‘Trifecta of errors’ warrants transfer in case of waived appeal, Chief Justice Rush writes in dissent

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The Indiana Supreme Court bench in the Indiana Statehouse (IL file photo)

A woman who pleaded guilty to felony dealing in methamphetamine did not knowingly or voluntarily waive her constitutional right to appeal her 48-year sentence, Indiana Chief Justice Loretta Rush wrote in a dissenting opinion to the high court’s decision to deny transfer to the case.

Lindsay Grate was sentenced in 2022 after pleading guilty to Level 2 dealing in meth and being a habitual offender.

Grate appealed, but the Court of Appeals of Indiana dismissed the case in a memorandum decision in Lindsay E. Grate v. State of Indiana, 22A-CR-2224, finding she waived her right to appeal her sentence as part of her written plea agreement.

The Indiana Supreme Court voted 3-2 to deny transfer, with Rush penning a dissent in which Justice Christopher Goff joined.

The record in Grate’s case reveals a “trifecta of errors,” Rush wrote.

First, Rush said, the plea agreement’s wording was ambiguous: “Also, the right to appeal, so long as the Judge sentences the Defendant within the terms of this plea agreement[.]”

Rush also cited the LaGrange Superior Court not mentioning at a subsequent guilty plea hearing Grate’s right to appeal her sentence, or that she was waiving the right by pleading guilty.

Finally, after imposing the sentence, Rush said confusion was compounded when the trial court advised Grate she had “the right to appeal this sentence” and later appointed counsel for that purpose.

“Grate’s plea agreement waiver is virtually indistinguishable from the generic, ambiguous waivers we have previously found insufficiently explicit to establish a knowing and voluntary waiver — transfer is warranted on that basis alone,” Rush wrote, adding that transfer is also warranted because the trial court made statements that contradicted the waiver provision.

Rush continued: “Thus, the trial court here fell short of safeguarding the validity of Grate’s appeal waiver. And, in dismissing her appeal, the Court of Appeals erred in focusing only on what happened during sentencing.”

By not granting transfer, Rush wrote the Supreme Court is passing up an opportunity to “cure a significant departure from law and to provide additional instruction on a recurring legal issue that will continue to impact defendants across our state.”

“Considering over 95% of criminal convictions in Indiana are resolved through guilty pleas, these recurring errors are alarming and, increasingly, deprive Hoosiers of their constitutional right to appeal their sentences,” Rush wrote. “… Because Lindsay Grate’s case exemplifies these concerns, we must intervene.”

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