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As a subscriber you can listen to articles at work, in the car, or while you work out. Subscribe NowA convicted drug offender has lost an appeal of his enhanced sentence after failing to convince the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals that the enhancement was improper because his former cocaine dealing conviction was not a predicate “serious drug offense” under the Armed Career Criminal Act.
Joseph Williams was being arrested for selling cocaine when police discovered a gun in his pocket. When Williams pleaded guilty to federal firearm and cocaine charges, a sentencing enhancement was sought based on his three prior convictions for burglary, robbery and a lesser included offense Class B felony dealing cocaine.
The Indiana Northern District Court then found Williams to be an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The ACCA enhancement depended on the dealing cocaine conviction, and the district court concluded the conviction qualified as a predicate “serious drug offense” under the ACCA based on the presentence report.
Williams’ status as an armed career criminal subjected him to a statutory minimum of 15 years behind bars, and the court calculated a sentencing guideline range of 210 to 262 months in prison. Williams was ultimately sentenced to 188 months, which he appealed in United States of America v. Joseph A. Williams, 18-2662.
Williams argued his enhanced guideline range was improper because his prior dealing cocaine offense was not a predicate “serious drug offense” under the ACCA. Under the act, “serious drug offense” is defined to include crimes “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.”
He specifically argued his conviction was not a predicate offense because the district court did not know which statute the state court used to convict him. Pointedly, he argued the state court judgment referred only to the “lesser included offense of Dealing Cocaine,” rather than a more specific statutory provision.
But the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed for two reasons in its affirmation of the district court, first finding that any ambiguity would not establish plain error.
“The court was entitled to accept the undisputed assertion in the presentence investigation report as a finding of fact. … Even if the documents may not resolve the issue beyond all reasonable doubt, this is plain-error review,” Circuit Judge David F. Hamilton wrote for the panel. “It is the appellant’s burden to show that an error actually occurred, not merely that an error might have occurred. … On appeal, Williams points to no evidence suggesting that he was convicted of a crime other than § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C).”
“Second, as a matter of fact, the context here actually removes uncertainty about the nature of the Indiana conviction. The information charged Williams with delivering cocaine, and it cited Indiana Code § 35-48-4-1,” Hamilton continued. “Under Indiana’s criminal code in effect in 2007, this statute had two subsections, both of which were also cited in the information. Subsection (a)(1)(C) defined the base crime — delivery of cocaine — as a class B felony. Subsection (b)(3) elevated that crime to a Class A felony if more facts were present, such as proximity to a school, which the information also alleged.
“Williams’ plea of guilty to a ‘lesser included … Class B Felony’ means that this additional fact of school proximity was not applied; the crime of conviction thus was § 35-48-4-1(a)(1)(C).”
The 7th Circuit further rejected Williams’ argument that a conviction under § 35-48-4-1 could not be an ACCA predicate, finding the Indiana statute is divisible pursuant to United States v. Smith, 921 F.3d 708, 715 (7th Cir. 2019). The 7th Circuit noted that even if it were not divisible, the entire statute does not encompass more conduct than the ACCA definition of ‘serious drug offense.’
“Williams argues that by including financing the manufacturing or delivery of cocaine, the Indiana statute reaches more broadly than the ACCA definition of a serious drug crime. We disagree,” Hamilton wrote.
The panel relied on Hyche v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1176, 1179 (Ind. App. 2010), to reach its decision.
“Hyche provides the most authoritative guidance on the scope of the Indiana crimes of ‘financing’ the manufacture and delivery of cocaine,” the panel concluded. “That scope falls within the federal definition of a serious drug offense under the ACCA.”
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