State appeals court affirms ruling that Posey County jail matron should be paid same as jail commander

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The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court’s ruling that Posey County’s jail matron should be paid the same as the county’s jail commander since the county sheriff ranks the two as equals.

The ruling comes after the Posey County Council reasoned that the two positions aren’t ranked the same partly because the matron _ paid $10,000 less annually _ “performs duties centered on female inmates and jail support functions,” according to court documents. The council also noted that the matron holds a high school diploma and has no law enforcement certification while the commander was a law enforcement academy graduate.

The appellate court confirmed a trial court finding that Indiana state law gives the county sheriff authority to determine rank, not the county council. The opinion, written by Judge Leanna Weissmann, was handed down Tuesday.

When Posey County Sheriff Tom Latham took office in 2019, he expressed confusion over the rankings and responsibilities of various positions within the sheriff’s department. The county council, in response, asked him to create an organizational chart depicting the department’s structure.

In the chart, Sheriff Latham did not specify rankings, but he listed the jail matron and jail commander side-by-side, albeit in different sections within the department.

In Posey County, the jail matron is responsible for receiving, searching and caring for both female prisoners and juvenile detainees under the age of 14. The matron also supervises the front office, jail kitchen and jail laundry, handles bonds after business hours, maintaining financial records for inmate trust and commissary accounts, and keeps the sex offender registry.

Sheriff Latham appointed current matron and appellee Kim Cross to the position in August 2020, and she assumed the list of duties.

Between August 2020 and July 2023, the county council set Cross’s salary using a matrix system that did not reflect her as being of equal rank to the jail commander. In December 2022, Cross attended “sheriff’s school” and learned from other jail matrons that the matron position is statutorily entitled to the same pay as employees of the same rank within the sheriff’s department.

Cross informed the sheriff, who began reaching out to the council about it. Despite his efforts, the county council continued to pay Cross less than the jail commander into July 2023.

On July 11, 2023, the council passed an ordinance setting the jail commander’s salary at $60,743 plus longevity pay and the matron’s salary at $50,235 without longevity pay, according to court documents.

Cross filed a complaint against the council in January 2024, and both sides moved for summary judgment.

A judge in Posey Superior Court granted Cross’s motion for summary judgment and denied the council’s. The court determined that, according to state law, Cross is entitled to the same pay as the jail commander and ordered the council to pay her $36,115.96 plus prejudgment interest.

At issue in front of the appellate court was the meaning of “complete hiring authority” in Indiana Code § 36-8-10-5, otherwise known as the Matron Statute. The statute states in part that sheriffs appoint a prison matron for the county, set qualifications for the position and, with a limited exception, have complete hiring authority over the position.

Both sides interpreted “complete hiring authority” differently: The county council argued that “complete hiring authority” meant the sheriff could appoint a matron but not rank her. Cross argued that the phrase includes the ability to rank the position.

Ultimately, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding that Matron Statute gives the county sheriff the authority to determine where the matron ranks in the department. Acknowledging that the language of the statute is ambiguous, the court relied on statutory interpretation to reach their conclusion.

The council does not have the authority to override the sheriff’s authority, either by invoking its general compensation authority over county employees or by substituting a duty comparison that the state legislature got rid of in 1972 in favor of the sheriff’s rank determination, according to the appellate court.

Judge Peter Foley concurred alongside Chief Judge Elizabeth Tavitas, who concurred with a separate opinion stating that the Matron Statute is unambiguous when read with Indiana Code Section 36-8-10-10(a), known as the Approval Statute. and Indiana Code Section 36-2-5-3(a), known as the Compensation Statute.

The case is Posey County Council v. Kim Cross, 25A-MI-2804.