 25A-CR-2155

Criminal. Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court, Judge William J. Hughes. Affirms Taylor’s convictions and sentence for Class A misdemeanor domestic battery and Class A misdemeanor theft. Holds the trial court did not violate Taylor’s Sixth Amendment rights because the sentence imposed for domestic battery did not exceed the statutory maximum authorized by Indiana Code §§ 35-50-3-1 and 35-50-3-2, and thus Blakely does not apply. Further holds the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Taylor’s substance use was a contributing factor to the offense and sentencing him under Indiana Code § 35-50-3-1(c). Also holds the trial court did not err by imposing probationary terms without a substantiating report because Taylor received 365 days of probation on each misdemeanor conviction, and no single probationary term exceeded 12 months, making the statutory report requirement inapplicable. Rejects Taylor’s argument that the aggregate probationary period required a report and notes Taylor did not preserve a challenge to the consecutive nature of his sentences. Accordingly, affirms the judgment and sentence. Appellant’s attorney: Michael D. Frischkorn. Appellee’s attorneys: Office of the Indiana Attorney General.

K.S. v. Y.L.

No. 25A-DC-1554

Civil. Appeal from the Monroe Circuit Court, Judge Emily A. Salzmann. Affirms the trial court’s order modifying custody to grant sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ two minor children to mother. Holds the trial court did not abuse its discretion by relying on the guardian ad litem’s report where father failed to object, had advance notice of the report, cross-examined the GAL at the hearing, and both parties relied on the report’s contents. Further holds the evidence supports the findings that a substantial and continuing change in circumstances occurred and that modification was in the children’s best interests, based on father’s frequent and increasing travel, repeated demands for parenting-time modifications creating instability, breakdown in parental communication, unilateral decision-making by father regarding schooling and medical matters, and father’s pattern of involving the children in parental conflict. Concludes the trial court properly considered the statutory factors for modifying physical and legal custody and acted within its discretion. Appellant’s attorney: Lauren E. Harpold. Appellee’s attorney: Zachary J. Stock.

Feb. 3

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of A.D. v. Community Fairbanks Behavioral Health

No. 25A-MH-3292

Mental Health. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, Judge David Certo. Affirms the trial court’s order temporarily committing A.D. to Community Fairbanks Behavioral Health for up to 90 days. Holds that clear and convincing evidence supported the finding that A.D. suffers from a mental illness — schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type — under Indiana Code § 12-7-2-130. Concludes the psychiatrist’s testimony, based on repeated evaluations, observed symptoms, and A.D.’s treatment history, was sufficient even though the physician could not specify the exact onset date of the disorder or personally observe symptoms for six months. Rejects A.D.’s argument that the diagnosis was too equivocal to support commitment. Notes that A.D. did not challenge the trial court’s finding that she was gravely disabled. Affirms that the evidence showed impaired judgment, inability to function independently, lack of a viable housing or employment plan, medication noncompliance, and behavior demonstrating an inability to regulate emotions. Appellant’s attorneys: Marion County Public Defender Agency (Talisha Griffin) and Joel M. Schumm. Appellee’s attorneys: Ice Miller LLP.

Feb. 6

In re Commitment of P.P. v. Community Fairbanks Behavioral Health

No. 25A-MH-1592

Mental Health. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, Magistrate Sarah Glasser. Reverses and remands. Reverses the trial court’s order of involuntary regular commitment and remands for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion. Holds that P.P.’s due process rights were violated when Community Fairbanks Behavioral Health petitioned for a temporary commitment but, during the commitment hearing, pivoted to request and obtained a regular commitment without prior notice. Concludes that the mid-hearing shift deprived P.P. of adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, including the potential for an indefinite loss of liberty, as required by Indiana Code § 12-26-2-2 and the Due Process Clause. Further holds the trial court lacked statutory authority to order a regular commitment because the Hospital neither filed a petition meeting the requirements for a regular commitment under Indiana Code § 12-26-7-3 nor proceeded through the statutory mechanism for transitioning from a temporary to a regular commitment under Indiana Code § 12-26-6-11 and § 12-26-7-4. Although P.P. did not challenge the findings that she was mentally ill, gravely disabled, and dangerous, the regular commitment order is void due to the procedural defects. Appellant’s attorneys: Joel M. Schumm; Brian Leon. Appellee’s attorneys: Jenny R. Buchheit; Abby V. DeMare; Rani B. Amani.

Reginald D. Akins, Jr. v. State of Indiana

No. 24A-CR-2140

Criminal. Appeal from the Delaware Circuit Court, Judge Judi L. Calhoun. Affirms Akins’ convictions for Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine, Level 3 felony dealing in cocaine, Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended, Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia and the habitual-offender adjudication. Holds that a warrantless search of Akins’ vehicle was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment and reasonable under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, despite Indiana’s legalization of hemp, because a trained narcotics-detection dog’s general alert — when considered with surrounding circumstances including Akins’ outstanding warrants, suspended license, prior narcotics involvement, and presence at a known drug house — supported probable cause and a meaningful degree of suspicion. Further holds that although the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by calling one of its own deputy prosecutors to testify during the habitual-offender phase, the misconduct did not rise to the level of fundamental error because the State presented sufficient independent documentary evidence to establish Akins’ identity and prior felony convictions, and the misconduct did not have an undeniable and substantial effect on the jury’s verdict. Appellant’s attorney: Lisa Johnson. Appellee’s attorneys: Office of the Indiana Attorney General.

In re Te.W. (Minor Child), Child in Need of Services; C.K. (Mother) v. Indiana Department of Child Services

No. 25A-JC-2257

Juvenile. Appeal from the Hendricks Superior Court, Judge Travis Bauman-Crane. Dismisses the appeal as moot. Holds the CHINS court had concurrent jurisdiction under Indiana Code § 31-30-1-13(b) to issue a temporary custody order while a paternity action was pending. Further holds the mother’s challenge to the CHINS court’s order awarding joint physical custody is moot because, after the CHINS case was closed, the paternity court assumed primary jurisdiction, held an evidentiary hearing, and entered a temporary order adopting the CHINS court’s custody arrangement. Concludes that because the paternity court’s order now governs custody and the mother does not challenge that order, the Court of Appeals can grant no effective relief. Appellant’s attorney: Audrey Kathleen Lunsford. Appellee’s attorneys: No appellee’s brief filed.

Scotty Lee Van Hawk v. State of Indiana

No. 24A-CR-3161

Criminal. Appeal from the Kosciusko Circuit Court, Judge Michael W. Reed. Affirms Van Hawk’s convictions for three counts of Level 5 felony stalking and the trial court’s rulings. Holds the trial court did not violate Van Hawk’s speedy trial rights under Indiana Criminal Rule 4 or the United States and Indiana Constitutions. Concludes Van Hawk was not entitled to discharge under Criminal Rule 4(B) because he was on home detention rather than in jail and because he acquiesced in delays through counsel. Further holds he was not entitled to discharge under Criminal Rule 4(C) because the delays were largely attributable to his own actions, including continuances, conflicts with counsel, motions, and other procedural conduct. Applies the Barker v. Wingo factors and determines that although the delay was presumptively prejudicial in length, the reasons for delay and lack of prejudice weighed against Van Hawk. Rejects Van Hawk’s claim that the trial court erred by denying severance of the three stalking charges, concluding the offenses were connected by a pattern of conduct and motive rather than merely similar in character and that he failed to show prejudice. Also finds the issue waived because he did not renew his severance motion at trial. Holds the trial court provided reasonable accommodations for Van Hawk’s hearing impairment, including amplification devices and real-time captioning, and did not violate due process or the ADA. Concludes Van Hawk failed to cooperate in arranging alternative transcription services and that any imperfections in the accommodations did not impair his ability to participate in trial. Affirms the trial court’s determination that Van Hawk knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel after extensive advisements and colloquy. Further holds that he had no right to standby counsel and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint one. Rejects Van Hawk’s claim that he received inadequate notice of the rescheduled trial date, emphasizing that he received notice by email and service, did not object, and chose to proceed to trial rather than request a continuance. Rejects claims that the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination, testimony, and closing argument, concluding he waived several issues and that the court acted within its authority to control proceedings and prevent harassment or waste of time. Appellant’s attorneys: Donald R. Shuler. Appellee’s attorneys: Office of the Indiana Attorney General.•

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