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As a subscriber you can listen to articles at work, in the car, or while you work out. Subscribe NowNegligence claims brought against Indianapolis Power & Light after an auto accident caused by inoperable traffic lights will continue after the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed a ruling granting the power company judgment on the pleadings.
A unanimous panel of the Indiana Court of Appeals on Monday reversed judgment entered for IPL on a claim of negligence in the case of Kenyon Tyus, Jr., Kyrie Tyus, Keyon Tyus, Amber Tyus, and Kenyon Tyus v. Indianapolis Power & Light Company, The City of Indianapolis, Indianapolis Department of Public Works, and Wright Tree Service Inc. d/b/a Wright Tree Service, 18A-CT-828. The appellate court also upheld a Marion Superior Court ruling allowing a gross negligence claim against IPL to proceed to trial.
Kenyon and Amber Tyus, along with their children Kenyon Jr., Kyrie and Keyon, sued IPL after Amber and the kids were involved in an accident at the intersection of Binford Boulevard and Kessler Boulevard. Traffic signals at the intersection had been inoperable for about eight hours after a storm in April 2016.
Amber and the kids sustained “catastrophic injuries” in the accident. Specifically, Amber suffered “severe fractures and other orthopedic injuries,” while 10-year Kenyon Jr. lost the ability to walk, talk or feed himself after a severe traumatic brain injury. Similarly, 2-year-old Kyrie also suffered a severe traumatic brain injury that’s left him unbale to form sentences or have normal control over the left side of his body. Keyon, who was 7 years old, suffered bodily injuries and “severe emotional damage.”
In their complaint, the Tyuses, who were not IPL customers, said the utility “was negligent or careless” and did not restore power to the intersection for more than 13 hours. IPL responded with a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that a schedule of rates, rules and regulations for supplying electricity, as laid out in a tariff release clause approved by the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission, “preclude[d] IPL’s liability for damages resulting from interruptions in the supply of electricity.”
The utility said the matter should be referred to the IURC, and argued separately that it did not owe a duty of care to the Tyuses.
The Marion Superior Court granted judgment on the pleadings to IPL on the negligence claim, finding that the Legislature, “through the IURC, had the power to restrict the Tyuses’ common law right to bring an ordinary negligence action against IPL … .” In challenging that ruling on appeal, the Tyuses raised Indiana constitutional claims and argued that “any approval of the IURC of language purporting to relieve IPL of liability for common law tort injuries to a noncustomer, when that injury occurs during IPL’s interruption in the supply of electricity, would exceed the power granted to the IURC by the Indiana General Assembly.”
Finding those constitutional arguments preserved for appeal, the COA rejected IPL’s argument that both it and the trial court lacked jurisdiction under Indiana Code section 8-1-3-1.
“Contrary to IPL’s assertions, our court’s jurisdiction in this matter does not rest on the Tyuses’ compliance with Indiana Code section 8-1-3-1,” Judge James Kirsch wrote. “… Because this appeal challenges whether the IURC stayed within statutory standards and legal principles in approving the Release Clause, our court has jurisdiction.”
Further, Kirsch said, “the Tyuses are not challenging the rates or charges set by the IURC. Instead, they are challenging the legality and constitutionality of the IURC’s approval of the Release Clause; a provision that bars noncustomers from recovering damages from IPL for personal injuries arising for IPL’s negligence.”
The appellate court then found a duty owed to the Tyuses, finding that “by allowing the gross negligence action to proceed, the trial court recognized that a duty existed.” The existence of a duty is also bolstered by I.C. 8-1-2-4, 170 Indiana Administrative Code 4-1-23 and Section 43 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, the court said.
Further, there was “no evidence that the legislature gave, or intended to give, the IURC power to shield IPL from liability for injuries caused by IPL’s negligence to noncustomers.” Thus, the grant of immunity to IPL “was beyond the IURC’s delegated authority and, therefore, that part of the Release Clause is ultra vires and void,” Kirsch wrote.
In dismissing the negligence claim, the Marion Superior Court relied on Prior v. GTE North, 681 N.E.2d 768 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). However, the COA said Monday that Prior is distinguishable and, thus, not controlling here.
In reversing the dismissal of the negligence claim, the Court of Appeals also remanded the case for further proceedings.
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