Ambiguous weight limit statute leads to infraction reversal

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The ambiguity of a state statute means a man performing farm drainage work in Henry County did not commit an infraction by driving his heavy equipment on a state highway, the Indiana Court of Appeals has ruled. However, the court noted its ruling was limited specifically to the facts of the instant case and was not an opinion on how the ambiguity might affect other circumstances. 

In Robert E. Dunham v. State of Indiana, 18A-IF-1442, Robert Dunham, an employee of Drainage Construction Unlimited, Inc., was hired to install drain tiles on a Henry County Farm using an excavator. When the work was complete, Dunham put the excavator on a trailer and towed it away by truck.

On his way back to the office, Dunham was stopped by Indiana State Police troopers, who weighed the truck, trailer and excavator and determined the load weighed 85,300 pounds, exceeding the 80,000-pound limit. Dunham was issued a citation, which he challenged in Henry Circuit Court.

The trial court determined Dunham was guilty of a Class C infraction and ordered him to pay a $35.50 fine, plus $135.50 in court costs. But on appeal, Dunham argued the equipment was subject to a weight limit exception found in Indiana Code section 9-20-2-2(b)(3), which exempts farm drainage machinery.

In reversing Dunham’s infraction, the Indiana Court of Appeals agreed with the driver that the statute is ambiguous. Senior Judge Randall Shepard, writing for the unanimous court, noted the “farm drainage machinery” exception is not limited to machinery that is being actively used.

“By contrast, the General Assembly set forth specific limitations on the other two exceptions listed in section 9-20-2-2(b),” Shepard wrote. “… Generally, when the legislature uses particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section, we presume that is intentional.”

Shepard then said the farm drainage machinery exception “may be reasonably read to apply to Dunham’s equipment.” Further, because the statute is ambiguous, the rule of lenity required the ambiguity to be construed against the state, allowing Dunham to prevail, he said.

“The State claims that under Dunham’s interpretation, the farm drainage equipment exception could apply to any equipment being hauled on state highways that could conceivably be used in farm drainage work, thereby frustrating Indiana Code section 9-20-4-1’s purpose of preventing wear and tear to roads,” Shepard continued. “We share the State’s concern, and our holding is limited to the facts before us: the equipment in question had just been used to perform farm drainage work, and Dunham was transporting it directly to the office after finishing the work.

“We express no opinion as to how the ambiguity in the statutory exception would apply to different facts, except to note that the burden of proof and persuasion generally falls on the litigant claiming the benefit of an exemption,” he concluded.

The infraction judgment was, thus, reversed.

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