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In the Matter of D.S.
No. 25A-JC-1881
Juvenile. Appeal from the Hendricks Superior Court, Judge Travis L. Bauman-Crane. Reverses the juvenile court’s modification of the CHINS dispositional decree authorizing placement of D.S. in a state psychiatric institution and remands with instructions. Holds the juvenile court lacked authority to authorize DCS to place D.S. in inpatient psychiatric treatment as “voluntary” under Indiana Code § 12-26-3-2 because DCS, as wardship holder, is not a legal guardian and therefore could not consent to voluntary admission; the court further concludes the placement constituted an involuntary civil commitment requiring compliance with statutory commitment procedures and due process protections, which were not provided. Judge Vaidik authored the opinion. Judge Pyle concurs. Judge Mathias dissents with separate opinion, concluding the juvenile court had authority to authorize DCS to place D.S. in inpatient psychiatric treatment based on its wardship, which includes decision-making over the child’s medical care. He reasons the placement was voluntary because DCS and D.S.’s parents agreed to the treatment, and the distinction between wardship and legal guardianship is not meaningful under these circumstances. Mathias further concludes the CHINS framework provided sufficient procedural safeguards and that requiring a formal civil-commitment proceeding was unnecessary given the facts. Appellant’s attorney: Joel C. Wieneke, Wieneke Law Office, LLC, Brooklyn, Indiana. Appellee’s attorneys: Office of the Indiana Attorney General.
Indiana Court of Appeals
Angela Holtswarth v. Eric M. Oliver, Personal Representative for the Estate of Darryl Lee Cook
No. 25A-EU-1580
Civil. Appeal from the Hendricks Superior Court, Judge Rhett M. Stuard. Affirms the denial of Holtswarth’s petition to determine heirship and her motion to reconsider. Holds the trial court did not err in declining to set a hearing under Indiana Code § 29-1-17-15.1 because the statute applies only when no will has been offered for probate and Cook’s will had already been admitted; also concludes the trial court correctly interpreted Indiana Code § 29-1-2-7 in determining Holtswarth was ineligible to inherit because she was over age 20 when Cook died and paternity had not been established during his lifetime, and her constitutional arguments were waived for failure to raise them before. Judge Foley authored the opinion. Judges May and Altice concur. Appellant’s attorney: Cassandra A. Kruse, Emswiller, Williams, Noland & Clarke, LLC, Indianapolis, Indiana. Appellee’s attorney: Denise F. Hayden, Lacy Law Office, LLC, Indianapolis, Indiana.
Indiana Court of Appeals
Michael C. Davis v. State of Indiana
No. 25A-CR-1132
Criminal. Appeal from the Floyd Superior Court, Judge Jason M. Mount. Affirms the trial court’s revocation of Davis’s probation and order that he serve 2,502 days of his previously suspended sentence. Holds the trial court did not err in concluding Davis waived his right to counsel by his conduct, where he repeatedly engaged in dilatory, obstructive behavior, caused multiple attorneys to withdraw, refused to cooperate with evaluations and was repeatedly warned of the consequences of his actions; also concludes the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking probation, as the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Davis violated conditions prohibiting contact with minors and presence at a park, and the sanction was supported by the nature of his underlying offenses. Judge Mathias authored the opinion. Judges May and Felix concur. Appellant’s attorney: R. Patrick Magrath, West Sixth Law, Madison, Indiana. Appellee’s attorneys: Office of the Indiana Attorney General.
The following opinion was issued March 20 after The Indiana Lawyer’s deadline.
Indiana Supreme Court
Marvin Moyers v. State of Indiana
No. 26S-CR-86
Criminal. Appeal from the Ohio Circuit Court, Judge F. Aaron Negangard. Reverses in part and remands with instructions to vacate Moyers’ Level 4 felony criminal confinement conviction and amend the sentencing order. Holds that convictions for Level 3 and Level 4 felony criminal confinement are elevated forms of a single statutory offense, requiring application of the Powell test, and concludes the evidence established only one continuous confinement, so multiple convictions violate substantive double jeopardy; the court further clarifies that when multiple convictions arise from a single statute with a shared base offense, Powell — not Wadle — governs the analysis. Chief Justice Loretta H. Rush authored the opinion. Justice Christopher M. Goff concurs. Justice Derek R. Molter concurs with separate opinion. Justice Geoffrey G. Slaughter dissents with separate opinion in which Justice Mark S. Massa joins. Molter emphasizes that despite acknowledged difficulties with the Wadle and Powell frameworks, the court should not reconsider or replace those precedents sua sponte without adversarial briefing. He cautions that substantive double jeopardy has long been a complex area of law and that repeated judicial overhauls risk compounding confusion rather than resolving it. Molter concludes that any reconsideration of the framework should await proper presentation by the parties, and therefore joins the majority’s application of existing precedent. Slaughter argues the court’s Wadle and Powell frameworks are unworkable and improperly prioritize judicially created tests over statutory text. He contends the case should be resolved under Indiana’s included-offense statute, which governs when multiple convictions arise from a single act, and criticizes the majority for bypassing that statute in favor of Powell. Slaughter concludes that substantive double jeopardy analysis should focus solely on legislative enactments rather than court-developed doctrines and would not vacate the conviction on the majority’s reasoning. Appellant’s attorney: Victoria Bailey Casanova, Casanova Legal Services, LLC, Indianapolis, Indiana. Appellee’s attorneys: Office of the Indiana Attorney General.
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